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Abstract 
This thesis examines the everyday practices of housing officers working in the 
Victorian Office of Housing, a large public sector statutory authority providing 
rental housing to low–income households.  Housing officer work has changed 
substantially associated with the shift from the provision of ‘public housing’ in 
the post–WWII period to the provision of ‘welfare housing’ from the early 
1980s.  These changes are evident in both the formal organisation of work and 
day–to–day practices. The principal research question addressed is ‘How has 
the work of staff in the Victorian Office of Housing changed as a consequence 
of the shift from the provision of ‘public housing’ in the post–WWII period to the 
provision of ‘welfare housing’ from the early 1980s?’  
This question is addressed by presenting an historically informed ethnography 
of the Office of Housing.  Research was undertaken over a twelve–month 
period through interviews, participant observation and the collection of 
documents.  The data collected through the use of these methods provided the 
basis for the presentation of ‘thick descriptions’ of the work of staff employed to 
provide rental housing to low–income households.   
The research into this large hierarchical formal organisation was undertaken in 
three offices: a local suburban office, a regional office and head office.  This 
enabled connections and tensions in direct service delivery work and policy 
work to be identified and analysed.  It revealed that the experience of the shift 
from the provision of public housing to the provision of welfare housing has not 
been uniform and underscores the importance of understanding organisations 
as socially constructed.     
Staff work was analysed by distinguishing four overarching problems 
consistently referred to by staff and highlighted in formal reviews.  First, 
‘problems with tenants’ refers to the changing profile of tenants and staff 
responses and interactions.  Second, the ‘problem with rent’ centres on setting 
and collecting rents from very low–income tenants.  Third, the ‘problem with 
housing standards and assets’ focuses on housing quality, maintaining 
properties and the tenant use of properties. Fourth, the ‘problems with the 
organisation’ are found in the constant searching for the best ways of defining 
roles, leading and communicating within a large and geographically distributed 
organisation. These are the features of work which present dilemmas for those 
who seek to produce better services for households who live in public housing.   
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Glossary 
 
Central: a term used to represent head office (pre–1990) 
Bogan: a person with particular behaviours, beliefs and appearance (in the USA 
“redneck”) 
Patch: a designated geographic area of public housing 
HSO: Housing Services Officer 
FSO: Facilities Services Officer 
TL: Team Leader 
HM: the housing manager at the local office 
Head Office: the central management office, located in the Central Business District 
Ministerial: an order from the office of the Minister responsible for public housing. 
Often, calling for a response to a publicised problem 
VCAT: Victoria Civil and Administrative Tribunal  
Regional Office: the ‘non–operational’ office located in each housing region 
KPI: Key Performance Indicators 
PD: Professional Development 
ISIP: Integrated System for Information on Property 
HIIP: Housing Integration and Information Program 
HAAT:  Housing Advisory and Assessment Team 
TPT: Tenancy and Property Team 
SLT: Support Links Team 
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Introduction 
 
We are really under the pump here; the phone rings and it could be 
the ministers office, it could be stuff coming down from central, it 
could be a newspaper reporter, it could be an unhappy tenant. 
When you put quality improvement stuff and redevelopment of the 
front end on top of a huge workload you risk swamping HSO’s. 
(Retired housing worker) 
 
Once upon a time, I was a university housing worker.  In late 2004, I found 
myself in a management meeting, reviewing quarterly performance against 
targets, a very common occurrence in the housing service delivery world. My 
manager was agitated because his manager had ‘put a rocket up him’. In 
response, he had ordered all managers to ‘immediately action rental arrears’, 
adding that ‘the level of outstanding rent is critically high and we need to 
proceed with eviction for those accounts over sixty days’.  After a brief 
discussion, he moved to the next item on the agenda, namely occupancy rates. 
Without seeming to be fazed by what he was saying, he observed, ‘We have 
failed to meet our retention targets, we need to work harder at keeping the 
buildings occupied’. I was amazed: how could I take any action around these 
two apparently contradictory directives? Start threatening to evict people, but 
make sure the place is full? How could I possibly control people’s income, 
direct their spending priorities, make the housing so attractive and their lives so 
blissful they wouldn’t want to leave? Leaving the meeting and muttering 
‘bullshit’ under my breath, I returned to my office to reflect on the stupidity of an 
organisation that had such incongruous albeit transient organisational 
objectives.  
 
I complained to a colleague about how irritating it was having to work to key 
performance indictors that were so closely focused on ‘big picture’ 
organisational priorities they became unworkable by the time they reached the 
‘front–line’. She laughed and told me to ‘pull my head in’. She implied that my 
experience was neither special nor unique.  She added that as a former 
housing officer with the Office of Housing she felt that things were much worse 
there: ‘At least if your tenants trash the place it’s an outrage. For most public 
housing staff, it’s part of daily life’, ‘At least you have enough stock to meet 
 11 
demand: imagine an ever expanding, desperate waiting list’ and ‘You are lucky, 
pretend that you have ten times the policies you have now and most are 
contradictory, out of date and convoluted’. Then she delivered her knock–out 
punch. ‘Yes, this place is annoying and stupid, but it’s stable. At the Office of 
Housing the government changes, managers change, policies change, tenants 
change, rules change and all through this never ending change you have to 
keep on plugging away at your job’.  
 
Some twelve months later, I found myself with the opportunity to carry out a 
major research project that would focus on the experience of people who work 
in the delivery of housing services. Quite fortuitously, RMIT University, the 
Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI) and the Office of 
Housing (Victoria) had entered into a partnership to use an Australian 
Research Council industry linkage grant to fund a PhD scholarship. The 
research question which evolved in the first months of the project was 
apparently a quite simple one: how has the work of staff in the Victorian Office 
of Housing changed as a consequence of the shift from the provision of ‘public 
housing’ in the post–WWII period to the provision of ‘welfare housing’ from the 
early 1980s? 
‘Public’ housing to ‘welfare’ housing 
The shift from ‘public’ housing to ‘welfare’ housing had begun in the mid to late 
1980s.  The shift involved, in somewhat simple terms, two kinds of changes in 
the provision of public housing in Victoria: 
 
Firstly, public housing has in the last decade and a half been increasingly 
preoccupied with providing housing to very low income households with what 
are referred to as ‘multiple and complex needs’ associated with conditions and 
factors like ill–health, mental illness, domestic violence, long–term 
unemployment and disability. Certainly the profile of ‘typical’ public housing 
tenants has changed over the past decades. Firstly, there has been a 
noticeable increase in the number of tenants with ‘multiple and complex’ needs 
(Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001). Additionally, a large proportion of 
the public housing community is ageing, resulting in communities that have 
become increasingly frail and elderly. 
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Secondly, as these changes were taking place, reduced government budgets 
and the deterioration of existing public housing stock has affected the ability of 
governments to address the needs of those relying on public housing (Berry, 
1999, Hayward, 1996). Compounding this, there has been a shift in public 
sector thinking often referred to as ‘new public management’ (Yeatman, 2008). 
‘New Public Management’ is perhaps best understood as a new kind of 
management practice associated with managers who promote customer 
service, support ‘best practice’, encourage ‘tenant feedback’ and expect 
appropriate action and meaningful interaction with tenants.  
 
In this thesis I want to understand how people employed in Victoria’s Office of 
Housing experience ‘work’ in a housing service under increasing pressure to 
remedy long–term and persistent problems with tenants and ageing housing 
assets while also trying to deal with major policy and organisational change.   
 
With a few exceptions (Saugeres, 1999, Howe, 1988b, Clapham et al., 2000, 
Darcy, 1999), the voices of housing workers and managers are largely absent 
from contemporary housing literature.  This is due in part to a preoccupation 
with research that has concentrated more on issues like cost effective design, 
innovative engineering for mass construction, urban planning, dwelling design, 
public policy and, more recently, welfare reform. The literature review I carried 
out uncovered a number of useful and informative housing texts, but provided 
no simple, single answer to my research question about how the work of staff 
in the Victorian Office of Housing changed as a consequence of the shift from 
the provision of ‘public housing’ in the post–WWII period to the provision 
of ‘welfare housing’ from the early 1980s. 
 
This simple and straightforward research question provided me with a clear 
research objective and it also suggested (after some reflection) how I would 
undertake the research. Given that my goal was to understand and document 
the workers’ experience, any research that I did needed to illuminate that 
experience. There is a rich body of what can be called ‘phenomenological’ 
research (Denzin, 1997, Lipsky, 1980, Bryman, 2001) grounded in a broadly 
defined ‘ethnographic tradition’ and this work seemed to offer the framework 
most likely to shed light on the experience and, in effect, give voice to the 
experience of workers and managers in the Victorian Office of Housing. Given 
my own experience of housing work, and the partnership framework 
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established between RMIT University, AHURI and the Office of Housing, it was 
agreed that I would need to be able to work in a number of housing offices, 
including head office and a number of regional offices, enabling me to engage 
in extended periods of participant observation. This would be supplemented by 
interviews and a substantial engagement with ‘in–house’ documentary material. 
Fortunately, my early exposure to some of the housing literature provided an 
important conceptual framework. 
 
Given my interest in how people working in the Office of Housing experienced 
a process of change, I soon discovered that dealing with change was in a 
sense only half of the story. As I began my ethnographic work, it quickly 
became apparent that people working in the Office of Housing were also 
dealing with quite persistent ‘old’ problems. The literature provided a valuable 
insight into the history of public to welfare housing in Australia and it was here 
that I encountered the concept of ‘enduring’ and ‘wicked’ problems. The 
Australian Public Service Commissioner, for example, has defined ‘wicked’ 
problems as ‘policy issues so complex they are highly resistant to resolution’ 
(Australian Public Service Commission, 2007. pg 3). The concept of wicked 
problems is useful because it is a way of referring to problems that are complex 
and intractable within the current housing system. As my research progressed, 
it became increasingly apparent that the simple concept of ‘wicked’ problems 
(that is, policy issues highly resistant to resolution) provided a useful and 
appropriate analytic and interpretive framework. As a result, I used ‘wicked’ 
housing problems to frame the data collected via participant observation, 
individual interviews and document analysis. In effect, these wicked problems 
provided a clarifying conceptual lens (a rubric) through which the data could be 
interpreted to begin to build up a ‘thick description’ (Van Maanen, 1988) of how 
housing workers experienced and understood this shift from ‘public’ housing to 
‘welfare’ housing.  
New knowledge 
This research is important for two reasons. It is the first systematic account of 
the day–to–day experience of staff working in the Victorian Office of Housing. 
Secondly, it is the first Australian study to critically examine the connections 
between the operational component of the organisation which can 
metaphorically be referred to as the ‘the front–line’ and the central 
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management component, no less metaphorically understood as the ‘head 
office’. 
 
From a practical point of view, my research is a response to three important 
challenges faced by the Victorian Office of Housing: 
 
This thesis will describe how and why  ‘public’ has become ‘welfare’ housing, 
explaining how public housing workers now service people whose social and 
personal circumstances are described in the literature as ‘complex and 
challenging’ (Victorian Auditor General, 1996, Thomson Goodall Associates Pty 
Ltd, 2001, Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service 
Provision, 1999, Peel, 2003). This thesis illustrates the difficulty of meeting rent 
recovery performance indicators when the people who are paying those rents 
have very low incomes and are often highly dependent on income support 
payments. I will describe how housing services officers and senior managers 
both understand and experience working in an organisation that provides 
‘housing of last resort’ (Chalkley, 2005c).  Housing staff will tell stories about 
how they feel increasingly pressured to respond to issues of social isolation, 
poverty, mental illness, ‘anti–social’ behaviour, drug/alcohol abuse and family 
violence. These are the ‘wicked’ problems of public housing work.  
 
Secondly, this research will also address the way people work in the Office of 
Housing, how staff apply discretion to implementing formal policy and 
procedures, how managers ensure compliance and performance and, 
generally, how housing staff go about their daily work. I will describe how 
workers manage conflicting objectives, work productively with fluctuating 
staffing levels and navigate complex workplace relationships. I will describe 
how individual staff experience and understand organisational change, frequent 
restructures, key performance reviews, tenant complaints, goal setting, the 
reorganisation of teams and leadership, delegation and workplace conflict.  
 
Finally, in this thesis I consider the impact of ‘new public management’ (NPM) 
on the work of housing staff. Dunleavy describes “new public management” as 
a ‘wave in public sector organizational change that was founded on themes of 
disaggregation, competition, and incentivization’.  He argues that:  
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Although its effects are still working through in countries new to 
NPM, this wave has now largely stalled or been reversed in some 
key ‘’leading–edge’ countries. This ebbing chiefly reflects the 
cumulation of adverse indirect effects on citizens’ capacities for 
solving social problems because NPM has radically increased 
institutional and policy complexity. (Dunleavy, 2006. pg 467) 
 
My research explores the consequences of an approach to management that 
continues to espouse reform of the public service by introducing management 
and business practices usually associated with private sector operations 
(Yeatman, 2008). New public management works on the premise that adopting 
what is called a ‘market orientation’ in the public sector will lead to ‘improved 
service quality’ and ‘greater cost–efficiency’ for government (Dunleavy, 2006).  
This research pays particular attention to how staff experience and understand 
the continued use of the tools of new public management. 
The research approach 
My research used a number of well–recognised and tested ethnographic 
practices involving semi–structured interviews, participant observation and 
document analysis.  One of the strengths of an ethnographic approach is that 
the depth of enquiry and richness of data enables ‘thick descriptions’ of sites of 
social practice and interaction (Geertz, 1973). In this sense, my research offers 
‘an ethnography of housing’, capturing the service work carried out in three 
dimensions: longitudinally (over time), geographically (at different locations) 
and operationally (examining different roles, positions and functions). By 
spending twelve months observing people with different roles and statuses, in a 
range of social groups and at various office locations, I can provide the reader 
with a rich portrayal of how individual housing workers experience 
organisational and cultural change.  
 
All ethnographic research is challenging. It calls for a great deal of trust on the 
part of the participants, allowing the researcher access to people’s private 
spheres.  As a result, successful fieldwork requires some subtle and skilled 
negotiation. The process of ethnographic enquiry is time–consuming, labour 
intensive and can produce enormous quantities of data.  My research has 
proved to be no exception. Negotiating field locations was delicate because no 
single housing office is ‘typical’, no particular office can be generalised to 
‘represent the organisation’ and, as a result, identifying the ‘ideal’ office to 
observe was always going to be problematic.   
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In order to secure access to the various sites, my negotiations with managers 
at the Office of Housing had to take into account my need to find a busy, 
interesting office and the intent of the Office of Housing to find a ‘stable and 
representative’ office.  I was aware of the pitfalls of observing a very secure 
and stable office, the housing managers were wary of sending an outsider to 
observe people who already had heavy workloads, or were in problematic 
teams and dealing with unresolved workplace conflicts. After some weeks of 
negotiation, we located the first of three field locations and the manager of a 
local office in the Western Suburbs of Melbourne agreed that their office was 
willing to participate.  
 
In this process I was helped by the fact that my project had a rudimentary 
framework of enquiry. Secondly, and more importantly, the Office of Housing 
senior management had already agreed to allow me to have access to field 
locations. So, in order to describe the complex sites of social practice found in 
the Office of Housing, I was ‘pre–approved’ to spend extended periods of time 
in three field offices, to develop an understanding of the every–day 
organisational work of housing staff and observe how they experienced and 
understood organisational change. In an effort to ‘blend’ into each location, I 
chose to become an active participant in the mundane work of each office, 
which included filing, photocopying, sorting files, envelope stuffing and, 
occasionally, cooking barbeques.  
 
The locations were all in Melbourne, Victoria as follows: 
 
Location one, the local office (Western Suburbs) 
The first location is a former industrial suburb in the western region of 
Melbourne. This area was once a thriving industrial hub, home to large 
factories, rail freight yards, market gardens and smaller manufacturing 
enterprises.   Because  ‘the west’ offered low cost housing, seemingly endless 
vacant land and a plentiful labour market for low and semi–skilled workers, the 
suburbs in this location were populated by generations of people employed in 
Location One: 
Local Office in 
Western Suburbs 
of Melbourne, 
Victoria 
Location Two: 
Regional Office 
in Western 
Suburbs of 
Melbourne 
Location Three: 
Head Office at 
555 Collins 
Street. 
Melbourne. 
Non–Location 
Specific: 
Housing Support 
Coordinators: 
State–wide. 
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manufacturing, the railways and other ‘factory work’ (Peel, 2003). Today the 
area is a mixture of big shopping centres, discount stores, numerous non–
government agencies, second–hand stores, small family businesses and a 
number of older, mostly empty shops. 
  
The Office of Housing has a long history in ‘the west’ and some of the local 
offices have a seventy–year (plus) association with the area. All the offices 
seemed to have many rows of voluminous and lengthy housing records, some 
dating back many years. Most of the staff in my ‘home’ office (the one in which 
I spent the longest time) drove to work from outside the area, but some staff 
grew up in ‘Housing Commission’ homes in local neighbourhoods and recall a 
time before ‘chronic unemployment, mental illness and single mothers’. My first 
impression was that the office was larger than necessary, a little too spacious, 
with numerous empty desks from ‘better times’ and laid out in a manner that 
definitively separates the 30 (or so) staff from the customers. 
 
Location two, the regional office (Western Suburbs) 
The second location accommodated housing workers with more specialised, 
‘non–operational’ responsibilities: staffing, training, performance management 
and special projects. The regional office is considered by most Housing 
services officers to be the ‘middleman’, a place where the dictums from head 
office are re–interpreted, filtered or enforced. It also presents as a security– 
conscious workplace.  Prior to arriving, the importance of locks, doors and 
codes was explained to me by a number of HSOs. For some staff, this security 
consciousness was tacit recognition of the difficult and risky work of the other 
service providers sharing the building. The regional office is home to public 
housing, school nurses, child protection and a number of other agencies with 
difficult and sometimes ‘risky’ customers. The design and security of this 
building definitively separated the staff from the customers and, more 
interestingly, had the (unintended?) effect of separating the regional office team 
from local office staff. 
 
Location three, head office (Central Business District)  
Head office was both imposing and invisible. It is one of many multistorey 
buildings in Melbourne’s central business district.  Entry and exit was monitored 
by a moderately high level of security. Head Office is home to the Office of 
Housing policy makers, planning people and senior management. The main 
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focus for this placement was to investigate the connections between head 
office and local office, exploring how workers from various levels of the 
organisation understood the ‘wicked’ problems they face.  I was particularly 
interested in how workers at ‘head office’ and the ‘local office’ might have 
different perceptions of the problems with tenants, assets, funding and 
organisation. 
  
This field location was the most challenging. Head office staff were significantly 
more mindful of the politically sensitive nature of their work and they often 
spoke about their concern for any consequences if they were identified in my 
research.  As a result, some staff were sometimes reluctant to talk directly and 
clearly about what they knew or to state their views. Their stories tended to be 
more ‘reflection’ than ‘disclosure’ and rarely did senior staff comment in a 
manner that was cynical, hyper–critical or blunt.  
 
In addition to local, regional and head office workers, in the local offices I 
discovered another small, discrete group of workers, the housing support 
coordinators. 
 
Non–Location Specific, the ‘Housing Support Coordinators’ (HSCs) 
The Housing Support Coordinator (HSC) is a specialised staff member and in 
most local offices there was only one HSC. Early in my fieldwork, two things 
happened. First, I was approached by a number of these workers, keen to have 
their stories ‘on the record’ and, second, it became apparent that incorporating 
the stories of individual HSCs into the data in an anonymous manner would be 
very difficult. Merging data from a single staff member with very specific 
responsibilities and specialised tasks into the generic stories of the HSOs and 
managers seemed impossible. The likelihood of maintaining anonymity was 
low and, because of this risk, a different approach was required for this cohort. 
As result, I interviewed as many HSCs as possible, attended their regional and 
state–wide meetings and have represented their contributions as a composite 
narrative.  
 
Doing the research is one thing, telling the reader what I have discovered is 
another. Here I briefly outline the structure of my thesis. 
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The thesis 
The first chapter provides a brief history of how housing work has been 
transformed by social change, shifting tenant expectations, new governments, 
diminishing tenant income and shifting welfare priorities. I use an historical 
narrative to explore how the enduring problems and the imperatives to change 
policy are understood by and faced by housing staff who seek to reform and 
reshape public housing. This first chapter concludes with a description of how 
current housing practice has been informed and shaped by the understandings 
embedded in the organisational sediment.   
 
Using this organisational history as a foundation, I then critically examine what 
might be learned from the research literature about organisational change in 
comparable state welfare agencies.  This literature could hardly be expected to 
answer the research question, but it was useful if only because it assisted me 
to better understand what others who have researched organisational change 
in similar welfare organisations have said. This literature provided me with an 
account of how researchers have employed similar qualitative methodologies 
to understand related forms of human service work. Kingfisher’s research 
investigates the relations between providers and recipients of welfare services 
in America (Kingfisher, 2002), while Considine and Sandfort describe the front–
line work of welfare decision–makers in the context of new contractual systems 
(Considine, 2001, Sandfort, 2000).  
 
In Australia, Hough employed an ethnographic method to investigate the 
challenges and problems experienced by front–line child protection workers. In 
her 2004 thesis, Fry found that an ethnographic approach allowed her to 
describe in great detail the day–to–day experience of triage nursing staff, 
especially how they experienced and understood their work and how they 
allocated limited resources to an increasingly complex cohort of patients (Fry, 
2004). One common feature of this literature was an argument about the value 
of developing ethnographic ‘thick descriptions’ as a way to better 
understanding the social relations present in welfare work, and to more 
accurately depict how welfare service providers make sense of the shifting 
context in which they work. 
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In Chapter Two I discuss the methods I drew on to answer the research 
question. I describe how ‘organisational ethnography’ will be employed to 
discover how housing service officers and senior managers both understood 
and experienced a major process of operational policy change associated with 
the shift from ‘public’ housing to ‘welfare’ housing. This chapter also introduces 
a concept called ‘sedimentation’, a geographic metaphor that I will use to help 
explain how workers, over time, produce ‘structure’ and ‘construct reality’ by 
progressively layering their concerns and issues by sedimenting a different set 
of understandings over preceding ones (Tolbert and Zucker, 1997). Chapter 
Two describes how ‘organisational ethnography’ was used as a methodological 
approach to gather and analyse individual stories (the most recent layer of 
sediment) about how housing workers experience and make sense of 
organisational change. This chapter concludes with a brief summary of the 
characteristics of ‘organisational ethnography’, and an explanation of how and 
why I used ethnographic tools to answer the research question.   
 
In Chapter Three I reframe the persistent, enduring problems described in 
Chapter One and use the vocabulary of ‘wicked problems’ (problems so 
embedded in the organisation and so socially complex that they have become 
highly resistant to resolution) to begin to make sense of the work of the Office 
of Housing (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007). In this chapter, I 
describe the wicked housing problems that were represented in the Housing 
Office Review (hereafter, ‘the Review’) and the stories of participants.  Here I 
explain how the categories/typology of problems (and the changes proposed to 
remedy them) will be used as a framework to order the discourse and 
participant narratives in the chapters that follow. I conclude chapter three with a 
description of how four key problems (tenants, assets, income and 
organisation) become the framework for presenting the research. They 
describe how these problems are socially (re)constructed by staff and how 
these problems guide the study and provide a useful rubric through which the 
data is examined. 
  
In Chapter Four (the first of four chapters where I draw on fieldwork stories) I 
begin to explore how staff experience and understand the ‘wicked problems’ 
they face.  This chapter is organised around the recurring and common themes 
in the stories of workers. In these stories the staff described how they 
experienced difficult tenants and coped with pressure to respond to persistent 
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neighbourhood disputes, mental illness and the effects of domestic violence. In 
‘Problems with tenants’, I describe how housing workers managed the 
‘revolving door’ of homelessness, the consequences of intergenerational 
unemployment, and struggled to place increasingly frail and vulnerable tenants 
in suitable accommodation. As the majority of the ‘problems with tenants’ 
experienced by housing workers seemed to be very similar to a number of the 
problems described in the Housing Office Review, I decided to employ the 
Review to guide the general direction of my ethnographic enquiry.  
 
Using the categories of problems and recommendations in the final report 
(Office of Housing, 2004), I asked housing workers questions such as ‘What 
are the effects of a growing number of tenants with complex and multiple 
needs?’, ‘How do you respond to negative portrayal of the organisation (and its 
tenants) in the press?’, ‘What the consequences of social reforms such as de–
institutionalisation?’ and ‘How do staff perceive life–long tenants who “lock up” 
family accommodation?’ and, finally, challenging questions such as ‘How do 
you feel about tenants as customers?’  
 
These stories are interrogated in a number of ways. Firstly, I examine how 
front–line housing workers experience, construct and understand these 
‘problem tenants’ and ‘problems with tenants’. Secondly, using front–line 
stories about the ‘problems with tenants’ as a guide, I investigate how head 
office staff appreciate and understand the same problems. The final section of 
Chapter Four brings together front–line and head office stories, allowing the 
reader to understand how workers use narrative to construct different patterns 
of meaning around exactly what are their ‘problems with tenants’. 
 
Stories about wicked problems with rent are the central focus of the next 
chapter. The literature reviewed in earlier chapters exposed the fact that rent 
has long been a problem for the Office of Housing. There has been a steady 
decline in funding under successive Commonwealth and State Housing 
Agreements, and the effect of this has been compounded by a decline in rental 
income from an increasing number of very poor tenants. ‘Problems with rent’ 
describes how the consequences of declining income have a significant limiting 
effect on the domestic, day–to–day operation of the business. This chapter 
uses first–hand accounts to illustrate how staff were increasingly expected to 
aggressively pursue rent arrears whilst sustaining tenancies (Office of Housing, 
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2004).  Chapter Five provides an insight into how arrears have long been an 
issue for state housing authorities and here I use first–hand accounts to 
describe how the organisation has always found it difficult to collect 
‘meaningful’ rent from tenants with very low incomes.  
 
The next chapter, ‘standards, assets and waiting lists’, presents an account of 
how housing workers dealt with outmoded property management software, 
inconsistent standards, complex allocation practices and sometimes conflicting 
key performance indicators. In order to understand how staff reconciled the 
problems of declining stock, limited income and increasing demand, this 
chapter juxtaposes the HSO’s stories about ‘chasing the rent of people in 
falling down buildings’ with the ‘constantly juggling inadequate resources’ 
stories from managers at head office (Chalkley, 2005c). In this chapter, I 
conclude with an outline of how the problems with rent and the problems with 
assets are exacerbated by wicked problems with old/inappropriate buildings, 
significant wear and tear and an ever–growing waiting list. 
 
Chapter Seven investigates some of the persistent problems with the 
organisation. This chapter explains how staff responded to the problems 
depicted in the previous chapters. In this chapter I describe how the problems 
with the organisation are, to some degree, a consequence of the wicked 
problems with tenants, rent, and assets.  I use first–hand accounts to represent 
the Office of Housing’s enduring problems with staff recruitment, retention, 
communication, consistent application of policy, fluctuating service delivery 
standards and, most importantly, I will describe how staff accept and resist the 
organisational change proposed to remedy the ‘problems with organisation’.  
 
I explore the wicked problems introduced in Chapters One and Two, revisiting 
the idea that public housing work is constrained by inflexible and outmoded 
work practices, with the staff duties constricted by highly localised, inconsistent 
procedures. This chapter also tells the stories of HSOs who felt that their work 
was very stressful, too complex and under–remunerated. Some felt that there 
was a lack of recognition of their efforts and many had reservations about the 
drive to professionalise housing management. In Chapter Seven, senior office 
managers describe how they experienced pressure to improve recruitment 
procedures, how they desperately needed more staff and struggle to retain 
existing staff. In this chapter, I am particularly concerned with stories about how 
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individual staff (at all levels) apply their agency to the process of social 
structuration and attempt to influence the organisational change activities of the 
department. 
 
In Chapter Eight, the conclusion, I explore how Housing Services Officers and 
housing managers worked to understand wicked housing problems and 
describe how individuals perceived and experienced the remedies proposed to 
solve these problems. In this chapter, I consider how the wicked problems with 
tenants, income, assets and organisation might contribute to the construction of 
what it is to ‘be a housing worker’.  This concluding chapter also evaluates how 
(and why) workers used their discretion in decision–making, how they 
selectively interpreted policy and used narrative to structure the organisation. 
The conclusion describes and explains how housing staff made sense of their 
often difficult work and, ultimately, how they understood and experienced a 
major process of operational policy change associated with the shift from 
‘public’ housing to ‘welfare’ housing. 
 
My research exposed a number of different understandings about the wicked 
problems with housing and the organisational change proposed to remedy 
them. It tells the stories of people who were sometimes openly hostile to 
change.  It describes a number of workers who were often highly ambivalent 
about the process of restructure.  Most importantly, it makes audible the as yet 
unheard stories of housing workers in Victoria. In this thesis, you will learn how 
some long–serving staff have ‘seen it all before’; you will hear from HSOs who 
are interested in reform, but bored and disillusioned with the slowness of 
implementation. You will read numerous, often conflicting opinions about the 
nature of ‘wicked housing problems’ and the changing world of public housing 
work. In spite of the conflicting stories, differing opinions and multiple 
viewpoints, there is, by the end of this thesis, a form of rough consensus:  
HSO’s, team leaders, local managers and senior managers understood that 
something has to change, housing work is too hard, the load too big and the 
‘needs of tenants seem to increase with every month that goes by’. 
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Chapter One 
‘Build it, Fill it and Bill it’: A  ‘little’ history of housing 
policy in Victoria, 1937–2003 
 
When I started with the commission, we were busy as hell with the 
last stages of construction of estates and high rises. Not much 
planning was done about what actually happened when tenants 
arrived; we could barely stop to take a breath. The unofficial motto 
was ‘build it, fill it and bill it’. (Retired Housing Worker)  
 
This comment is a succinct enunciation of the changing world of work for one 
employee over his life in the organisation, but it also suggested to me a 
structure for this chapter.  As a result, this chapter, similar to the career of the 
retired housing worker, is organised into three forms of organisational activity 
(loosely titled ‘build, fill and bill)’ with each of these activities discussed in 
relation to three discrete phases or periods in the history of the organisation 
which are signalled by the terms ‘slum reform’, ‘mass construction’ and ‘welfare 
housing’).  My reason for writing a ‘little history’ (Schensul et al., 1999) of 
housing work was simple. The function of this ‘little history’ is to better 
understand what happened before and after the period in which the Housing 
Commission stopped building large estates and developed new asset and 
tenant policies. This history helps shed light on what happened to the 
organisation when ‘public housing’ started to house more and more very low 
income households, many of which were experiencing other forms of 
disadvantage.  It also provides a context in which to explore how staff 
experienced new difficulties in managing the provision of rental housing to this 
changing group of tenant households. 
 
The first organisational activity is ‘build it’ and here I discuss how the 
construction of new estates is presented in the organisational artefacts 
produced in the periods of slum reform, mass construction and finally, welfare 
housing. The first section describes how church groups and activists promoted 
social reform through the ideas of better housing, improved personal and family 
hygiene and better housekeeping. I also explain why the private sector 
contributed little to the provision of low–income housing and, finally, describe 
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how the ‘dominant narrative of construction’ shaped organisational 
communication for many years. 
 
The second organisational activity is ‘fill it’, and here the focus shifts from the 
construction of new dwellings to who is allocated new public housing and why. 
This section is concerned with how applicants and tenants are described, 
assessed and allocated housing. Again I use organisational artefacts to 
describe how, over the years, workers and managers have categorised ‘who 
gets what’ and who deserves housing and who does not. The final component 
is a discussion about the ‘typical’ public housing tenant and how this definition 
has changed through the three periods of slum reform, mass construction and 
welfare housing. 
 
The third organisational activity is ‘bill it’. Here the discussion moves to the next 
stage in the housing process, the management of communities, the 
organisation of neighbourhoods and supervising tenant behaviour. Here the 
organisational artefacts are used to describe how initially the slum reformers, 
architects and builders struggled with this part of their work, and how over time 
the workers directly involved in tenant management have faced a number of 
‘wicked’ tenant management problems. ‘Bill it’ explores how four big housing 
problems - setting rents, calculating rebates, collecting arrears and responding 
to antisocial behaviour - are discussed in the organisational artefacts produced 
by the slum reformers, the builders and welfare housing providers. 
 
In order to construct this ‘little history’ I did two things: 
 
Firstly, I built an archive of materials that recorded aspects of the history of 
public housing provision in Victoria across the twentieth century. I sourced 
literature from the bibliography of the Office of Housing Review’s final report, 
from internal official documents like the 1960s estate officer training handbook 
and a number of official and/or public reports, papers and journals as well as 
the small body of scholarly historical work (such as Howe’s (1988) edited 
history of fifty years of public housing in Victoria). These historical artefacts 
provide a useful way of developing accounts of the ongoing debate about how 
best to provide public housing. They can be analysed so as to understand the 
way in which different actor groups have understood public housing provision 
and its administration. These documents, written from different perspectives, at 
 26 
different times, seek to define problems and what should be done about them. 
This ‘artefact gathering’ exercise produced both good and bad news. 
 
The second activity I undertook was to interview some of the older and now 
retired housing workers.   In the course of one of those interviews and over a 
cup of coffee in 2004, one of them (quoted at the start of this chapter) told me 
that when he started with the old ‘Housing Commission’, the predecessor to the 
Victorian Office of Housing, the organisational motto of the day was ‘expand, 
build and develop’, which he saw as an expression of what was then a 
‘construction boom’. Some years later, ‘when the money ran out’, he 
supervised the ongoing maintenance and repair of housing stock that had 
started to age, and eventually, he was the reluctant supervisor of housing 
workers who found themselves ‘negotiating a minefield’ of increasingly ‘tricky’ 
tenancies or what are now defined as ‘clients with complex and multiple needs’ 
(Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001). As he put it, the unofficial motto 
of the Housing Commission was to ‘build it, fill it and bill it’. That phrase turned 
out to be apt in all sorts of ways and provided the structuring principle outlined 
earlier in this chapter. 
 
Together, the small number of interviews with retired workers, and the larger 
archive of documentary material, enabled me to write ‘a little history’ (Schensul 
and LeComte, 1999) addressing the development of public housing work in 
Victoria. In the pages to follow the headings ‘build it’, ‘fill it’ and ‘bill it’ provide 
the framework around which I construct my ‘little history’, explaining how these 
three activities have changed (and stayed the same) from the start of the slum 
reform movement in 1937 to just prior to the implementation of the Housing 
Office Review in 2003. 
 
Build it: Why did the Victorian Government begin to build public 
housing? 
In the first decades of the twentieth century a succession of campaigns by 
churches and progressive movements sponsored the resolution of the problem 
of ‘slum housing’.  That activism peaked in the course of the great depression 
of the 1930s, as activists like Rev. Gerard Kennedy Tucker (the founder of the  
Brotherhood of St Laurence), and F. Oswald Barnett, a left–leaning lay 
Anglican, drew attention to the housing situations of tens of thousands of slum 
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dwellers.  As Barnett and Burt put it,  ‘a scarcity of affordable housing has 
forced the most vulnerable members of the community to exist ‘under 
deplorable conditions’ with the consequence ‘falling most heavily on those least 
able to bear it, women and children’ (Barnett and Burt, 1942. p.10).  
 
Figure 1.1: ‘Behind the scenes’ flyer showing a hand pulling back an illustrated curtain 
to reveal the slums behind the public face of the City of Melbourne.  
 
In an effort to respond to the public concern, which the anti–slum movement 
had mobilised, the Argyle UAP government, perhaps reluctantly, established 
the Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board in July 1936, which 
reported in October 1937.  The government quickly followed up on the 
recommendations of the report by creating the Housing Commission of Victoria 
(HCV) in December 1937 (Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board, 
1937) 
 
This newly formed Victorian Housing Commission (HCV) was charged with the 
task of assessing how life in ‘slum housing’ affected the welfare of individuals 
and to investigate the consequences of ‘slum minded’ behaviour on ‘society’ in 
general.  
 
The progress that the slum reform movement had made through the 
establishment of the HCV and the commencement of a construction program 
was short lived. From 1939, World War II (WWII) led to major changes in the 
organisation of the Australian economy and the scaling back of resources 
allocated to house building, and, as a result, the embryonic Victorian public 
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housing construction program was put on hold. However, the debate about 
better housing was not over. In 1943 the Australian federal government 
established a committee of inquiry into housing, which supported the abolition 
of the slums and set out a plan for a post–war program for expanding the cities 
through the mass construction of new suburban houses. By 1945 the 
Australian federal government confirmed its support for these 
recommendations by establishing the Commonwealth State Housing 
Agreement and began providing state governments with significant resources. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: (No. 4531) An Act to make provision with respect to the Constitution of a 
Housing Commission and the Powers and Duties thereof and to authorize the raising of 
Moneys by the State of Victoria and to Sanction the Application thereof 1937. (Public 
Records Office, 1937) 
 
In the post–WWII context, the outcome of the Victorian inquiry, the 
establishment of the HCV and the complementary inquiry by the 
Commonwealth Housing Commission was broad acceptance of the idea that 
there was a role for government in the direct provision of housing. In other 
words, it was now accepted that the private housing market was not able or 
willing to satisfy the demand for low cost housing and that government needed 
to act to support supply. The HCV rapidly became a high volume, low cost 
housing provider. In the context of a weak and disorganised housing 
construction industry, the HCV developed a large scale constriction program by 
putting out tenders to local builders for the construction of houses (Garden, 
1992). The HCV quickly became a significant force in stimulation and 
organising Victorian housing construction. 
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In 1946, 5,812 houses were completed and by 1947 this number had increased 
to 9,562 homes. In 1948 the building industry began to recover and the number 
increased to 13,580. In 1948 this number represented 16 percent of total 
completions in Victoria (Jones, 1972). At the time, the Minister of Housing 
explained why the commitment to construction was perhaps less than it might 
have been by suggesting that ‘whether the Housing Commission builds or not, 
the total number of houses finished each year will not vary to any extent, 
because the number built is governed by the total quantity of materials 
available ‘(Housing Commission: Victoria, 1949. p. 20). In his report, the 
minister explained that the HCV was, however, continuing to encourage small 
private builders to construct public housing: 
 
To assist these (smaller) builders, the Commission, as far as 
possible, has been calling for tenders for smaller quantities. The 
quantities have recently been again reduced. Even its larger 
contracts have been divided into a number of smaller contracts, and 
builders have been given the option of tendering for one or more 
houses, but the response of smaller builders generally has been 
negligible. (Housing Commission: Victoria, 1949. p. 20) 
 
Although there were definite capacity constraints, the minister was 
nevertheless continuing to be pressed by the government–appointed chief 
commissioner, who had earlier been the leader of the 1920s and 1930s slum 
reform campaign, to maintain and indeed increase public housing production. 
As Barnett put it: 
  
… since private enterprise hasn’t, and can’t do the job, because 
there aren’t sufficient returns, then the State Governments, financed 
by the Federal Government, must do it, and do it urgently. 
(Australian Army Education Service, 1948. p. 9) 
 
Some years later, Gaskin and Burkitt explained why, at the time, private 
enterprise was disinterested in the construction of low cost housing, explaining 
why public/private partnerships in the early 1950 also met with limited success: 
 
When land cleared by the commission is sold to tender to private 
developers, the sale price realised is usually well below the cost of 
resumption and a loss results. This loss is met by the Commission 
from resources already limited by what the State can afford. Here 
again, Commonwealth assistance is needed to expand the rate of 
private development. (Gaskin and Burkitt, 1958. p. 51) 
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The reason that the state became the largest provider of low cost housing is 
straightforward: alternative models of provision had proved to be inexpedient, 
unpopular and unattractive to provide developers and not economically 
‘unattractive’. The problems of high reclamation costs (for the state), a low sale 
price to the developer and a marginal return on investment would prove to be a 
long–standing impediment to large scale private development of public 
housing. The idea that public/private partnerships are ‘costly to develop, sold 
on the cheap and return an unsustainable profit from rent’ was a common 
theme in public discussion in the years between 1940 and the late 1980s. One 
retired housing worker described to me his experience of how private 
developers ‘came and went’ in the provision of public housing: 
 
Every year a few local builders would knock on my door with an idea 
to develop, say, a small block of flats on some land they had, and 
were keen to get us on board with tenants.  When we showed them 
the rate of return and the potential lag with rental payments, they all 
pissed off pretty quick. It’s too hard for them to deal with a large 
government body; the profits are woeful and often so are the 
tenants! (Chalkley, 2004a) 
 
A more official expression of this dilemma can be found in the 1967 estate 
officer’s training manual: the main reason for the scarcity of private investment 
in public housing (and affordable private rental) is because: 
 
It does not require any involved mathematical calculation to 
demonstrate that the private sector investor is not able to provide 
newly erected or newly acquired housing units for families of 
moderate means; an investor would reasonably expect to receive a 
gross annual return (on a $10,000 home) of not less than $1000. A 
breadwinner of a family whose gross weekly wage is in the $35–$70 
range cannot be expected to meet an outgoing of that nature. 
(Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967 p.A3) 
 
It seems that, in short, private enterprise was not expected to contribute in any 
meaningful way to the provision of low cost housing in Victoria. As later reports 
(National Housing Strategy, 1991, Housing Commission, 1966, Gaskin and 
Burkitt, 1958) indicated, the absence of privately provided ‘welfare housing’ 
was readily explained: the cost too great, the risks too high and the return too 
little. This story has proved to be influential because it informs and shapes the 
perceptions of many of the participants in my study. Contemporary Office of 
Housing staff have been influenced by a sedimented narrative that directs them 
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to now consider public housing a responsibility of the state. Public housing was 
initially perceived to be ‘affordable accommodation for the working poor’ but 
increasingly it is understood as ‘housing of last resort’ and, as such, would be 
considered a poor investment for the housing entrepreneur.  This discursive 
position is currently subject to contestation, as senior bureaucrats work to 
reform social housing by promoting and funding public/private partnerships 
and, increasingly, senior managers at the Office of Housing are promoting the 
idea that private enterprise has a meaningful (and profitable) role to play in the 
provision of low cost social housing.  
 
What does this mean? The chief consequence of the Housing Commission’s 
acceptance that it would be a major supplier of public housing became 
increasingly apparent as engineers and architects came to dominate the 
operations of the Commission (Dalton, 1988). 
 
The technical language of these engineers and architects (such as ‘planning’, 
‘building’ and ‘construction’) displaced the older, short–lived discourse about 
social welfare and slum reform and, as a result, the documents of this period 
are more concerned with the strength of concrete than social reform. The 
engineers and architects were in charge. From 1945 onwards, two important 
things happened in the structuring of the organisation. Firstly, the critical mass 
of the operational workers understood as ‘the front–line’ were the builders, 
engaged in the construction and commissioning of new dwellings.  Secondly, 
as the old commissioners (the ‘social reformers’) like F. O. Barnett retired, they 
were replaced by managers whose qualifications, skills and interests were in 
the area of building, construction and programmed development. (Dalton, 
1988. ) 
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Figure 1.3. Exterior of pre–fabricated concrete Housing Commission homes in 
Oakleigh. (Fowler, 1946) 
 
As a consequence of this ‘domination by builders’, the majority of housing 
documents from this period are shaped by the discourse of construction. The 
1958 ‘Report on Some Aspects of Housing Overseas’ provides an insight into 
the organisational significance of ‘construction discourse’. This report explored 
the ‘construction and management of multi–story flats, slum clearance and 
reclamation, The use of light weight and prestressed concrete in house and flat 
construction‘ (Gaskin and Burkitt, 1958). On their return to Australia, Gaskin 
and Burkitt proposed a number of innovations for consideration by housing 
managers in Victoria, the overwhelming majority of which were about building 
more, for less. The content of this report is quite revealing: eleven of the twelve 
chapters are concerned with the technicalities of construction, engineering and 
new strategies for more cost–effective building. Written in the language of 
building and mass production, Gaskin and Burkitt’s report illustrates how the 
‘discourse of construction’ was a potent force in the structuring of the 
organisation.  
 
This ‘construction discourse’ was also reflected in the stories told to me by 
retired housing workers: 
 
In the 1960/70s … the culture of the public works engineers was 
nothing like the housing staff, the engineers were building million 
dollar projects and the local housing guys were responsible for 
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piddly little jobs, the blocked sinks. They just didn’t get on.  (Retired 
Housing Worker)  
 
The ‘narrative of construction’ continued to dominate the housing policy and 
organisational literature as ‘building’ remained the central focus of the 
Commission until well into the late 1970’s (Australian Army Education Service, 
1948. , Barnett and Burt, 1942, Howe, 1988b) As a result of the saturation of 
‘construction discourse’, housing staff had little time or need to develop a 
discursive framework to engage with the growing number of persistent 
problems associated with increasingly complex tenancies, ever lengthening 
waiting lists and escalating rental arrears.   
 
One of the retired workers told me that the inability to talk about these 
problems or to have them represented in the official point of view resulted in 
what one retired worker recalled as: 
 
 … a feeling of panic …  there was a time when the job seemed to 
get harder and harder with each month that went by. It felt like 
public housing was out of our control for most of the 1980s and we 
didn’t really know how to begin to fix it. (Retired Housing Worker)  
 
That observation points to a persistent problem which both the Housing 
Commission and its successor the Office of Housing have had with both 
‘thinking about’ and ‘dealing with’ the people who become tenants in the public 
housing system. The problem, in short, has proved to be a lack of narrative 
around how best to respond to the persistent predicaments facing the staff 
charged with filling the stock of public housing.  
Fill it: ‘Holding one hand and smacking the other’ 
The selection and then the management of ‘suitable’ and ‘deserving’ tenants 
has been a long–standing issue for housing workers (Barnett and Burt, 1942) 
(Housing Commission Victoria, 1966). While the language categories have 
changed, including ‘slum dwellers’ (Australian Army Education Service, 1948. ), 
‘the housing poor’ (Barnett and Burt, 1942), ‘applicants and ballotees’ (Housing 
Commission: Victoria, 1949),  ‘occupants’ (Housing Commission Victoria, 
1966), ‘Tenants’ (Gaskin and Burkitt, 1958, Henderson, 1975), ‘clients’ 
(Ministry of Housing; Task Force on Housing Policy Review, 1979) and most 
recently ‘customers’ (Office of Housing, 2004), the underlying social realities 
have been persistent. Whether defined as ‘slum dwellers’,  ‘the poor’, 
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‘disadvantaged people’, or indeed into our own time as ‘clients with complex 
and multiple needs’, the people seeking and getting public housing have 
always tended to be drawn from the ranks of the economically dispossessed. 
 
The terminology used to define and construct the ‘public housing tenant’ is 
important because these definitions have been both layered over time and 
sedimented into the culture of the organisation (Crompton and Jones, 1988). 
Ethnographers use the concept of ‘sedimentation’ to illustrate how, like sand on 
a beach, meaning is produced in layers with socially constructed meanings 
layered over time. Cooper et.al argues that ‘The geological metaphor of 
sedimentation allows us to consider a dialectical rather than a linear view of 
change. Case studies show how one archetype is layered on the other, rather 
than representing a distinct transformation where one archetype sweeps away 
the residues of the other’ (Cooper et al., 1996). 
 
The meanings and constructions in the ‘discursive sediment’ of housing work 
have been used by generations of housing workers as they attempted to make 
sense of their work. For example, many of the staff who contributed to this 
study have worked with ‘applicants’, ‘tenants’ and now ‘customers’.  The 
categorisation of ‘who gets what’ in the provision of public housing resources 
has long been highly politicised, often contentious and subject to public debate.  
 
This is suggested by a series of discursive snapshots, taken from the 
organisational artefacts: 
 
In 1939 those eligible for public housing were understood to be ‘slum dwellers’ 
and as  ‘persons of limited means’ (Barnett and Burt, 1942). In 1948, the 
narrative line continued to be both judgemental and moralistic: 
 
Mr Barnett found that most slum dwellers in Fitzroy were British 
born. Most had slum parents. Mr Barnett found that the majority of 
these people were slum–minded – that is, slovenly and vicious. 
Most did not earn enough to live on. (Australian Army Education 
Service, 1948. p. 17) 
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Figure 1.4: Typical tenants? ‘Both were under the influence of liquor. The doctor with 
me said that one baby had been very ill, and had recovered, but now would die owing 
to neglect’. (Barnett, 1935) 
 
The Army’s Education Service policy guidelines for the housing of public 
tenants insisted that tenants in the system be classified: 
 
Two main classes of people must be provided for in housing policy. 
The first, the ‘sub–economic’ class, are people who will never be 
able to buy a decent home, and who without some assistance are 
condemned to live always in the slums. (Australian Army Education 
Service, 1948. p.8) 
 
The Army’s Education Service policy guidelines affirmed the comments of 
Barnett and Burt: 
 
The problem of the ‘sub–economic’ tenant is largely the problem of 
poverty. That problem is linked up with unsanitary housing, slum 
abolition and reclamation, and the enforcement through the states of 
health powers and standards in relation to Housing. The problem in 
every sense is wholly a ‘Social Service’ problem. (Barnett and Burt, 
1942. p.65) 
 
Writing in 1949, Warner opted for a ‘scientific’ approach to his taxonomy of 
people who needed public housing: 
 
The following types present problems in slum areas and in 
emergency camps: 
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a) habitual drunkards 
b) sexual perverts  
c) sub–normals. 
(Housing Commission (Victoria), 1949. p.36) 
 
In 1949 only families earning less than £520 per annum could apply for housing 
and by 1967 little had changed; an applicants’ income was still the primary 
eligibility requirement. As section 21 of the 1967 legislation put it: ‘Eligible 
Person means a person who, in the opinion of the Commission is, or was at the 
time of his first becoming a tenant of a house under this Act, by reason of his 
financial circumstance, in need of assistance’(Housing Commission of Victoria, 
1967p. 1 (F1)). 
 
In 1967, one estate officers manual also provided housing staff with a 
comprehensive list of the ways in which potential tenants might be considered: 
 
1) The Deserted Wife: A woman in possession of a maintenance 
order against her husband. 
2) The Aborigine Tenant:  The responsibility of the Aborigine 
Welfare Board. 
3) Persons Not Fully Employed: In order to be considered for public 
housing, needs medical certification for not working a full week. 
4) Self Employed Persons: the commission does not finance 
unprofitable or unproductive businesses through rent rebates. 
5) Seasonal Workers: needs employers certificate for 13 weeks in 
order to be considered. 
6) Unemployed persons: people who are unemployed for reasons 
outside their control and are in receipt of a Social Services benefit. 
7) Elderly tenants: aged sixty five and older and in receipt of an 
aged pension. 
(Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967pp.7-9) 
 
Though the dominant discourse emphasised issues to do with the physical 
environment, this did not mean the complete occlusion of social issues.  Some 
years earlier, in their lengthy report concerned with concreting, cladding and 
rendering, Gaskin and Burkitt (1958) deviated to make the following 
recommendation: 
 
(a) At least one qualified and experienced Social Welfare worker 
should be appointed to the Commission’s staff. Principal duties 
would be to deal with difficult welfare cases referred to her by the 
Housing Officers and in turn put the families concerned in touch with 
appropriate existing outside welfare agencies whether State or 
Private. 
 37 
(b) The Housing Officers themselves should undertake a course of 
instruction in Social Welfare work. This could possibly be arranged 
via the Social Studies department of the University. (Gaskin and 
Burkitt, 1958. p.153) 
 
This proposal echoed the sentiments in a recommendation made by the 
Minister for Housing some ten years prior: 
 
Some of the people in the slums will also be below average quality. I 
suggest that a committee should be established to consider how this 
problem might be solved. This committee might operate under the 
auspices of the Housing Commission and should consist of a 
number of experienced welfare workers. I do not believe that the 
problem can be solved by taking the worst cases and putting them, 
without attention, into new Housing Commission Homes at the tax–
payers’ expense. (Housing Commission (Victoria), 1949.p.36) 
 
Some thirty years later, following the dissolution of the Housing Commission in 
1983 and the evolution of the Office of Housing, officials were struggling to 
come to terms with an increasingly ‘disadvantaged’ population of applicants. In 
consequence, a new lexicon began to emerge. It would appear that, during this 
period, the structure and function of the Housing Commission was subject to 
‘discursive arbitration’, a process of narrative disputation, agreement and 
dissent (Pigozzi, 2005).   The policy literature of this period introduced 
terminology such as: ‘The de–institutionalised’, ‘the frail elderly’, ‘homeless 
young people’, ‘shared housing’, ‘youth housing’ and ‘group housing’. The 
language of categorisation begins to permeate housing literature (Carter, 1988) 
and the mono–cultural ‘building and construction’ discourse of the early years 
disappeared and no single, dominant discursive position would take its place. 
One of the retired housing workers remembers the 1990s as ‘a confusing 
period, rich with position papers, reports, and what he called ‘ironically named 
working parties’. He told me that: 
 
 … it seemed that every few months we would talk about the next 
big new way forward, get a report and talk some more.  This was a 
frustrating and challenging period for managers. (Interview: Retired 
housing worker) 
 
The process of ‘narrative disputation’, agreement and dissent (Pigozzi, 2005) 
became increasingly severe during the 1990s.  Any number of reports 
discussed and criticised the supply and management of public housing in 
Victoria, and went so far as to doubt the long–term sustainability of public 
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housing in Victoria.   One common theme was the case for reorganising public 
housing in order to restructure the Office of Housing so as to better service a 
changing tenant base (Australian Housing Research Council, 1990, Eather, 
1988, Hayward, 1996, Ministry of Housing, 1989, Ministry of Housing; Task 
Force on Housing Policy Review, 1979, Victorian Auditor General, 1996, Wulff, 
1994). 
 
At stake in all of this discussion was concern about the population of people 
being dealt with.  
Bill It: Managing public housing tenants 
In Victoria and Australia more generally, there was no previous experience of 
large–scale landlordism and the development of ideas about how large–scale 
landlords should manage tenancies. This is the context in which housing staff 
have struggled to manage tenants, allocate properties, calculate rental rebates, 
collect arrears, evict ‘bad’ tenants, deal with anti–social behaviour and, more 
recently, respond to ‘customer’ service complaints.  Consequently there has 
been constant development of systems for managing tenants and the language 
used to describe the issues experienced by housing workers.   
 
Three main phases can be distinguished in the history of tenant management.  
Initially the focus was on how to manage tenants who were being rehoused 
from the slums.  Subsequently, there is the very large growth in public housing 
in the period when public housing was largely being built to house workers and 
their families in new metropolitan industrial areas. The most recent phase has 
been the growth in the proportion of tenants who are excluded from the labour 
market, experience other forms of disadvantage and are very dependant on a 
range of welfare services.  However, running through all three phases there 
has been one stand–out issue: how to set the rent using the rebate system.  
 
The behaviour of the public housing tenant became an issue as soon the first 
public housing was built. In the 1930s and 1940s, the slum reform movement 
had developed an analysis that the poor urban and housing environment of the 
inner city area of Melbourne created forms of behaviour and ways of thinking 
that could only be changed through the provision of high quality housing and a 
less congested urban environment.  This was the problem of the ‘slum–minded’ 
which would be solved by these people becoming tenants in new 
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neighbourhoods (Barnett and Burt, 1942).  This led to the early housing staff 
seeking to manage tenant behaviour by requiring them to comply with rules 
and regulations.  
 
The first ‘Conditions of Tenancy’ agreement set out numerous requirements for 
the tenant, including keeping the house clean and in good repair.  It also 
included twelve things that the tenant was not permitted to do, ranging from 
using the house ‘for any illegal or immoral purpose’ through to not hanging 
pictures ‘otherwise than on the picture rails provided’ (Howe, 1988b. pg. 56). 
Sixty years ago, the Army Education Service thought that the role of housing 
authorities should be to ‘relocate’ and then ‘re–educate’ tenants: 
 
People who are rehoused must be taught to get the best out of their 
environment. There are two aspects of living in a new home – taking 
care of the house itself and getting the best out of the 
neighbourhood. It isn’t enough to put people in a house with plenty 
of light and air and leave them to make out the best they can. 
Modern housing policy goes beyond that. It plans a satisfactory 
social environment for rehoused people. (Australian Army Education 
Service, 1948. p. 16) 
 
In this context the focus should be on modifying tenant behaviours and 
attitudes.   
 
It is necessary to reconstruct tenants as well. Under–privileged 
families (who) may benefit by new public housing schemes have 
faced terrific hardships in the past. It isn’t surprising to find that their 
attitude to the world and people in general is one of distrust, and for 
this reason, friendly relations should be established between 
tenants. (Australian Army Education Service, 1948. p. 23) 
 
One early step towards establishing friendly relations was by bringing women 
into the HCV. They were charged with instructing and modelling appropriate 
domestic behaviour (Barnett and Burt, 1942).  
 
As the housing stock expanded rapidly into the new industrial suburbs in the 
post WWII period, the profile of new tenants changed and the scale of tenant 
management processes grew significantly.  This is a period in which the HCV 
reduced their focus on tenant behaviour and attitudes. By the late 1950s the 
Commissioners were more circumspect and establishing greater distance 
between the HCV and tenants:  
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… there is a close tie between tenant and authority resulting in a 
firm but flexible control of property preservation, the authority not 
being too inquisitive into the every–day life of tenants. (Gaskin and 
Burkitt, 1958. p.78)  
 
The idea of ‘not being too inquisitive into the every–day life of tenants’ was 
elaborated upon in the 1967 estate officer manual.  Housing staff should be 
friendly towards tenants, but: 
 
care should of course be exercised to ensure that this friendly 
feeling is kept on an impersonal basis as any close personal 
friendship between an estate officer and his tenant could cause him 
embarrassment if he found it necessary to take action. (Housing 
Commission of Victoria, 1967p.3 (S2)) 
 
The reason for this ‘impersonal friendliness’ was straightforward and pragmatic: 
 
He (the Estate Officer) is in a position to assist them when 
misfortune strikes by advising them of the facilities available to 
provide relief. One of his functions is to ensure that tenants are able 
to obtain maximum enjoyment of their premise by seeing other 
tenants do not cause annoyance by unsatisfactory behaviour. 
(Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967p.3 (S3)) 
 
By the late 1970s and certainly by the 1980s it was becoming apparent that the 
tenant profile was changing.  Papers, such as Carter (Carter, 1983) were 
beginning to present analyses of the growth of low income and disadvantaged 
tenants as a proportion of all tenants.  Those undertaking the day–to–day 
tenancy management were also noticing this change.   
 
A retired housing worker told me that he started his working life as a 
government electrician and some thirty years later, with little training, he found 
himself responsible for the supervision of a team who were responsible for the 
administration of increasingly difficult tenancies. Asked about when he first 
noticed the emergence of people with complex needs, he responded: 
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Crikey, that’s a hard one.  Look, in all honesty, the hardest part was 
the fact that we didn’t notice – they just changed, we just changed 
and the organisation had restructured a heap of times in those 
years. We never got any training in complex tenants, you just dealt 
with the ratbags and helped with disasters where you could. I 
wouldn’t want to be a housing officer today – you have to be a social 
worker and landlord–holding one hand and smacking the other. 
(Retired Housing Worker)  
 
This candid answer provides an indication about how it became more difficult 
for the staff housing staff to identify and appreciate the changing nature of 
tenants and their needs.  Subsequently this change has been reviewed and a 
new framework for understanding it has been established. This is perhaps best 
described by noting the phrase, used in reports and by housing staff, that many 
tenants now have ‘complex and multiple needs’ (Thomson Goodall Associates 
Pty Ltd, 2001).  This provides the basis for the development of new forms of 
tenant management that spreads responsibility beyond the Office of Housing to 
a broader network of service providers (Victorian Auditor General, 1996).   
 
Although there have been changes in the way in which housing staff have 
analysed and described tenants, one factor in their work has remained 
constant.  Housing staff have always been responsible for setting the rent that 
each tenant must pay.  This has always been done within a policy framework 
(McNelis, 2000a).  Initially rents were calculated based on the cost of providing 
each house.  However, after the mid 1950s, rents were related to income and a 
judgement about what a household could reasonably be expected to pay: 
 
The principle of charging a tenant a reduced or rebated rent is 
based on the assumption that a family man on the basic wage 
should not be called upon to expend more than 20% of his earnings 
on rent. (Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967p.3 (P1)) 
 
In both theory and in practice, four different sets of tenants living in the same 
block of flats might be paying four different rents, and as their circumstances 
change, so will their rent. Rebates are perceived as making rents equitable, 
flexible, and tailored to the circumstances of individual tenants. They are also 
exceptionally complex.  
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The historical archive suggests that this complexity has long been a problem 
for housing workers.  
 
As early as 1942, housing commentators remarked on the difficulties facing the 
Housing Commission as it tried to administer the rental rebate system: 
 
In the opinion of the Authors the rental rebate system adopted in 
Victoria has disclosed inherent defects; (a) it is not directly related to 
subsistence requirements of the tenant for the reason that the cost 
of living and the basic wage varies considerably from time to time; 
(b) it presents difficulties in administration and (c) it is not easily 
understood by tenants, thereby tending to create dissatisfaction and 
misunderstanding. (Barnett and Burt, 1942. p.35) 
 
Twenty-five years later, the Estate Officers Manual dedicated an entire chapter 
to the complexity of rebates, instructing staff that rebates require them: 
 
… to be at all times knowledgeable of all Social Services benefits 
and pensions, the Means test, the Repatriation pensions and 
allowance, Social Welfare and worker’s compensation, both weekly 
payments and settlement amounts (Housing Commission of 
Victoria, 1967p.8 (P1)). 
 
Should they fail to be at ‘all times knowledgeable of all social benefits’, abuse 
of the rebate system was likely to flourish, a highly undesirable situation 
because: 
 
Rental rebates give the Housing Commission tenant an advantage 
over those outside the Commission and we are therefore 
determined that this great privilege should not be misused or 
abused. Over the past, many instances of cheating have come to 
my attention, and I suspect that many other cases have happened 
where tenants are obtaining a rebate to which they are not entitled. 
(Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967p.9 (P1))  
 
In 1996, the Auditor General of Victoria made the following critical comments 
about rental rebates: 
 
1) The Department faces difficulty in ensuring the accuracy of rental 
rebates provided to tenants in that much reliance is placed on 
tenants' honesty in declaring income levels or changes in household 
circumstances such as additional occupants. In addition, while 
tenants found to be deliberately supplying inaccurate information 
are levied with adjusted rentals, an effective deterrent such as 
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eviction is generally not pursued as the taking of legal action is, in 
most instances, not considered to be a cost–effective option.  
2) Under departmental policy, rebate recipients in high–risk 
categories, which include all recipients other than aged and invalid 
pensioners, are required to be subject to annual reviews by 
departmental staff as a means of confirming continuing eligibility to 
receive their current level of rental rebate. At the time of audit 
examination, 3400 departmental reviews of such tenants, or 11 per 
cent of total high–risk tenants, were up to 12 months behind 
schedule.  
3) Several assessments of rental management procedures 
undertaken within the Department have identified a range of 
shortcomings in documentation held to support tenants' income 
levels used for calculation of rental rebates. (Victorian Auditor 
General, 1996. pp. 33-34) 
 
In 2004, one of the retired workers I interviewed talked of an uneasy 
partnership between tenants honestly disclosing their income and staff 
understanding and correctly applying a complex mathematical formula, 
describing the process as ‘fraught with peril’. He told me that new staff are 
quickly overwhelmed by a lack of clarity and transparency around how 
‘rebating’ works and he explained how new staff are swiftly inoculated into the 
‘leave it til last’ club. When I spoke with the other retired housing workers about 
rebates, they, without exception, remembered their own experience: 
 
Rebates! What a nightmare. One bloke and I spent the best part of 
a day trying to work out what to charge this woman. The manual 
was pages and pages long, filled with descriptions of circumstances, 
rules and tens of variations to each rule.  We just settled on what we 
though she looked like she could afford. (Retired Housing Worker) 
 
One of the authors of the Estate Officers Manual made the following admission:  
 
I think it is fair to say that we are all likely to be more sympathetic to 
an attractive young blond who is in arrears than to an elderly 
unattractive woman. (Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967p.4 
(S2)) 
 
In short, calculating and applying rental rebates has long been unduly 
burdensome, costly and difficult to manage. The multifaceted and enduring 
problems with rental rebates appear to be deeply layered in the sediment of the 
Office of Housing.   Rebates are, and have always been, difficult to administer.  
They have been easily exploited, and have required constant surveillance by 
staff. They have  also been  poorly understood and often resulted in unintended 
arrears (Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967, Barnett and Burt, 1942, 
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Ministry of Housing, 1989). The sedimented discourse about rebates tells staff 
to expect this procedure to be difficult and problematic, and it is.  
 
Once the rebate has been calculated and the weekly rent established, the next 
step for the housing worker is to monitor the payment of rent in their patch (a 
‘patch’ being a number of homes in a geographic area). Once again, the 
archive suggests that the collection of rent has two long–standing problems. 
Firstly, like the Housing Commission, the Office of Housing has always had 
difficulty in effectively administering the payment of rent and the recovery of 
arrears. Secondly, arrears have increasingly been expressed as ‘unrealised 
income’ and arrears have a direct and very real impact on local budgets. In 
1988, Howe explained some of the problems which lead to arrears: 
 
The increase of rental arrears worried the Commission. At 30 June 
1945 the total amount of arrears was £292.7s; three years later it 
was £12,568; and by 1954 the total was close to £100,000. The 
Commission could do little to slow the increase (let alone decrease) 
arrears while it was understaffed. (Howe, 1988b. p.83) 
 
In 2004 the Victorian Auditor–General found that little had changed.  The size 
of the arrears balance had continued to grow and ‘of the $6.1 million of debts 
written–off in 2001–02, $4.2 million ($1.8 million in 2000–01) related to the 
inability of the Office of Housing to locate former tenants with rental and 
maintenance debts outstanding – a significant increase over the preceding 
year’. (Victorian Auditor General, 2004.) 
 
Once again, these problems are not new.  The archive provides any number of 
accounts of how the collection of rent has been a problem.  In the 1930s 
Pennington’s idea of all female housing officers collecting rent under the 
Octavia Hill model collapsed, mainly because a suitable time for the collection 
of rent could not be found (Howe, 1988a). Other factors have also exacerbated 
the problems with arrears, for example, in the 1950s and again in the 1970s, 
arrears climbed as tenants protested over rent increases with a number 
refusing to pay rent (Eather, 1988).  Economic factors such and war, 
depression and unemployment have long had a deleterious effect on the 
income of state housing authorities and, more recently, the decline in the 
manufacturing sector (particularly the automotive industry) resulted in an 
increase in the number of tenants living on reduced incomes and/or 
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government benefits (Peel, 2003). Strategies such as the construction of 
mobile rent collection vans, locating staff in offices on the estate, the deduction 
of rent from payroll (as early as 1956) and encouraging staff to collect rent as 
their first and most important task, all met with limited success.  The 
introduction of direct debit for rent resolved some problems with the 
‘mechanisms of collection’ (Dalton, 1988. ).  Even so, the number of default 
payments (that is, tenants having insufficient funds to cover the deduction) 
created a new set of problems for housing workers. 
 
The archive points to the enduring problems facing housing workers who have 
always had to balance the imperative to increase incomes from rent with their 
responsibility to provide affordable housing. This archive points to a record of 
‘patchy’ attempts to resolve the problems of inadequate and inconsistent 
income. It would seem that the problems expressed in the archive some 
seventy years ago are as relevant today as they were then. 
 
The problems with the collection of rent are significant, but the Office of 
Housing has another no less intractable difficult and long–standing problem. 
There has been a steady increase in the number of tenants with very limited 
income and this means that the Office of Housing is not able to charge a rent 
that recovers the actual cost of their services. The archive records the many 
remedies proposed to fix the problems created when an organisation like the 
Office of Housing becomes increasingly dependant on funds that are sourced 
from the ‘rent of the poor’ (Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, 1975). As with 
so many of the problems with ‘building, filling and billing’ this is not a recent 
problem.  
 
In 1947, anticipating that income from the federal and state governments was 
likely to continue to decline, the then–Minister of Housing proposed that: 
 
At some stage, increases of rents of such dwellings (i.e. Housing 
Commission Homes) will have to be considered. In the long run, it 
has to be realised that the State cannot provide homes much 
cheaper (if any) than can private landlords, and the question that 
must arise at some time in the future, as to whether the difference 
between real costs and charges shall be born by taxpayers not 
receiving the benefits of Government subsidised houses, or by the 
occupants. (Housing Commission: Victoria, 1949. p. 36) 
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In the early 1950s the Cain Labor Government attempted to partially address 
the concerns with rental income by increasing the rent for vacated properties, 
hoping to bring these properties in line with full economic (or ‘market’) rent. Due 
to a relatively small number of vacant properties and the complexity of property 
typology, this innovation had little effect on the overall collection of economic 
rents.  As result, in 1955 the Bolte Liberal Government approved the 
Commissioner’s request to increase rents across the board (Eather, 1988).  
Not surprisingly, these increases were unpopular with tenants, who found the 
revised rental charges unjustifiable and a sharp contrast to the previous, strictly 
regulated wartime wage policy.  
 
Subsequent attempts to increase rents met with a hostile response: rent 
strikes, tenant protests, complaints from church and community groups and, in 
some cases, the intervention of the local Member of Parliament.  
 
In the 1970s, a subtler, alternative approach to increasing rental income was 
initiated. The focus moved from tinkering with the minutiae of individual weekly 
rents to an evaluation of the systems used for charging, rebating and changing 
the rental assistance for tenants. Some of the recommendations made to (and 
by) government implied that the provision of public housing might benefit from 
the competitive principles of a free market (Henderson, 1975). In 1975, Ronald 
Henderson made the rather optimistic suggestion that, as income maintenance 
improved, then perhaps the rental rebate scheme might be significantly 
overhauled and eventually disbanded: 
 
We wish to see a competitive situation in the supply of rental 
housing with the housing authorities gradually raising all rents to 
market levels as improved income maintenance enables tenants to 
pay. When this is achieved there can be a relaxation of means tests 
on entry and we believe the feelings of inferiority and stigma among 
tenants will be greatly reduced. The charging of market rents by 
public housing authorities will also mean that subsidies in kind are 
not paid to those well above the poverty line. (Henderson, 1975p. 
166) 
 
In 1996, the Council of Australian Governments communiqué on potential 
reforms to housing assistance echoed the sentiments of the Henderson Report, 
suggesting that a more competitive rental market, teamed with better income 
support, will ease the burden on public housing waiting lists (Henderson, 1975). 
Max Parker (a former Commissioner and participant in the 1993 Industry 
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Commission’s inquiry into public housing) agreed with the proposal to bring 
state housing rents to market value, arguing that: 
 
Public housing rents should be set at market values. As long as 
tenants are offered a choice between appropriate dwellings, rent 
rebates should be structured to ensure that, within affordability 
limits, tenants in similar circumstances receive similar levels of 
assistance.  Assistance should decline as income increases.  
(Parker, 1997. p. 25) 
 
The historical archive provides an enduring and unresolved account of how 
housing managers have tried to reconcile the imperative to increase incomes 
from rent with their statutory responsibility to provide affordable housing. This 
archive records a number of ‘patchy’ attempts to resolve the problems caused 
by inadequate and inconsistent income.   
Conclusion: Public housing to welfare housing  
Understanding the history of public housing proved important to me for two 
reasons.  Firstly, it has helped me to examine the sedimented meanings found 
at work in contemporary policies and procedures.  In this way it has also helped 
me contextualise and understand the work of present day housing staff.  
 
This historical account based on an historical archive and complemented by 
interviews with retired housing workers provides an insight into how the long–
established problems with ‘building, filling and billing’ have had an enduring 
impact on the roles and responsibilities of contemporary housing workers.  
 
The more recent discursive representation of the mission of the Office of 
Housing looks different. It contains strategic assessments about how to reduce 
waiting lists/times, how to better understand the changing and yet highly 
complex needs of tenants and makes some efforts to develop functional 
linkages between intergovernmental departments and, more broadly, how best 
to respond to the changing needs of tenants (Office of Housing, 2004). Yet, as 
will become clear in later chapters, the managers of the modern Office of 
Housing continue to struggle with old problems about how best to develop a 
simple, equitable and effective rebate system.  
 
The problem is that they continue to face permanently high rent arrears, while 
maintaining properties that require substantial, costly repairs. This provide an 
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important insight into how the understandings and perceptions of past housing 
managers are still pertinent to and yet subject to ongoing (re)interpretation in 
the work of the modern day Office of Housing. The historical archive suggests 
how, over time, housing staff have evolved into managers of ‘welfare’ housing, 
offering accommodation as a component of the social welfare system, 
providing shelter to the most needy and marginalised members of society.  It 
would appear that they have been, for sometime, managers of ‘housing of last 
resort’. The archive suggests that, just as there have been persistent problems, 
so have there been persistent questions. Should housing authorities go beyond 
simply housing people? Is it realistic to expect housing workers to ensure that 
tenants ‘behave’ and comply with laws, rules, and regulations? Are housing 
authorities responsible for tenant education, community development and 
social guidance? Is it possible for one agency to perform two very different 
tasks, facility management and social welfare?   
 
The following chapter explains how the sedimented problems described here 
become a framework for a ethnographic study of ‘what it is like to work in public 
housing’ and explores how housing workers use narrative to describe and 
explain the consequences of organisational change on their everyday work.  
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Chapter Two 
Captured stories and whispered disclosures: Developing 
the research framework 
 
The welfare housing period that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
provides the organisational setting for the research question.  This is the period 
in which the Housing Commission stopped building large estates and 
developed new asset policies; began to house more and more very low income 
households, experiencing many other forms of disadvantage; and the staff 
experienced new difficulties in managing the provision of rental housing to this 
changing group of tenant households.  The research question takes as its 
starting point the experience of the staff in this new context.  It asks ‘How did 
housing workers and managers, employed to deliver new kinds of public 
housing services, deal with and experience major changes to long–established 
policies and practices?   
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, it establishes a framework for 
analysing the way in which housing workers and managers work in a state 
service delivery agency where policy and practices were changing rapidly.  In 
other words, we need to be clear about the approach that will be taken to 
understanding the changing life world of managers and workers who design 
and provide services to tenants.  Second, the chapter presents the framework 
used in getting to know, observe and record the changing life world of 
managers and workers.  The Office of Housing is a large agency measured in 
terms of size of budget, employment, assets, service delivery to tenants and 
geographic dispersal of this service delivery.  It is therefore important to be 
clear about how it is to be researched.   
 
The framework presented in this chapter for analysing the way in which 
housing workers and managers work in a large state service delivery agency 
has two parts.  It has two parts because it is important that our research gaze 
can encompass the way in which individual workers and managers act but 
within the context of a large agency within the Australian state that is a part of a 
larger policy process.  They are the social constructionist approach to 
understanding human agency; and human agency within the ‘organisational’ 
context.  The social constructionist approach to understanding human agency 
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is important because ultimately it is the things people do and say day–to–day 
that shapes social and economic life.  This is as relevant in providing housing 
services as it is all other spheres of society.  The ‘organisational’ context idea is 
important because there are patterns and power relations in the things that 
people do and say day–to–day.  The idea of ‘organisations’ is a way of 
comprehending particular codified patterns of human activity.   
 
The framework used to get to know, observe and record the ‘organisation’ in 
this research has three key elements.  First, the research required the 
researcher, me, to become a part of the day–to–day life world of public housing 
service delivery.  This involves not just formal permission but the establishing 
of durable trust relations with workers and managers in the Office of Housing.  
Second, the research requires clarity about how we come to know what it is 
that people do and say as they go about planning and providing housing 
services.  This requires clarity about how we capture day–to–day interactions, 
the stories that people tell and the documents they write.  Third, the 
‘organisation’ has a geography.  At the most basic level workers and managers 
work in a number of offices spread across the state. It is important that there 
was sufficient coverage of these different sites to ensure that the research 
results are generalisable at the agency level. Of course, these offices in 
different places are distinguished by titles that indicate the imbricated nature of 
the organisation’s spatial and power relations.  
Social constructionism 
The choice of social constructivism as the theoretical framework was, to some 
degree, an easy one. Grounded theory, sociological positivism, critical 
discourse analysis and a number of alternative approaches would have worked 
quite well but my reason for drawing on social constructivism was informed by 
a simple remark about epistemology. Early in my reading I came across a 
statement about the ontological characteristics of nominalism: ‘we cannot really 
know or represent “reality” directly because our understanding of it is mediated 
by the constructs of our consciousness’ (Morrow and Brown, 1994. pg 54). This 
was exactly what I was aiming to do: explore the way in which Office of 
Housing housing managers and workers constructed their life world by hearing 
their stories and reading their texts, and through this learn about the way they 
understood their agency in relation to other workers and managers.   
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A social constructivist framework enabled me to do this.  For a start, those who 
work within a social constructivist frame want to understand how individuals 
construct their reality, to explore how groups communicate, to capture day–to–
day interactions in order to examine how people negotiate and construct 
shared views and perspectives in broader context. In other words, the focus is 
on human activities and the way in which they then reproduce broader 
institutions and societal structures.   Giddens explains it like this: 
 
Structure is both the medium and the outcome of the human 
activities which it recursively organises. Institutions, or large–scale 
societies, have structural properties in virtue of the continuity of the 
actions of their competent members.  But those members of society 
are only able to carry out their day–to–day activities in virtue of their 
capacity of instantiating those structural properties (Giddens, 1987 
p. 61) 
 
Giddens simple statement is about the duality of structure, an idea of structure 
referring to ‘both the medium and the outcome of the human activities which it 
recursively organises’.  It eloquently provides guidance about how the complex 
and intertwined processes of service provision in a large hierarchical state 
authority can be understood. It does this by directing attention to the day–to–
day activities of managers and workers in this setting and analysing them at 
two levels. On the one hand, there are the directly observed actions of 
managers and workers and their texts that can be described in simple terms.  
On the other hand, their day–to–day work is undertaken in a context, which has 
a set of ‘structural properties’. Of course these structural properties are not 
immediately apparent and have to be discovered through analysis of the 
actions of managers and workers and their texts.   
 
This duality of structure idea can be illustrated by referring to the way in which 
vacant public housing is allocated to new tenants.  This is routinely done by 
housing officers in a local housing office, whose job it is to allocate vacant 
dwellings.  They have in front of them a short list of vacant properties and a 
long list of applicants who have already been judged eligible through a 
centralised rule–bound application process.  They also have in front of them 
the lengthy and well–thumbed Allocations Manual, which is there to guide their 
decisions about which applicants come off the waiting lists and become public 
housing tenants and which house they move into.   
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Observations, their stories and notated copies of the Allocation Manual reveal 
the duality of structure in the way they do their jobs.  Broadly, what can be 
observed is that housing officers ‘comply’ with the provisions of the manual.  
However, it is apparent that there are competing and conflicting interpretations 
of the provisions by housing officers.  A reasonable interpretation of what 
underlies these competing and conflicting interpretations is: on one hand, the 
use of scarce housing resources ‘structural property’ driven by the idea of 
housing the greatest number of applicants; and on the other hand, meeting the 
assessed housing needs of applicants ‘structural property’.  All this takes place 
in a context where timeliness is a key performance indicator of the allocation of 
scarce state resources.   
Social constructionism and organisations 
Already in the discussion of social constructionism it is evident that what 
housing managers and workers do on a day–to–day basis and is the focus of 
the research can be better understood by using the duality of structure concept.  
However, it is also evident that the idea of the ‘structural properties’ in this day–
to–day work cannot be fully understood unless the relationships between the 
immediate work group or team and others that are out of sight in other offices 
are recognised. This can be done by clearly recognising the ‘organisation’ as a 
larger unit of analysis. There is another reason for this approach. Brown–
Saracino et.al argued that recognising the larger institution is important 
because ‘organisations, communities and other collective actors are more than 
the sum total of the interactions that comprise them’ (Brown–Saracino, 2008). 
The idea of ‘organisations’ is a way of comprehending particular codified 
patterns of human interactions at a larger scale.  This is important for this 
research because, as has been shown in Chapter One, there has been a long 
history of codified human activity that initiated and developed a system for 
building, resourcing, maintaining and allocating dwellings to low–income 
households.   
 
The most common approach in the discussion of organisations is to reify them 
in a way that ascribes to them simple goals and person–like status.  In this way 
people speak of ‘the organisation’, ‘the Commission’ and ‘the Office of Housing’ 
as an entity that has its own identity, agency and clearly stated goals. A formal 
organisation chart with clear reporting structures often accompanies this type of 
organisational discussion.  The charts map the divisions, branches and 
 53 
bureaus and the way in which they relate to each other.  At a more detailed 
level there will be the documentation that specifies job roles and reporting 
arrangements.  Linking this there will be mission statements, descriptions of 
organisational targets and ways measuring performance against targets 
through the use of key performance indicators.   
 
This approach to understanding organisations is reflected in much 
organisational and especially management literature.  For example, Carl ‘Max’ 
Weber devised what he called an 'ideal type' of management bureaucracy. 
These were organisations with elaborate hierarchical structures that served to 
divide up the labour of the workplace by rigid enforcement of explicit rules (that 
were formally and consistently applied) (Weber, 1968). Weber’s ‘ideal 
bureaucracy’ would staffed by full–time, life–long, professionals, who do not 
‘own’ the 'means of administration', or their jobs, or the sources of their funds 
(in other words, the means of production). Instead, staff would receive a 
predetermined annual salary, which would not come from the income/profit 
derived directly from the performance of their job. The above characteristics 
include many features found in the ‘modern public service’ and large ‘private 
industries’ that are staffed by salaried professionals. The work of other 
organisational theorists (such as Robbins and Barnwell) attempts to 
understand the nature of organisations by constructing typographies to 
categorise the different roles and functions for members of these organisations 
(Barnwell and Robbins, 2006).  Further, much of this literature evaluates and 
discusses the best ways of designing organisations and measuring 
organisational performance.   
 
This is one way of representing organisations and does describe a key feature 
of contemporary society which, as Galbraith (1983) observed, had become an 
‘organisational society’.  He was making the point that formal organisations, 
with goals, internal formal structures of divisions, branches and bureaus, 
targets and performance indicators were defining features of contemporary 
society.  However, Galbraith’s description of a key feature of contemporary 
society should not obscure another feature of life within these organisations. 
Organisations exist, but it should not be assumed that: there is consensus 
around goals; reporting and communication follows formal arrangements; and 
targets and use of indicators are uniformly pursued (Galbraith, 1983).  The 
extent to which there is consensus, formal reporting arrangements followed 
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and targets pursued is ultimately feature of an organisational life that can only 
be understood through knowing about what happens in formal organisations.  
Another way of making this point is to recognise that the setting of goals, 
reporting relationships and formulation of performance indicators is the 
outcome of manager’s work.   
 
This approach to understanding formal organisations, which on the one hand 
recognises their ontological presence while on the other hand acknowledges a 
level of precariousness, can be illustrated by referring again to the way in which 
vacant public housing is allocated to new tenants.  In the discussion of social 
constructionism above, I noted competing and conflicting interpretations of the 
rules guiding allocation of properties by officers at the local level.  When this 
same process is analysed against the background of the Office of Housing as a 
formal organisation, other key features and tensions in the allocation process 
becomes apparent. Performance at the local level focuses on individual 
housing service officers who are assessed using a ‘timely allocation’ of 
property key performance indicators.  However, in the budget and strategy part 
of the organisation, assessment of performance is different.  Here the focus is 
on the system and the reconciliation of this indicator with many other indicators, 
including rent income, vacancy rates and ‘responsible allocation’, which 
focuses on the match between dwelling and household size.  Further, in this 
part of the organisation, there was constant review of performance indicators 
and changes in emphasis about priorities.   
Access to the organisation 
In order to foreground the ‘duality of structure’ mentioned earlier, I employed a 
number of well–recognised and tested ethnographic practices. The data was 
gathered using semi–structured interviews, participant observation and 
document analysis.  One of the strengths of an ethnographic approach is that 
the depth of enquiry and richness of data produces ‘thick descriptions’ of the 
social practices and interactions described in the earlier part of this chapter 
(Geertz, 1973). In this sense, my research offers ‘an ethnography of housing’, 
making visible the service work carried out in three dimensions: longitudinally 
(over time), geographically (at different locations) and operationally (examining 
different roles, positions and functions). By spending twelve months observing 
people with different roles and statuses, in a range of social groups and at 
various office locations, I captured both the directly observed actions of 
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managers and workers and their texts and the structural context in which these 
actions occur. 
 
Ethnographic research is a risky undertaking for any organisation because 
sending a relatively unsupervised researcher into the workplace for an 
extended period and allowing them unfettered access to staff can lead to the 
discovery of events, attitudes and observations that might otherwise remain 
‘invisible’.  As a result, the initial process of negotiation was time–consuming 
and delicate.  I experienced a number of ‘false starts’. Two locations were 
assessed by head office as ‘not the most appropriate’. One location was 
considered not representative as it had too many high–rise buildings and 
another local office was unavailable as the manager had recently retired. ‘Too 
stable, too boring’, ‘going through a difficult period with staffing problems that 
do not accurately characterise the whole of the state’ and ‘head office agrees, 
but the local manager thinks that the staff would find it too much of an intrusion’ 
were some of the reasons for the early exclusion of particular sites.   
 
Gaining access to the field was further complicated by the implementation of 
the Housing Office Review. At the time of commencing my research in 2005, 
reform to staff structures, salary scales, job classification and general 
conditions were subject to difficult and sensitive negotiation between the union 
and the Office of Housing. My contacts at head office believed that a poor 
selection of field location could impact negatively on these negotiations. When I 
finally arrived at my first field location, participants never mentioned these 
negotiations and to date I have yet to ascertain what these ‘negative impacts’ 
might have been. It would appear that these concerns were limited to a small 
number of managers at head office and were anticipated issues, not actual 
ones. Silverman refers to these early negotiations as ‘trading with the 
gatekeepers’ (Silverman, 2000): in order to gain access to a site, the 
researcher must understand the role that organisational actors may and 
actually do perform in facilitating access. It is at this stage that the roles seem 
to be reversed, the observer becomes the observed as managers seek to 
determine if, and to what extent, they can trust the researcher. For me, it was 
quickly apparent that the gatekeepers at the Office of Housing were concerned 
with three things: maintaining involvement in the process of research (not the 
product), ensuring anonymity for participants (themselves included) and 
reducing the impact of an inquisitive outsider intruding on a workplace already 
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under pressure. But, after some weeks of negotiations, ethics approval and 
many cups of coffee, a fieldwork plan was established: 
The field locations 
 
 
Location one: Local office in the Western Suburbs. 
The first location is a formerly prosperous industrial area of Melbourne. This 
area of Victoria was once thriving; home to large factories, rail freight yards, 
market gardens and smaller industries providing steady work for semi–skilled 
employees.  It was home to the ‘working poor’ as it offered low cost housing, 
seemingly endless vacant land and had a plentiful and diverse employment 
market. Today this area is home to shopping malls, discount stores, numerous 
non–government agencies, second–hand stores and many empty, older shops.  
The Office of Housing is important to this area and all of the local ‘Commission’ 
offices have a long history of providing accommodation for the people in ‘the 
West’.  The Office of Housing is by far the single largest low cost housing 
provider in the region. Most of the staff in my ‘home’ office (the one in which I 
spent most time) drive to work from outside the area, but some staff grew up in 
‘Commission’ houses in local neighbourhoods and recall a time before ‘chronic 
unemployment, mental illness and single mothers’. The office seems a little too 
large, it has numerous empty desks from ‘better times’ and is structured in a 
manner that definitively separates the 30 (or so) staff from the customers. 
 
Location two: Regional office in the Western Suburbs. 
The second location accommodates housing workers with wider, non–
operational responsibilities; staffing, training, performance management and 
special projects. The Regional Office is considered by most housing services 
officers (HSOs) to be the ‘middle man’, a place where the dictums from head 
office are re–interpreted, filtered or enforced. It also presents as a security–
conscious workplace; prior to arriving, the significance of locks, doors and 
codes was explained to me by a number of HSO’s in location one. A large part 
of this security consciousness stems from the fact that the building is home to a 
Location One: 
Local Office in 
Western 
Suburbs of 
Melbourne 
Location Two: 
Regional 
Office in 
Western 
Suburbs of 
Melbourne 
Location 
Three: 
Head Office at 
555 Collins 
Street. 
Melbourne 
Non–Location 
Specific: 
Housing 
Support 
Coordinators – 
State–wide 
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number of service providers: housing, school nurses, child protection and a 
number of other agencies. Some of the staff at regional office had previously 
worked in location one and it was apparent that strong connections and 
linkages exist between the two locations. 
 
Location three: Head office, Central Business District.  
Head office is both imposing and invisible; it’s more than 20 stories tall, 
monitored by high level security and is home to the policy makers, planning 
people and managers of the Office of Housing. My main focus at head office 
was to explore the connections and shared understandings between Head 
Office and local offices.  I was particularly interested in how managers 
construct and understand housing problems; and how their understandings 
influence policy, staff training and perceptions about the social reality of the 
work at front–line. This field placement was the most challenging as staff at 
head office were significantly more conscious of the politically sensitive nature 
of their work, their comments more guarded and often their remarks were 
carefully measured and without prejudice. Head Office staff were significantly 
more concerned with the risk of identification in the data. As a result, some staff 
were, on occasion, reluctant to disclose, they gave lengthy and vague answers 
or simply referred me to a more appropriate person to ask. However, some 
staff openly critiqued the department, venting their frustrations with ‘the 
problems’, ‘maintaining the status quo’, ‘weak and indecisive management’ and 
those they perceived to be ‘producing reform for reforms sake’. 
 
In addition to local, regional and head office workers, in the local offices I 
discovered another small, discrete group of workers that were spread though 
out the local offices in the organisation - these were the Housing Support 
Coordinators (HSCs). 
 
Non–location specific: Housing Support Coordinators (HSC). 
In an effort to assist with the most difficult and complex tenancy issues, one of 
the earliest recommendations in the Housing Office Review was that larger 
local offices need to appoint a specialised staff member - the Housing Support 
Coordinator (HSC). Early in my fieldwork, it became apparent that incorporating 
the stories from HSCs into the data would be difficult. It was not possible to 
generalise data from a single staff member, with quite specific responsibilities 
and specialised tasks. The likelihood of maintaining anonymity for these 
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participants was low. As result, I attempted to interview as many HSCs as 
possible, attend their regional and state–wide meetings, and collect documents 
pertaining to their work. In order to protect their anonymity, stories from HSC’s 
have been merged into a single narrative; this is a common and well–accepted 
practice for ethnographers researching a small and specialised group. 
Entering the field 
In November 2004, I arrived strategically early, deliberately under–prepared 
and empty–handed at a housing office in the Western Suburbs of Melbourne. 
This first visit was unannounced. Most contact had been via email with the 
office manager and my primary task on day one was to attend and address the 
staff meeting. Staff meetings at this office seemed relatively formal yet my 
presence seemed to cause little disturbance. I was introduced as a ‘guest 
speaker’ keen to become an ‘informed outsider’. I explained my research 
question and honesty described how the findings might benefit housing 
workers. My field notes record a range of staff reactions, from quiet disbelief to 
mild scepticism. As one staff member commented, ‘Why the hell would you 
want to research us for? What could you possibly learn that would be of any 
use to anyone?’  My intention in this first contact was not to build trust and 
develop rapport, but to signify that head office had endorsed and was 
supportive of this project.  As the fieldwork progressed, I was to learn that this 
endorsement was both a liability and an asset. A number of front–line staff 
were initially reluctant to fully participate because I might be ‘a spy for head 
office’, some middle managers seemed assured by this endorsement and head 
office staff, almost without exception, were most interested in the ‘final 
destination’ of my thesis.  This process, the action of establishing a role as 
researcher with many and yet, no affiliations, was time–consuming and 
delicate. In an effort to establish myself as a bipartisan observer, I left the staff 
meeting and waited for a little over a week before returning to get my fieldwork 
underway. 
 
Over time, I came to better understand the dynamics of these ‘introductory’ 
meetings. As a result, I was able to more effectively gauge the enthusiasm and 
the potential for engagement, learning what to empathise with, when to 
elaborate and selecting terminology most appropriate for each audience. The 
part–time, fragmented nature of these workplaces (and the fact that my partner 
gave birth to twins mid–fieldwork) meant that it was sometimes weeks before I 
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had contact with all the staff. As a result, I became quite adept at speedy initial 
introductions and developed a simple explanation of the project and its 
purpose. 
 
In an effort to ‘blend’ into each location, I chose to become an active participant 
in the mundane work of each office; filing, photocopying, sorting, envelope 
stuffing and, occasionally, cooking BBQs. Singer describes this early stage in 
the fieldwork as becoming a learner: ‘Ethnographers must be learners, and as 
such, they must position themselves so that people in the community feel 
comfortable teaching them’. (LeComte et al., 1999b. pg 21). This technique 
allows participants to become comfortable with the presence of a researcher; it 
builds informal and natural rapport and allows time for the researcher to attune 
their eyes and ears to what is occurring around them. Schensul believes that 
this process takes some time and ‘the first month or so of fieldwork produces 
many impressions that are not accurate or relevant to the study’ (LeComte et 
al., 1999b. pg 22). Engaging in intuitive understanding is common in 
ethnographic work; early data usually includes perceptions about the 
organisational environment, initial observations about how staff relate to each 
other, an outline of the geo–social nature of the building and the identification 
of local gatekeepers and key informants. My initial observations would focus on 
how social and physical boundaries are defined and the way in which patterns 
of etiquette, political organisation and leadership, status and other cultural 
patterns structure this office. In the later part of this thesis, the focus moves 
from these broad, general observation to a more focused and structured 
exploration of individual accounts of housing problems, as expressed in the 
housing workers ‘stories’.  
 
Doing the research is one thing, telling the reader what I have discovered is 
another. Here I briefly outline the structure of the research approach: 
 
One of the key premises of this research is that modern day housing ‘work’ 
(and the problems inherent in this work) is a form of practice that has been 
‘socially constructed’ over a long period of time (Bourdieu, 1994).  As such, it 
has both old and new understandings amalgamated and sedimented in layers.  
‘Public housing work’ has been represented in historical texts (the ‘artefacts of 
the organisation’) in many different ways, as ‘slum abolition’, ‘education of the 
poor’ and ‘improvement in individual health and hygiene’.  In the preceding 
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chapter, I described how public housing has long been seen as a device to 
improve society by reforming the habits and behaviours of its less ‘well to do’ 
citizens.  In the organisational artefacts in the preceding chapter, it is apparent 
that staff create and are informed by narrative about how best to mandate 
edibility criteria, they talk about what constitutes ‘appropriate behaviour’ and 
they discuss and dispute the most appropriate policies and procedures to 
remedy housing problems.  By charting the evolving roles and responsibilities 
of housing workers over the last century, these texts allowed me to understand 
how the current organisational reality is a collage of multi–layered, sedimented 
meanings.  
 
I was particularly taken with Boden’s description of how workers participate in 
this sedimentation process. She wrote,  ‘And all the while they (the workers) 
are producing that reasonable and reasoned account of action that makes 
sense now and links past actions to only partially grasped futures’ (Boden, 
1994. pg. 153). This simple sentence encapsulated how I would answer my 
research questions, by employing an ethnographic approach to collect and 
analyse these ‘reasonable and reasoned accounts of daily actions’ and to then 
use these accounts to better understanding human agency; in this case, 
human agency within the ‘organisational’ context. 
 
This research followed a well–established approach for doing ethnographic 
work. I used semi–structured intensive interviews as the principal method of 
data collection. Spending nearly twelve months in the field produces a 
staggering volume of data. Many hours of talk was recorded, some people 
were interviewed many times and a few lengthy interviews exceeded the 
memory capacity of my digital recorder! My experience as a ‘professional 
stranger’ in the local office was overwhelmingly positive and, once comfortable 
with my presence, the vast majority of staff were active participants in the 
research. Staff were willing to share their thoughts, take time out of their day to 
be interviewed or simply invite me along for home visits. Crompton and Jones 
have observed this positive response in other organisational ethnographies and 
believe that ‘Once individuals are assured of your independence they seem, 
almost always, to welcome the opportunity to discuss their work, their 
aspirations and their discontents’ (Crompton and Jones, 1988. pg 70).   
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Interviewing staff at head office was more challenging. Senior managers were 
keen to talk but they are highly skilled communicators; often experts at qualified 
disclosure and would answer my questions with reflective and impartial 
comments, often disclosing very little, sometimes answering with a question of 
their own. To counter this, I would often casually ‘revisit a comment made in an 
interview’ over coffee, in the lift or at a morning tea. This allowed me to produce 
a layer of understandings, combining the formal, qualified interview comments 
with the more pragmatic and unofficial discussions, producing what Van 
Maanen calls a ‘thick description’ of the workplace. 
 
The interviews were recorded (overtly and with permission) on a Sony Digital 
Voice recorder, archived on an RMIT laptop, backed up to compact disk and, 
due to the significant volume of data, a moderate number of stories were 
transcribed. As the research progressed, it became apparent that the most 
useful way to catalogue and navigate through the interviews was to use 
‘Problems with Tenants, Assets, Income and Organisation’ as data categories. 
Each interview was then bookmarked with more specific descriptors and 
ordered for easy recall. Like most ethnographers, I worked to develop 
relationships with a number of staff who were ‘boundary spanners; key 
informants who able to relate to a variety of different settings, sectors, networks 
and individuals and are prepared to link the ethnographer with these 
informational resources’ (LeComte et al., 1999a. pg 87). These boundary 
spanners/key informants were often the long–serving staff, those involved in 
large, organisation wide projects, people who had worked at regional office and 
those with strong external links. Many of these key informants participated in a 
number of interviews and, by the end of my first field placement, some HSOs 
were requesting a quick chat, telling me to ‘..grab your tape machine and I will 
tell you something’. 
 
The second data collection method involved another well–established 
ethnographic practice - in this case, participant observation. The strength of 
participant observation recorded over long periods of time is that the 
researcher can discover discrepancies between what participants say (and 
believe) might happen and what actually occurs. With field notes spanning 
some twelve months, this research captures conflicts between different aspects 
of social systems and describes any discrepancies between perception and 
action (Schensul and LeComte, 1999). I found that Holly’s research on keeping 
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a professional journal to be particularly useful, and employed her journal 
strategies to guide and structure my record keeping. She describes 
professional journals as ‘a chronicle of events as they happen, a dialogue with 
the facts (objective) and interpretations (subjective), and perhaps most 
important, it provides a basis for developing an awareness of the difference 
between facts and interpretations’ (Holly, 1997. pg 5). This dialogue between 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ fact is particularly useful when analysing contentious 
issues; my participant observations allow me to contextualise the events as 
portrayed by individuals in their narrative accounts. In other words, allowing me 
to ‘expose the duality of structure’. 
 
My field journal had two components. The first was a collection of hastily 
penned annotations, scribbled in meetings, dot points from tea room 
conversations and observations of overheard discussions. The second 
component was a more structured use of participant observation to uncover 
how organisational culture might be represented in different ways and unlikely 
places. Crompton and Jones suggest that the ethnographer play close 
attention to minutiae of organisational life: do people have personalised work 
spaces? Is the office organised in a clear hierarchical manner?  How do the 
workers settle disputes and go about their daily work? (Crompton and Jones, 
1988). One of the greatest challenges for the ethnographer is responding to the 
desire to view every event and interaction as data, to treat every 
communication as important and struggling to assess what is significant (and 
what is not).   Most housing workers spend many hours facing a computer, so I 
did likewise, and typed many pages of observation, most of which did not make 
any immediate sense, but would prove very useful as the research progressed. 
 
 
The final method of data collection was to accumulate as many documents as 
possible. I set about copying and collecting posters, emails, memos, policy 
manuals (which, tellingly, proved too large and cumbersome to copy), research 
reports, consultant reports and many other texts.  In the early stages of my 
fieldwork, my collection technique was rudimentary and, with little knowledge of 
what documents were important, I collected indiscriminately. As the research 
progressed, I became increasingly aware of the ‘important challenges’ for 
public housing and the ‘pressing issues’ for the workforce and began to focus 
on collecting documents that focussed on ‘housing problems’. The Housing 
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Office Review, Final Report (Office of Housing, 2004) was particularly useful 
here, as it summed up the ‘little’ problems I had encountered in the archives. 
This archival material was valuable as I refined my research approach: what I 
was hearing in my conversations was confirmed and the definitions contained 
in this archive eventually provided the structure and framework for my 
voluminous data.   
 
At the completion of fieldwork, in excess of one hundred and forty hours of 
individual interviews have been recorded, several notebooks filled with 
scribbled observations, three boxes filled with documents and tens of hours 
spent listening, talking, watching and attending social functions. 
The telling of the tale: Composites protect participants 
In order to ensure the anonymity of participants, these stories are presented 
using a recognised ethnographic technique: as a series of vignettes 
constructed as composite identities (Schensul and LeComte, 1999). The 
process of creating composite identities takes the personal characteristics of 
the participants and merges them to form a series of amalgamated characters, 
each with a distinct voice and identity (Schensul and LeComte, 1999). In this 
research, the process of manufacturing composite profiles was relatively 
straightforward. By examining the characteristics of individual participants in 
this study, a pattern emerged. There seemed to be some clearly identifiable 
typical (and atypical) behaviours, mutually held beliefs, shared ethical 
positions, common idioms, mutual understandings, similar family backgrounds 
and shared career trajectories.  
 
It became apparent that five composites would be the best way to accurately 
and honestly represent the stories of the fifty or more people whose stories I 
gathered in this study. The first two composites are ‘Phil’ and ‘Sophia’, names 
selected simply because no participants in the study had these (or similar) 
names.  
 
Phil is an ‘accidental HSO’; he started with the housing commission some 
years ago, simply to fill a temporary vacancy answering the phones and 
covering reception when staff were ill or away. He never really intended to stay, 
and is a little surprised to find that many years later he has become a ‘career 
public servant’. After more than ten years of housing work, he finds himself 
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senior in terms of age, but working in a position that is still relatively low on the 
management hierarchy. Phil is an informal mentor to the new staff and, on 
occasion, his history, knowledge and ‘selective memory’ can be a challenge for 
the newer, ‘aspirational’ managers in the department.  
 
Sophia is a ‘centrally recruited HSO’. She completed her VCE and subsequent 
higher education qualification and decided that the Victorian Public Service 
offered both security of employment and a diversity of roles.  Sophia, like a few 
of her peers, was recruited, interviewed, inducted and trained by (and at) head 
office.  She finds the work challenging, at times interesting and mostly 
enjoyable, but is growing increasingly frustrated by the volume of admin and 
reporting required. She has long–term career plans, but is beginning to think 
that her work in housing might be too narrowly focused and, as a result, the 
opportunities for promotion and growth might be more limited than she first 
anticipated. Sophia feels a little torn between her ambition and the security, 
benefits and dynamic work of the HSO job, especially as a ‘newlywed with 
family plans’.  
 
The second composites are head office staff, middle level managers I have 
called ‘Henry’ and ‘Sara’.  
 
Henry has come to housing from another government department (his third job 
since graduation) and his new job requires him to make policy and procedure 
decisions which have a very real impact on the daily work of HSOs. His 
motivation to accept this job was not so much an interest in public housing, but 
more his considerable expertise in quality assurance, customer service and 
policy production. He will work hard in his current position and hopes that, in 
two to three years time, he might move to a more senior management position, 
possibly heading up a major project team in either a state or federal 
government department.  
 
Sara works on the same level as Henry, but her career trajectory is a little 
different.  Sara started out at a housing office in her local area, after her 
neighbour told her about a job vacancy where she worked with ‘the 
Commission’. As her children grew older and more independent, Sara found 
herself increasingly interested in the projects and secondments that regularly 
appeared on the staff room notice board. After a brief stint working on a project 
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at regional office, Sara applied for (and got) a job at head office. Even though 
she is now a senior manager, well established and well known in the 
organisation, she is quick to disclose her pedigree; she started out at the front–
line, she was and still is a HSO at heart and remembers ‘what it’s really like out 
there’. 
 
The final composite comes from the voices we heard earlier in Chapter Two, a 
small group of retired housing workers.  Their backgrounds are quite diverse, 
but all started with ‘the Housing Commission’ and have spent the majority of 
their careers as managers of an organisation that provides basic housing to the 
working poor.   
 
This composite I have called Doug. Doug describes himself as ‘pensioned off’, 
but is able to recall with some clarity the last few years of his housing career. 
As Doug’s housing career drew to a close, he found himself dealing with an 
increasing number of complex tenants, some of whom were housed in ageing 
properties that needed immediate and costly repairs. Doug experienced a 
number of restructures, realignments and reorganisations over his career and 
the final years were spent managing the consequences of de–
institutionalisation, multi–generational welfare dependence, increasing 
numbers of single parent families, a significant growth in the number of elderly 
tenants and the slow but inevitable introduction of the language and culture of 
'customer service’. Doug enjoyed his career in public housing, but he is ‘glad 
he got out when he did’. 
 
Composites are a useful tool for ethnographers as they allow the researcher to 
personalise the connection between important personal experiences and an 
area of knowledge, in this case to contrast the problems experienced by 
housing staff and the understandings of senior managers with the literature 
concerning the same problems (Tedlock, 2003). In this study, composites were 
used as they ensure participant confidentiality by conferring anonymity on a 
large number of people who have told their stories, by ‘telescoping character 
traits and anecdotes drawn from a number of sources into a single 
representative sketch’ (Zeller, 1995. pg 167).  It is interesting, but not 
surprising, to note that the majority of participants were concerned with 
ensuring that their contribution be confidential and the data be presented in a 
manner that does not disclose their identity.  
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Composites are not without their limitations, and one of the challenges with the 
production and employment of composite narratives is the risk of stereotyping. 
This risk has been addressed in this research by ensuring that the narratives of 
each and every participant are used.  Where possible, the stories and accounts 
were drawn from the contributions by all staff and managers.  As a result, these 
data contain a number of sometimes–contradictory positions and opinions that 
cannot be easily reconciled. This is an accurate representation of what I found 
in the field: housing staff use contested narratives to produce meaning, they 
are often divided, sometimes unified and occasionally ambiguous about their 
problems. This contested ‘meaning making’ is the principle focus for much 
narrative ethnography, and the stories from ‘Phil, Sophia, Henry, Sara and 
Doug’ are no exception - their stories are framed in the social theoretical 
thinking espoused by Spradley in 1979 (and supported by the work of Dorr–
Bremme some years later): 
 
The essential core of ethnography is this concern with the meaning 
of actions and events of the people we seek to understand … 
people make constant use of these complex meaning systems to 
organise their behaviour, to understand themselves and others and 
to make sense out of the world in which they live. (Spradley, 1979. 
pp 66-67) 
 
This is because; 
 ... the goal of modern ethnography is to take a primary interest in 
how human groups routinely make sense of their world and act 
sensibly in it. (Dorr-Bremme, 1985. pg 66) 
 
Having decided to use composites to ensure anonymity whilst telling stories 
that were, at times, personal and confronting, the next concern was how to best 
represent the content of these stories. Van Maanen suggests that there are 
three approaches to the representation of ethnographic stories: realist, 
confessional and impressionist (Van Maanen, 1995). The realist approach most 
closely follows positivist traditions, attempting to remove the author from the 
text, aiming to realistically tell the tale as ‘truthfully’ and ‘scientifically’ as 
possible. The second approach, confessional, is an approach where the author 
is revealed within the text by writing about emotional reactions and unexpected 
developments as part of their explanation. Van Maanen describes the third 
approach as impressionist; the author is the teller of a tale in dramatic form of 
episodes considered to be notable and significant. 
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This project has elements of all of the above. At times (especially when at head 
office) I was removed from the stories; listening, eavesdropping and observing 
in an asynchronistic manner, with little or no opportunity to question or clarify. 
Conversely, at the local office, the research explores the experience of people 
working with often ‘colorful’ customers, as a result, there is a predictable 
inclination towards impressionism, but telling only tales that are extreme, tragic, 
funny, complex or upbeat is a trap for all ethnographers. Recognising this risk, I 
have purposely set out to frame the data in a confessional manner and, where 
possible, engage in dialogue between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ fact by 
referring back to my field notes for clarification (Holly, 1997). 
Conclusion 
The research approach in this project is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the 
framework is built around data gathering which employs a combination of ‘tried 
and true’ ethnographic tools and the application of a new and related research 
approach, ‘organisational ethnography’. Because the manner by which housing 
staff use narrative to construct the organisation (and its problems) is of 
particular interest, this research is underpinned by the theoretical framework of 
social construction. Secondly, the research approach will produce new 
knowledge about the under–researched work life of the staff who work in the 
rapidly changing world of public housing in Victoria. Stories will be employed to 
explain how staff ‘work and deal with’ housing problems, using the voices of 
participants to provide an insight into how staff experience, construct and make 
sense of their changing work as ‘public housing’ becomes ‘welfare housing’.  
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Chapter Three 
The Housing Office Review 
 
 
The Housing Office Review commenced to develop a more effective 
and consistent service delivery model that better supports staff to 
work within an environment where the nature of public housing is 
changing and the demand for services and the number of clients 
with complex needs is increasing. (Office of Housing, 2004. pg.10) 
 
In this chapter, I describe and analyse the Housing Office Review (hereafter, 
‘the Review’) using the final report as a surrogate for the overall process of 
review and reform. In particular, I will focus on the way the Review defined the 
problems and preferred solutions. Bacchi has argued strongly that how a policy 
is presented plays an important role in shaping the resultant policy ‘solutions’ 
(Bacchi, 2009). This suggested to me that there was a need to pay attention to 
the way the problems the Review identified were represented. Yet other 
reasons also point to the value of understanding the way the Review set loose 
a framework for change. As I have already suggested, the Review sponsored a 
process of organisational change which had a significant impact on the 
participants in my study. As later chapters reveal, staff would frequently discuss 
the Review, with some speaking of little else. Senior managers insisted that the 
Review was ‘the most significant reform to public housing since the 
establishment of the Commission’. Conversely, the majority of housing officers 
I spoke with said that the Review was important, but largely because it was 
disruptive, unnecessarily complex and poorly implemented.  
 
Understanding the Review in terms of Bacchi’s framework goes some way then 
to understanding the policy process, but only goes so far. How the people 
charged with delivering services (services that are designed to give effect to a 
changed policy) understand and experience that policy also matters as they 
struggle to implement that policy. Another reason for employing the final report 
as a framework is that it provides a useful analytic structure with which to try 
and make sense of the organisational culture and practice I experienced in the 
Office of Housing.  
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In January 2004, the Victorian Office of Housing released the final report of its 
Housing Office Review, referred to by staff as ‘the HOR’ (Office of Housing, 
2004). This final report brought together data from numerous sources: 
consultant reports (Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001), auditors’ 
reports (Victorian Auditor General, 1996, Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 
2003) and many other previously released discussion papers (Office of 
Housing, 2002a, Office of Housing, 2002c). The final report summarised the 
views of a number of stakeholders (including senior executives, managers, 
staff, tenants and the many agencies linked to public housing) about a range of 
problems in public housing policy and proposed the solutions to remedy these 
problems. Though no process of policy review and change can ever be 
reduced to, or represented by, a single report, by drawing on the materials 
used to inform this report, it is still possible to make the 2004 final report ‘stand 
in’ for the Housing Office Review.  
 
The ‘HOR’ provides a particularly clear and concise account of what the Office 
of Housing in 2004 took to be the key problems it was addressing and the 
solutions it was proposing to ‘fix’ those problems. It triggered a process of 
change in policy, process and organisational culture, which my research sought 
to make sense of. In particular, by formally acknowledging that many of the 
‘clients’ of the Office of Housing had ‘multiple and complex needs’ (Thomson 
Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001), the Review signalled a period of major 
organisational change. This organisational change had a significant impact on 
the experience of managers and workers, an impact on the people I worked 
with, spoke with and listened to. The Review is important because it provides a 
clear and concise articulation about how public housing has changed and 
provided me with insight into how housing staff might understand and 
experience the proposed major process of operational policy change as the 
Office of Housing formally shifts from ‘public’ housing to ‘welfare’ housing. 
 
In what follows, I begin by briefly outlining the broader context in which the 
Review took place before I outline how the Review represented the problems 
and constructed the solutions it offered to transform Victoria’s public housing 
policy. 
 
As I have already suggested, while the Final Report (Office of Housing, 2004) 
does not represent the entirety of the Housing Office Review, it has the merit of 
 70 
summarising the key problems which the Office of Housing believed it needed 
to identify and resolve. One clue to the early intentions of the review process is 
signified by a small but basic change in terminology. In early documentation, 
the acronym ‘HOR’ was an abbreviation for the ‘Housing Officer Review’. By 
the end of 2002, the letter ‘r’ had been removed and the ‘HOR’ became an 
acronym for the ‘Housing Office Review’. This small revision signalled a shift in 
focus as the Review moved away from an examination of the classification of 
housing officers and became a broader review process, examining the service 
delivery and organisational culture of the Office of Housing. As the report put it: 
 
The Housing Office Review was established to respond to the 
changing nature of public housing in Victoria; to address workforce 
issues in the light of both high attrition rates and the increased 
complexity of customer needs; and to examine the effectiveness of 
the Housing Services Officer role. (Office of Housing, 2004. pg.13) 
 
What is old is new again: The review in context 
Change at the Office of Housing (OoH) is not new.  In the text, ‘New Houses for 
Old’ Howe (and others) describe a number of attempts to review, reform, and 
transform Victorias public housing sector (Howe, 1988b).  Howe’s work 
provided a useful insight into how the role and responsibilities of housing 
workers has changed (and stayed the same) over the years, describing how 
changing priorities and shifting organisational goals impact on the day–to–day 
work of housing staff. In the past, housing solutions have included (but were 
not limited to) slum reclamation, the construction of high–rise units, 
neighbourhood renewal, rent setting and numerous other forms of ‘social 
engineering’ and community intervention. As I will suggest later in this thesis, a 
number of housing problems appear to be ‘perennial and persistent’. 
 
What differentiates this Review from previous exercises was that, as a number 
of senior managers put it, ‘the Housing Office Review is not simply about 
tenants’. They believe that the Review was different because it attempted to 
critically reconsider all facets of the organisation and involved shifting the focus 
from the nature and behaviour of individual tenants, to the systems and 
organisation of housing services. The recommendations in the Final Report 
were drawn from a broad range of reports and reviews, including an 
assessment of customer service standards, reviews of complaint procedures, 
and an appraisal of the rebate system, the collection of rent, issues with 
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maintenance and property management and a number of other housing 
policies and procedures. 
 
Irrespective of the motivation for the Review, it was important to the 
participants in this research for three reasons. Firstly, housing managers used 
the Review as a vehicle to construct and represent the problems facing state 
housing. Secondly, the Review became a device for policy makers and senior 
managers to communicate their views about the changing nature of public 
housing, the hardship of the tenants it accommodated and the services it was 
called on to provide. Finally, and most importantly, the Review provided 
leverage for managers as they struggled to implement organisational change. 
The Review was used to describe, explain and justify the need for 
organisational reform.  
 
The Final Report (Office of Housing, 2004) became the definitive means by 
which the Office of Housing represented and articulated the problems with 
tenants, assets, income and organisation. The final report consolidated the 
wide range of housing ‘problems’ as constructed by managers, consultants, 
outside agencies, housing staff and tenants. The final report presented these 
problems in a ‘clinical’ way and responded to each problem area with a series 
of lengthy recommendations.  The focus of the final report moved from 
‘managers construct problems’ to proposing organisational reforms designed to 
reduce the impact of these problems on the housing system. 
 
The improvements recommended in the Review included most elements of the 
operation, but one recommendation caught my attention more than others; to 
include the ‘clarification of job roles and improved staff knowledge and 
consistent business practices’ and to ‘examine the effectiveness of the Housing 
Services Officer role’. Statements such as this signalled an intention to 
question, critique and evaluate the policies and procedures used to direct the 
work of housing staff, which will, in turn, result in a critique of housing workers 
themselves. 
 
In addition to the Housing Office Review Final Report, in this chapter I use a 
number of supporting documents to describe how housing problems have been 
constructed and represented in the housing review literature. These individual 
documents are useful and insightful in their own right, but when they are 
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combined, the cumulative effect is to expose how housing problems are 
entrenched and deeply embedded in the structure of the organisation and 
sedimented in the service culture of local offices.  
 
A quick survey of some of the reports and reviews points, if nothing else, to a 
sense that some problems never seemed to go away.  
 
As early as 1979, the Ministry of Housing released a discussion paper (Task 
Force on Housing Policy Review, 1979). This 1979 discussion paper was 
released prior to the 1981 Green Paper on housing reform ‘in an effort to 
catalyse the consultant and discussion processes’.  The paper sought to 
‘catalyse’ the discussion through the use of two devices. Firstly, it summarised 
the housing environment, at the time, with a series of generalised observations: 
‘Family types are becoming more varied. There are more single parent and 
other “non–standard” families. Different sorts of households require different 
sorts of housing’ (Task Force on Housing Policy Review, 1979. pg. 34).  
Second, the paper posed a number of questions relating to these observations: 
‘What can be done to improve the variety of housing for rent? What could be 
done to improve the management of estates?’  
 
In 1996, the Victorian Auditor Generals office released a report titled ‘Public 
Housing; responding to a fundamental community need’. This document 
described in broad terms, the condition of public housing in Victoria, including 
the location of estates and the type of amenity available to tenants. The report 
also described how public tenants are treated by staff, how they experienced 
transactions such as the response to maintenance requests, the provision of 
information and the competence of staff. This report concluded with a 
recommendation that housing managers needed to develop a better 
understanding of how ‘problems with the organisation’ might impact on 
customer service, complaint management and the often hard to quantify 
human–interface facet of housing work.  
 
The Housing Assistance Act. Annual Report 1998–99 was a financial audit 
document which, in addition to appraising the Housing Assistance Act, 
identified a number of secondary, related public housing ‘challenges’ (Steering 
Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision, 1999). 
This report confirmed the Auditor–Generals 1996 findings and, described a 
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number of related housing problems with timeliness, repairs, waiting lists and 
consumer satisfaction.  It highlighted difficulties with the accuracy of the 
organisation’s data, inconsistent performance indicators and described the 
State’s ongoing inability to fully understand the complexity (and capacity) of its 
housing operations. This document framed public housing funding in a national 
context and described how public housing had become one component in an 
expanding (and under funded) welfare sector. The Housing Assistance Act. 
Annual Report 1998–99 provides a succinct and yet compelling description of 
the enduring problems with the funding of public housing. Issues with state and 
federal funding was only one of the income problems of the OoH; they also had 
another income problem: rent.  
 
‘Rent’ was the focus of the Brotherhood of St Laurence’s report (Lyons, 2000). 
This report assumed a tenant–centric perspective in its exploration of the 
persistent problems with rental arrears. Bureaucrats and housing managers 
used this type of independent research to understand and contextualise the 
broader circumstance under which tenants fall behind in their rent.  It offered a 
number of alternative explanations for the ‘problems with rent’ and describes 
the consequences of an increasing number of applications from tenants with 
‘complex needs’(Lyons, 2000). These problems with rent stemming from 
tenants with complex needs were confirmed by Berry and Hall in their study 
‘Public housing: Shifting client profiles and public housing revenues’. (Hall, J. & 
Berry, M. 2007) 
 
Accelerating the targeting of allocations to those in greatest need has meant 
that those on single and the very lowest incomes (almost all of these 
households depend almost entirely on pension and benefit payments) now 
dominate allocations. Even with changes in rent–charging policies, it is likely 
that the medium–term real rent received per tenancy will fail to meet the cost of 
provision. (Hall and Berry, 2007. pg. 2) 
Berry and Hall’s findings are logical (and to some degree, predictable) because 
the more perilous the lives of the people you help, the more precarious is your 
ability to generate income from their tenancy, so it makes sense that the 
organisation’s ability to generate revenue will be reduced. But, the concept of 
precarious tenancies, complex and multiple needs and poverty were not just 
‘problems with rent’. These problems now dominate the organisation, affect the 
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provision of services and require a new approach to the management of public 
housing.  
 
As a result, perhaps the most significant precursor to the release of the Review 
was a report prepared by consultants commissioned by the Department of 
Human Services to assess the capacity of the Office of Housing to deal with 
‘people with high and complex needs’ (Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 
2001). This literature review was the first comprehensive examination and 
evaluation of the support systems for a small, but growing group of people 
whose ‘high and complex’ needs challenged an already overloaded public 
housing system. The purpose of this report was to ‘investigate how strategies 
can be developed and implemented from a whole of department perspective to 
respond to people whose needs require a higher level of service planning and 
provision than the service system currently provides’ (Thomson Goodall 
Associates Pty Ltd, 2001. pg 1). This report signalled the need for a ‘whole of 
department/government’ approach to tenant management and argued that 
housing managers needed to consider the problems with tenants as simply one 
of many demands on the social welfare system. This report focused on how 
‘people with high and complex needs’ impact on all the elements of the housing 
system: rent, community, staffing, allocations and the many other components 
of the organisation of public housing.  
 
Some years later, the Office of the Victorian Auditor General once again 
examined public housing and produced a parallel report titled ‘Maintaining 
public housing stock’ (Victorian Auditor General, 2004.). This report reiterated a 
number of unresolved issues flagged three years earlier in the 1996 report 
(Victorian Auditor General, 1996).  Both these reports provided a 
comprehensive summary of the Auditor General’s evaluation of how well the 
Office of Housing (OoH) is maintaining Victoria’s public housing stock. The 
report identified a number of long–standing deficiencies with the OoH’s 
management of housing maintenance, including issues such as poorly 
programmed maintenance, unresponsive (‘breakdown’) repairs, the tardy and 
substandard preparation of vacated properties and a failure to provide 
adequate housing stock management systems (including an absence of 
comprehensive condition reports and the lack of an up to date data–base of 
properties currently owned and managed by the state). This report was openly 
critical of the OoH’s lack of action around maintenance, asset growth and 
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protection and called on housing managers to urgently remedy the problems 
with assets. 
 
The housing office review that began in 2002 emerged out of this backdrop of 
persistent concern about Victoria’s public housing policy, the capacity of the 
organisation, waiting lists, allocation, rent, policies and practices and the 
condition of the housing stock. 
 
Reports such as those summarised above were to play a role in shaping the 
agenda of change proposed in the Review. Curiously, it is not entirely clear 
when that review process began, though the production of discussion papers 
during and prior to 2002 clearly suggests that senior managers were 
experiencing increasing pressure to reform the organisation. As a result, 
identifying an ‘exact’ commencement date for the Housing Office Review was 
not possible. Some told me that it ‘really started’ when the public housing 
construction boom ended, others felt that it was ‘early 1990, in the Kennett 
years’ and most long–serving housing officers felt that reform ‘has always been 
around, operating under a different name’. One thing was very clear in these 
reports: the Office of Housing faced a number of increasingly complex 
problems. 
Representing the problems 
The review, epitomised by the Final Report, identified four kinds of problems. 
These can be represented as follows: 
The Housing Problems 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The problems identified in the Housing Office Review. 
FUNDING 
The OoH faces problems with income, 
including complex rent setting 
procedures, high levels of arrears, 
declining commonwealth funds and an 
increasingly poor tenant base from 
which to collect rent. 
ORGANISATION 
The OoH has a number of issues with 
the nature of its organisation. These 
are problems with communication, 
staffing, training, retention, teams and 
work practices more generally. 
ASSETS 
The OoH has significant problems with 
its assets. A growing number of 
properties are old and no longer ‘fit for 
purpose’, the waiting list grows faster 
than new development and the 
changing needs of tenants calls for  
new types of accommodation. 
 
TENANTS: 
The OoH has a growing number of 
tenants with ‘complex and multiple 
needs’. These needs relate to health, 
ageing, drug use, family breakdown, 
unemployment and many other social 
issues. 
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In what follows, I will use these problems as a framework to address three 
questions:  
 
1) What were the problems senior management at the Office of Housing were 
seeking to address through the Housing Office Review?   
2) What were the measures proposed to remedy these problems?  
3) What organisational change needed to occur if those problems were to be 
remedied? 
The problems 
Firstly, let me summarise the way the review represented each of the problems 
to be remedied by the implementation of a ‘more effective and consistent 
delivery model’.  
 
The first of these problems, ‘tenants’, examines the changing nature of a 
‘typical’ public housing tenant. ‘Problems with tenants’ explores how the shift 
from neighbourhoods populated by the ‘working poor’ to communities typified 
by very low income, multi–generational welfare dependence and complex and 
multiple needs is represented in the literature (Shiel, 1998, Thomson Goodall 
Associates Pty Ltd, 2001, Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 2003, Ministry of 
Housing, 1989).  
 
The second problem, ‘funding’, looks at two significant fiscal issues for the 
Office of Housing. Firstly, there has been a steady decline in funding from the 
Commonwealth and State Housing Agreement and, secondly, income from rent 
is constrained by the very low incomes of the tenants. 
 
The third problem, ‘assets’, is concerned with the cumulative problems created 
by maintaining ageing and deteriorating properties whilst simultaneously, 
responding to the increasingly complex physical needs of tenants. The OoH 
faces a significant maintenance liability; it has a long–standing shortage of 
appropriate properties, until recently had no proactive replacement plan and 
there is a significant and noticeable inconsistency in the service standards 
across the organisation (Victorian Auditor General, 1996).  
 
The final problem, ‘organisation’, examines the broader culture and climate of 
the Office of Housing. ‘Organisation’ brings together service delivery, staff skills 
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and attitudes, work practices, recruitment and customer service in an attempt 
to understand the nature (and culture) of work in the Office of Housing.  
Tenant problems: Tenants with complex and multiple needs 
The Review represented the tenant problem as a result of a growing number of 
consumers presenting with ‘multiple and complex’ needs like mental illness, 
poverty, ageing, immigration and de–institutionalisation. Of particular interest 
were three key changes in the profile of ‘typical’ public housing tenants. Firstly, 
there has been a noticeable increase in the number of tenants identified as 
having ‘multiple and complex needs’. Secondly, a large segment of the public 
housing community is ageing and this has resulted in communities made up of 
tenants who are predominantly frail and elderly. Finally, these changes had 
been accompanied by a shift in public sector thinking referred to as ‘new public 
management’ (NPM). Broadly, new public management in the Australian 
context emerged in the early part of the 1990s and assumed that: 
 
Managerial reforms in Australia, over the past two decades, have 
been driven by two distinct claims; first, efficient management is 
the foundation of good governance, and second, practices that 
are appropriate for the conduct of private sector enterprises can 
also be applied to public sector services (Marston, 2004. pg5). 
 
Two features of new public management emerged in the administration of 
public housing. Firstly, ‘tenants’ became ‘customers’. The final report of the 
HOR is written in the language of customer service. Phrases such as ‘to deliver 
a quality service to customers’ and ‘increased complexity of customer need’ are 
common through out this document (Office of Housing, 2004). Secondly, senior 
managers increasing promoted ideas such as ‘organisational efficiency’, ‘key 
performance indicators’ and other performance based policies and procedures. 
The HOR final report states that ‘our key performance indicators will allow us to 
measure our success in those activities the ensure sustainable tenancies’ 
(Office of Housing, 2004. pg 23). For the Office of Housing, NPM was about 
increasing efficiency, standardisation and measuring the effectiveness of their 
response to housing problems. 
  
The first, most important and frequently discussed complex tenancy problems 
seemed to relate to two specific groups; those with multiple and complex needs 
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linked to mental illness, drugs, alcohol and the increasing number of ageing 
and frail tenants. 
 
The Final Report described how an increasing number of tenants presenting 
with multiple and complex needs is likely to place extra demand on an already 
stressed housing system. This observation would come as no surprise to 
housing workers because the steady increase in applications from potential 
tenants with particularly high needs was a dominant factor in the daily work for 
housing staff and over time, HSOs have come to perceive these tenants as a 
representation of the ‘typical public housing renter’.  This growth in applications 
from ‘challenging and needy’ tenants created a number of challenges for 
managers at head office, placed a particular strain on the housing system and, 
in turn, on the HSO’s themselves.  In 1996, the Victorian Auditor General had 
reported that the OoH had made some progress with prioritising the waiting list, 
but still had work to do: 
 
The department (OoH) has (since late 1995) concentrated on 
improving its knowledge of the needs in the following categories: 
 
1) Those requiring crisis accommodation.  
2) Those eligible for housing assistance within existing priority 
groups; the homeless, victims of domestic violence, serious 
neighbour conflict, overcrowding or urgent medical need. 
3) Disabled and aged persons.  
4) Referred by other welfare agencies.  
5) Meeting general income eligibility criteria. (Victorian Auditor 
General, 1996. pp. 8-9) 
 
One of the key observations in the Thomson and Goodall report (Thomson 
Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001) was that public housing is not acknowledged 
to be an important component of the support system for people with complex 
and multiple needs. A number of housing staff and managers in this study told 
me that being ‘outside the system’ had a deleterious impact on the resourcing 
of public housing and a number believed that, as external service providers 
‘buckle under the weight of the needy’, the situation would need to urgently 
change. Over the years, housing workers have come to understand and 
(reluctantly) accept the fact that social reform external to housing (such as de–
institutionalisation and intergenerational unemployment) will continue to impact 
on their work as providers of housing services in Victoria. As a result, 
managers in the Office of Housing used the Review to push for ‘coordinated 
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housing placement’, ‘integrated services’ and ‘joined–up government’ in an 
effort to formalise public housing as a meaningful contributor to the provision of 
State welfare services. In their report to the OoH, Thomson Goodall revealed 
that the most fragile tenant group is often cared for by a multitude of agencies 
and service providers, most of which delivered services in an autonomous and 
disconnected manner.  
 
Tenants with complex needs might be in contact with service providers from 
mental health, disability, child protection, juvenile justice, drug treatment, 
education and aged care as well as a range of other community service 
providers and non–government agencies. Different responses, eligibility criteria 
and priorities mean that tenants with high and complex needs were frequently 
referred from service to service, with little or no advice to the provider of their 
housing service (Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001). Thomson and 
Goodall observed that most public sector organisations, when faced with 
difficult and complex service demands, ‘ordinarily attempt to cope with such 
situations by further elaborating and strengthening their own organisational 
structure while placing greater reliance on eliciting the views of consumers’ 
(Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001. pg.7). 
 
Without a clear understanding of the existing organisational structure(s), 
connected experts or an integrated service model, the Office of Housing was ill 
equipped and unable to effectively assist these challenging tenants. The 
Review was implemented to: 
 
Respond to the complexity of tasks required of the housing worker 
role, including the impact on staff capacity to manage the 
challenges of assessment of need and complex social issues to 
deliver a quality of service to customers (Office of Housing, 2004. 
pg.10). 
 
Further exacerbating the ‘tenant problem’ was the fact that the government’s 
approach to ‘troubled’ and ‘challenging’ customers was (and still is) often the 
subject of media interest. In 1998, The Age newspaper described the Fitzroy 
and Richmond high rises as ‘sink estates on which the mentally ill have been 
dumped by an increasingly uncaring government’. Two years later, the same 
newspaper featured the tale of ‘Vikki’, a single mum from Eaglehawk, who lived 
in ‘a bleak corridor of public housing that had more sole–parent families that 
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any other part of the state, more children more likely to leave school early, 
unsafe and run down houses and very high unemployment’ (Shiel, 1998. pg. 
21). One of the reasons that the Housing Office Review was useful to senior 
managers was because the Review provided a proactive reply to negative 
media commentary. The Review provided senior managers with a concrete 
response to questions about how these problems were to be solved. This was 
an important by–product of the Review because, in their stories, staff told me 
that the portrayal of public housing estates, their management and the 
competence of housing staff had a deleterious effect on their morale. 
Ultimately, the HOR allowed staff to answer media questions about ‘What are 
you doing about these terrible problems?’ with ‘We are doing this, this and this’. 
Tenant problems: Ageing, frail tenants 
Ageing in place is a challenge to the Office of Housing and, as a result of 
lifetime tenancies, the final report noted that an increasing number of public 
housing tenants are frail and elderly.  Ageing tenants resulted in two dilemmas 
for the Office of Housing.  Firstly, this cohort had special physical needs that 
required the commitment of extra resources from support systems already 
under stress and, second, a number of tenants continued to reside in largely 
unoccupied ‘family–sized’ homes.   Why was this a problem?  Waiting lists for 
public housing are subject to public scrutiny and comment and managers told 
me that, at election time, housing staff expected public housing to be an site for 
political sparring. During long periods of political stability, staff anticipated ‘spot 
fires’ - a period when they would be exposed to intense media campaigns that 
burn brightly, but fade as quickly as they came. For example, in 1994, the 
Sunday Age leaked news of a draft proposal to reduce the number of people 
on the 56,700–strong waiting list by relocating long term resident’s currently 
‘under–utilising’ public housing (that is, singles or couples in 2+ bedroom 
homes).  Predictably, the press’s portrayal of the OoH ‘uprooting’ and 
‘dumping’ pensioners and ‘war heroes’ ensured that this proposal was quickly 
abandoned (Hewitt, 1994. p.2/3). 
 
The issue of elderly tenants ‘locking up’ family homes, life–long leases and 
under–utilised properties had not gone away.  In fact, the emergence of older 
adults as a dominant group in the general population, teamed with a decline in 
available properties, continued to exacerbate the problems faced by managers 
at the Office of Housing. In order to understand and manage these problems 
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the Review employed a ‘systems’ approach, - the review examined the impact 
of high need tenants on the service system as a whole.  Rather than use a 
diagnostic approach - that is, dividing client groups into particular categories 
and offer an appropriate response for each individual category - the Review 
identified ‘complex needs tenants’ as those that seriously interfered with the 
housing service system, describing how tenants with ‘complex and multiple 
needs’ negatively interact with other tenants, staff, routines, families, 
community agencies or the community at large (Thomson Goodall Associates 
Pty Ltd, 2001). 
 
The Review understood that under this new ‘self–managed customer service’ 
model, tenants had the right to live in socially mixed communities, to participate 
in ‘self–managing’ their neighbourhood and to experience the ‘normality’ of 
every–day ‘community living’. The housing staff who participated in this study 
seemed to agree in–principle with some of the ideals of New Public 
Management and ‘self determination’, but expressed some scepticism about 
how to implement these NPM ideas with increasingly complex tenants and a 
history of inadequate public housing resources. This scepticism is not new. In 
1979 the ‘Housing in Victoria’ report recognised that this self–managed 
customer service ideal might have its own problems: 
 
Self–management, however, will not work in a number of situations: 
disputes between neighbours, rent arrears, etc. Hence some forms 
of bureaucratic intervention would still seem necessary, regardless 
of how effective the tenants’ own management might be. (Ministry of 
Housing; Task Force on Housing Policy Review, 1979. pg. 17) 
 
One of the key objectives stated in the Review is to assess to what degree of 
‘bureaucratic intervention’ would be needed to solve a range of problems with 
tenants, what form these inventions might take and what resources managers 
and housing workers might access in order to solve complex tenancy-related 
problems. The process of how to remedy these problems with tenants was 
further complicated by problems with the organisations fiscal capacity. The 
Office of Housing has long struggled with insufficient income. 
Income problems: Declining funding 
 
The following section deals with one of the income problems faced by the Office 
of Housing. The first and most significant problem was the steady decline in 
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recurrent funding through the Commonwealth and State Housing Agreement.  
The final report of the Review sums up the first problem and signals the second:  
 
Funding under the CSHA has declined over the past decade and 
there is a growing need to avoid rental arrears through proactive 
recovery. (Office of Housing, 2004. pp. 11-12) 
 
Second, the organisation has long carried a high level of unrealised income in 
the form of rental arrears. Finally and most importantly, these first two problems 
were further exacerbated by the fact that the majority of tenants survived on 
very low incomes and as a result, the Office of Housing was (and is) unable to 
charge full economic (‘market’) rent. These issues were not new, nor were they 
a recent concern. In 1989, the final report of the ‘Rental Arrears Review Panel’ 
stated that ‘ten years ago, an Interdepartmental Working Party on Rental 
Arrears was established between the then Housing Commission of Victoria and 
the Department of Community Welfare Services. The conclusions of the 
committee, in certain key areas, were not dissimilar to those of this Review’ 
(Ministry of Housing, 1989. pg. 2).  Both of these reviews identified declining 
Commonwealth funding and an inconsistent and inadequate return from rent as 
ongoing challenges for state housing authorities. 
Income problems: Collecting rent from poor tenants 
The literature used in this chapter exposed a distinct and sedimented record of 
problems with the Office of Housing’s rental system, starting with the first 
housing workers struggling to find a suitable time to ‘meet the woman of the 
house’ in order to discuss issues of good housekeeping and to collect the rent 
(Howe, 1988a). 
 
As I worked through the organisational artefacts, I began to realise that the 
‘problems with rent’ were actually a series of smaller, interconnected problems, 
the first of which occurred when the housing worker set out to calculate a new 
tenant’s rental charge. In 1989, the Rental Arrears Review Panel made the 
following comments about this difficult first stage in the rent collection process;  
 
In the panel’s view, the current rebate formula is extremely complex 
in terms of assessment by MOHC (Ministry of Housing and 
Construction): Confusions abound, time is wasted, anomalies exist 
and lie unresolved, and poverty traps can be created whereby there 
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is little incentive for some people to increase their income earning 
potential. (Ministry of Housing, 1989. pg.6) 
 
Some twenty–eight years later, the calculation of rent was still a difficult and 
complicated process, with a number of variables altering the final payment 
figure and the likelihood that any calculation, no matter how accurate, would 
rapidly be ‘out of date’.  Every housing worker has a slightly different approach 
to the application of rebate policy, the weekly income of tenants varied widely 
and minor changes to the welfare payment system resulted in potential arrears 
for unsuspecting tenants. A quick glance at the arrears action flow chart (Figure 
3.2) illustrates how difficult this process was for staff in the 1960s (Housing 
Commission of Victoria, 1967).  I discovered that little has changed.  
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Figure 3.2 The Arrears Action Flow Chart in the 1967 Estate Officers Handbook 
(Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967). 
 
The second ‘problem with rent’ is the collection of arrears. In spite of numerous 
reviews and interventions, the proactive recovery of rental arrears was still a 
problem for the Office of Housing and the unpleasant nature of ‘pestering 
tenants for money’ meant that some staff place arrears collection low on their 
priorities. The Estate Officers Manual dedicates an entire chapter to the 
collection of rent and the pursuit of arrears.  Once again, this was not a new 
problem and some twenty years after the Estate Officers Manual was written, 
arrears were still on the agenda: 
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There are signs that the reduction of rental arrears was not a priority 
within the organisation and that this position had a devastating 
impact on tenant perceptions of MOHC seriousness in relation to 
rent payment and the recovery of arrears. (Ministry of Housing, 
1989. pg. 5) 
 
The Final Report recommended that the Office of Housing ‘should not go soft 
on arrears in order to sustain tenancies’ (Office of Housing, 2004. pg.15) but 
must instead move to a more proactive model of intervention in the early phase 
of arrears. This recommendation echoed the sentiments of the Minister for 
Housing, some fifteen years later: 
 
‘… there has been too much focus on client welfare and tenant 
related services issues rather than the business aspects of public 
rental housing and prudent financial management. Ministry field 
staff, whose jobs bring them into most contact with tenants, indicate 
that they currently receive mixed messages on arrears.’ (Ministry of 
Housing, 1989. pp. 5-6) 
 
The management and collection of arrears had always been problematic. In the 
period November 2003 to November 2005, Housing Services Officers in 
Victoria undertook 7,580 arrears–related home visits and of these 4,864 were 
registered as ‘no contact made’ (Housing and Community Building Division, 
2007). In effect, 64% of all HSO’s arrears related home visits required 
subsequent follow–up action, a time–consuming activity, often with little 
positive outcome.  
 
In the organisational artefacts, rental arrears were portrayed as having a 
deleterious effect on the whole of the organisation and the unrealised income 
from arrears was perceived as having a limiting effect on recruitment, staffing, 
budgets, repair and renovation (Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 2003). 
Arrears are and always have been a problem for the Office of Housing. 
Asset problems: Old, tired, expensive and inappropriate 
The following section brings together two of the significant challenges faced by 
the Office of Housing: homes that were old, tired and beyond repair, and 
insufficient funding to build enough new dwellings. The organisational artefacts 
in the earlier chapters also linked the two issues, the Final Report linked the 
two problems and most of the participants in this study did the same - problems 
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with assets are also problems with funding and vice versa.  The ‘problems with 
assets’ are also interconnected with the ‘problems with income’ and the 
‘problems with tenants’ and, as a result, I will deal with these problems as a 
matrix of issues.  The ‘assets problem’ brings together the concerns with 
declining properties, poor replacement planning, a shortage of new buildings, 
ongoing repair, appropriateness of property, neighbourhood renewal and life 
cycle planning for future building. The Review also dealt with ‘asset 
maintenance’ in a separate, but connected inquiry, through the maintenance 
review undertaken by the Office of the Auditor–General in late 2002.  
 
The maintenance review examined all aspects of the maintenance program for 
Public Housing in Victoria. This review encompassed most components of the 
maintenance service offered to tenants, examining the standard of service, the 
adequacy of planning and customer service more generally. The Auditor 
General’s Review identified a number of (persistent) deficiencies in the 
standard of maintenance service, the effectiveness of new initiatives and a lack 
of improvement in maintenance outcomes for tenants. This report contained a 
number of recommendations for ‘urgent action’ and argued that, unless a 
number of shortcomings are rectified, the situation would only get worse. These 
recommendations were not new, nor were they a surprise to senior managers 
at the Office of Housing. 
 
Ascertaining exactly how many properties the Office of Housing provides 
turned out to be surprisingly difficult, but one fact was easily established: the 
Office of Housing is the largest provider of social housing in Victoria.  In 2003 
the Victorian Auditor General calculated that the OoH provided some 62,600 
properties with an estimated value of $10 billion (Victorian Auditor-General's 
Office, 2003) and by 2007 the OoH estimated that it owned, managed or 
provided funds to agencies for over 77,000 properties, including crisis, 
transitional, public and community housing (Office of Housing, 2007). The 
condition and age of these 77,000 properties varies considerably. Sixty two 
percent are less than twenty years old and thirty–eight percent are over twenty 
years old. Some are high–rise, some walk–up and some are free–standing 
dwellings built on broad acre estates.  
 
A number of properties are subject to high tenant turnover and repeated ‘hard’ 
use, often resulting in ‘wear and tear’ that staff described as beyond ‘normal’ 
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and ‘reasonable’.  The challenge of renovation, repair and renewal has long 
been an issue for State housing authorities and, most recently, the Auditor–
General’s maintenance assessments of 1993, 1996, and 1999 identified a 
number of deficiencies in the Office of Housing’s maintenance and 
management programs. The Auditor General identified problems with timely 
response to maintenance requests, poor replacement planning, a lack of 
knowledge and data of the condition of properties and a substandard and 
lacklustre complaints procedure (the consequence of which will discussed in 
greater detail later in this thesis). 
 
Nearly ten years prior to the 2002 review (in 1993) the Auditor General was 
concerned that the OoH faced a mounting maintenance liability, a problem that 
was further compounded by an absence of a replacement plan for ageing and 
inappropriate properties. In addition, the 1993 report highlighted the fact that 
repairs were not dealt with in a timely manner, complaints were poorly handled, 
and the implementation of policy and standards of performance differed across 
the organisation. By 2002, little had changed and the Auditor General found 
that ‘the OoH cannot be certain all work it paid for has been provided, that the 
work meets the required standard and was performed within the required time 
frame’ (Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 2003. pg. 27)  
 
The Auditor–General identified four other major problems with assets: 
a) The lack of an effective preventative maintenance program. 
b) Inadequate records about the physical condition of the properties. 
c) The lack of a centralised and coordinated asset management strategy. 
d) Poorly trained staff and a lack of accurate maintenance data. 
 
For a number of housing managers, the auditor–general’s report had some 
resonance. The findings confirmed what managers at the Office of Housing 
already knew.  The housing stock was old, tired and the condition of individual 
properties was/is not well understood (or recorded) and the production of new 
properties was having little effect on the allocation of housing to those on the 
waiting list.  
 
A separate, but related problem was the impact of media portrayal of the OoH 
as ‘slum lord’ and ‘benign manor lord of the poor’.  These sporadic press 
campaigns were usually countered by stories of multicultural functions, 
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community gardens, successful and happy new Australian families and other 
positive stories from the public relations unit at the OoH. In September 2005, 
the Geelong Advertiser ran a number of public housing related stories. This 
type of media story usually focuses on mothers and the elderly; ‘a single 
mother living under troubled conditions waited days for the OoH to repair her 
kitchen after a fire. It was only after this newspaper contacted the office, did 
they do anything’ (Geelong Advertiser, September 2005 P. 2). A few days later, 
the middle section of this paper was devoted to a photo spread of an elderly 
public housing tenant and his ‘collapsing house’.  
 
Understandably, the Review cannot ameliorate the pressure of negative media 
portrayal, but the recommendations proposed in the Review were a useful 
device for managers as they attempt to reply to negative media commentary 
such as those described above. 
Organisational problems: Recruitment, communication, culture, 
morale and retention 
This final problem, ‘organisation’, is concerned with the human component of 
the business and in this section I discuss how staff attitudes, the 
professionalisation of housing work, staff morale, and office ‘culture’ work to 
construct the problems with the organisation that is the Office of Housing. 
Phrases such as ‘workplace culture’, ‘open and honest communication’, 
‘meaningless job descriptions’ and the ‘climate of the office’ were expressions 
used by staff to represent to me how they ‘felt’ about the organisation. The 
Review aimed to address the ‘Organisational problems’ through the 
implementation of stronger team structures, improved staff knowledge, 
consistent business practices, the clarification of job roles within teams, 
clarifying the competencies staff need, building stronger relationships with 
customers and developing tools to assist and guide teams, including local area 
plans and team service agreements (Office of Housing, 2004).  
 
The Final Report recommended that the OoH needed to develop 
better/stronger team structures and organisational arrangements to meet the 
increased demand for assistance for the most fragile and vulnerable members 
of society (Lyons, 2000). Team structure was not the only ‘problem with 
organisation’, but it was the most frequently discussed problem for staff and 
managers and was the focus of a number of recommendations in the Final 
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Report. Developing a team structure that worked effectively and efficiently was 
a significant problem for the managers at the Office of Housing. 
 
In the reports and documents produced during the early part of the last decade, 
there was much discussion about the consequences of three organisational 
problems. Firstly, the recruitment of housing staff was portrayed as particularly 
ad hoc. The shortage of suitable applicants resulted in inventive recruiting and, 
as a result, friends, neighbours, prison staff, temps and ‘anyone warm and 
upright’ had been employed to supervise ‘a patch’. Secondly, these reports 
noted that communication across the organisation was poor and, finally, there 
was little or no career mobility for front–line workers. In the more recent 
documents, there was a volume of discourse about the professionalisation of 
HSO’s work.  The Final Report recommended that the OoH professionalise its 
work force by:  
 
Creating a more consistent team structure which makes career 
pathways clearer, working to improve the recognition of housing 
staff as a professional workforce, with skills and knowledge that are 
transferable across DHS and within the Social Housing sector. 
(Office of Housing, 2004) 
 
In addition to the above ‘staffing’ issues, the OoH had two other problems with 
organisational communication.  The first was its ‘communication with tenants’ 
and the second was ‘communication with/by staff’. Like a number of the 
housing problems discussed in this chapter, communication with tenants was 
not a recent problem nor was it restricted to any particular operational activity. 
In 1967, estate officers were instructed on the appropriate manner by which to 
address tenants, guided with advice about how to dress and how to approach 
difficult conversations regarding personal matters. 
 
In 1989, the arrears panel found that ‘there are currently deficiencies in style, 
content and format, all of which constrain the capacity to achieve the intended 
purpose of the communication’ (Ministry of Housing, 1989). Some fifteen years 
later, the Auditor General found that the OoH ‘needs to develop a 
communication strategy to plan, deliver and evaluate its communications with 
tenants’ (Victorian Auditor General, 2004., Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 
2003). When negotiating my first round of fieldwork, I observed an excited 
family being told that the letter they had received was not an offer of 
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accommodation, but a form letter requesting confirmation of their details. Staff 
at this office told me that communication with tenants has always been a 
problem. 
 
Problems with communication were also one of the most pressing 
organisational issues for staff.  In their stories, HSOs, managers and even a 
housing worker, retired for almost twenty years, all talked about ‘what works’, 
and ‘what doesn’t’, and most staff had a tenant communication ‘horror story’ to 
share. ‘Communication problems’ are also captured in the many documents 
informing the Review.  The Auditor General also described poor feedback to 
tenant enquiries, lack of response to complaints, confusion between regional 
and local offices and poorly structured information for new tenants (Victorian 
Auditor General, 1996).  The Brotherhood of St Lawrence found that rent 
statements are hard to read and difficult to understand, are not provided in 
languages other than English and the process for dealing with payment 
difficulties was not easy for tenants to recall (Lyons, 2000).  
 
Thomson Goodall’s work around people with high and complex needs took a 
slightly different approach. Tenants at risk are often hard to contact, mentally 
and/or physically fragile and typically exhibit a low response rate to written 
material (Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001). As a result, senior 
managers at the OoH (through the Review) were working to improve the way 
the organisation ‘talks’ with tenants and the final report included a number of 
recommendations of how the OoH might improve its communication with 
tenants. Once again, this was not a new problem; the Estate Office Manual 
tried to address this issue: 
There has been a tendency on the part of some Estate Officers 
to address the wives of tenants in a familiar manner. Some have 
been heard to use terms of endearment to tenants wives. It 
cannot be emphasized too strongly that all tenants and their 
families must be addressed in a proper manner at all times. The 
fact that a person occupies Commission accommodation in no 
way lowers them in the social scale nor does it deny them their 
fundamental right to the respect due to a human being (Housing 
Commission of Victoria, 1967. sect S1). 
 
In the organisational artefacts, the word ‘communication’ was so prevalent that 
I developed an abbreviation to record the comments and opinions about 
‘organisational communication’, ‘leadership communication’ and 
‘communication problems’. In Chapter Seven ‘Problems with Organisation’, I 
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describe in detail how staff experience and make sense of mundane, 
operational communication, inter–office communication and, most importantly, 
how they communicate with managers and each other about organisational 
change. 
 
The final organisational problem is the character of OoH staff themselves; how 
it is they have come to work there, their motivation and aspiration, how they 
understand and value their work and their motivation to develop as housing 
professionals. The Office of Housing (and predecessor organisations) is an 
organisation made up of semi–autonomous, interconnected departments, a 
series of ‘micro–bureaucracies’ staffed by (in theory) like–minded people 
working together to achieve an agreed goal. Nevertheless, the Housing Office 
Review talked of an increasingly urgent need to formalise roles and 
standardise responses to problems. One challenge for the OoH is that 
maintaining bureaucracies such as these requires a great deal of policy 
regulation and staff compliance, consistent and potent ‘top down’ management, 
strict adherence to policy and standardised practices across the workforce.  
 
The findings and recommendations described in the Review suggest that 
maintaining this type of bureaucracy requires a degree of organisational 
capacity that is beyond the OoH. The organisational artefacts used to construct 
the review describe a workforce that has long been an amalgam of long–
serving and new staff, staff working with different levels of enthusiasm and 
housing workers with different levels of skills and abilities.  The profile of a 
‘typical’ housing worker is almost impossible to pen: some are old, some 
young, most feel tired, some are ‘accidental’, some highly career focused, 
some are ‘just property managers’ and a number consider themselves to be 
‘welfare workers’.  They display very different aspirations for and attitudes to 
their work and this variation is a problem for those charged with moving the 
organisation towards Weber’s ideal of a ‘fully–developed bureaucracy’.  Weber 
argues that bureaucracy is the typical expression of rationally regulated 
association within a structure of domination and is impersonal, objective, 
indestructible, indispensable, technically superior, and rationalist in its 
approach to the application of policy and procedure. The recommendations 
made in the Review would suggest that the Office of Housing has some way to 
go in order to be considered a ‘fully–developed bureaucracy’. 
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Staff at head office believed that a critical mass of employees with what they 
described as ‘the right attitude’ was required if the OoH was to change the 
organisational culture of this ‘imperfect bureaucracy’. This ‘critical mass’ was a 
key obstacle facing those charged with the implementation of the Review. The 
suggestion that the OoH has a ‘work culture’ that is well established and locally 
embedded was a theme in the majority of the organisational artefacts 
examined in this chapter (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007, 
Housing., 1979, Office of Housing, 2004). This research found that front–line 
staff were recruited and trained in a fairly ad hoc manner, had a relatively 
active and resourceful union, imaginative and localised interpretation of policy 
was commonplace, low morale and cynicism typified some locations, and there 
existed a strongly held perception that some offices were ‘better to work in’ 
than others. The second hurdle for those charged with implementation of 
organisational change was the sedimented nature of discourse at the local 
level. The understandings and perceptions about housing work were not 
‘washed away’ by new governments, organisational reform, restructure, new 
management or new workers.  Invariably, ‘old ideas’ and ‘established ways’ 
persisted and were used by HSOs to challenge new understandings of public 
housing problems. 
 
The authors of the final report argued that in order for the Review to succeed, 
its implementation needs be highly structured and from the ‘ground up’. 
Overhauling an organisation staffed by ‘professional’ public servants, ‘renties’ 
near retirement, the next door neighbour who can ‘fill in’ for a few weeks, 
university graduates, part–timers, ex–public housing tenants and social welfare 
activists was no easy task. Weber (Weber, 1949)uses the concept of the ‘iron 
cage of rationality’, to describe a world of beliefs and activities created and 
managed by bureaucrats and experts.  The challenge for those charged with 
the implementation of the Review was getting the staff into the cage! 
The solutions 
Firstly, let me summarise the way the review represented each of these 
solutions: 
 
The first of the recommended solutions for the ‘tenant problems’, involves 
changing the organisational structure in order to better respond to the changing 
nature of a ‘typical’ public housing tenant. The recommendations in the Final 
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Report advise housing managers how best to react to the shift from 
neighbourhoods populated by the ‘working poor’ to communities typified by 
very low income, multi–generational welfare dependence and complex and 
multiple needs (Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001). 
 
The second set of recommendations focused on addressing the ‘income 
problems’.  The Review tackles two significant fiscal issues for the OoH. Firstly, 
how to address the decline in funding from the Commonwealth and State 
Housing Agreement and, secondly, how to remedy the rental arrears and 
limited capacity to generate sustainable/market rent.  
 
The third solution, solving the ‘assets problems’, was concerned with two 
things. Firstly, disposing of or renovating the old ‘past their use by date’ 
properties in order to better meet the changing physical needs of its customers 
(the tenants) whilst addressing a significant maintenance liability. Secondly, 
solving the problems created by the long–standing shortage of appropriate 
properties, developing private partnerships to build new low cost housing and 
to address inconsistencies in the service standards across the organisation 
(Victorian Auditor General, 1996).  
 
The final recommendations deal with how to solve the ‘organisational 
problems’. The ‘Organisational solutions’ proposed by the Review include, the 
development and implementation of consistent service delivery standards, 
improved staff skills and training, changed attitudes, revised work practices, 
better recruitment and standardised management practices across the 
organisation. 
 
The Review, epitomised by the Final Report, recommended that the solutions 
to the problems would only occur after significant organisation change. The 
recommended solutions in the Final Report can be organised into the four 
categories: 
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The recommendations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The recommendations of the Housing Office Review, Final Report. 
Tenant solutions: New tasks, new teams, new staff 
In the first of these solutions, ‘tenants’, I will describe how the Review 
represented the operational reforms needed to remedy the problems created 
by the changing nature of the ‘typical’ public housing tenant.  These descriptors 
explain how the Housing Office Review has been used to identify and 
understand tenants with very low personal income, multi–generational welfare 
dependence and ‘high and complex’ needs (Thomson Goodall Associates Pty 
Ltd, 2001). 
The opening remarks of the Final Report explained how the increasing 
demands on housing staff were typical of the increased demand on social 
welfare services more generally: 
 
The integration of Housing into the broader human services system, 
policies such as deinstitutionalisation in the mental health and 
disability field, the prevalence of drug and alcohol issues in 
contributing to unstable housing, the introduction to the segmented 
waiting list and other factors have all resulted in demands on 
Housing Services Officers. (Office of Housing, 2004. pg. 10) 
 
At the commencement of this research, HSOs worked under the ‘patch’ model, 
a model that required staff to perform a broad range of roles and 
responsibilities in their ‘patch’ (a patch being a loose collection of 
neighbourhoods within a (theoretically) set geographical boundary).  HSOs 
undertook a range of duties including interviewing new tenants, home visiting, 
FUNDING 
New teams, centralised work and call 
centre to ‘free’ HSOs up to prevent 
arrears. This will be underpinned by 
direct debit and centrepay initiatives. 
Managers will continue to explore new 
ways of funding and managing low 
cost housing. 
ORGANISATION 
The implementation of the three team 
model (HAAT, TPT & SLT) will allow 
focus on consistent functions; staff will 
rotate across these teams. Central 
recruitment and training will renew the 
workforce. Better communication 
planned.  
ASSETS 
Develop better local understanding of 
properties and feed this back via a 
central database. Roll out a new 
housing software management package 
(HIIP) and implement the maintenance 
call centre. Assess and record condition 
of every property. 
 
TENANTS: 
Introduction of new team structure will 
result in function–based work. 
Transactional tasks will be centralised 
in order free–up staff to work 
proactively with complex tenancies. 
HSC positions to support this work 
and new customer service model. 
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intervening in and attempting to resolve neighbourhood disputes, the 
calculation of rent rebates, general enquiries, preparation for and attendance at 
VCAT hearings, pursuing rental arrears, inspection of properties, preparation of 
vacant properties and a suite of ‘other duties as required’. The Final Report 
acknowledged that HSO’s capacity to deliver a quality service was adversely 
affected by the complexity of the tasks required under this ‘patch’ model (Office 
of Housing, 2004). The combination of increasing numbers of tenants with 
complex and multiple needs, and increasing demand for places, resulted in this 
‘complexity of task’ becoming a major issue for the organisation. One of the 
staff at head office explained to me that this increase in numbers was one of 
the reasons the HOR came about: 
 
In the past, even as little as five years ago, you might have a patch 
of 250 properties with, say, 10 tenants with complex needs, today 
the same patch would have 20+ tenants with complex needs. The 
housing office review came about because HSOs for a long time 
were saying ‘We can’t do all this, we can’t provide the service 
needed, we can’t meet our KPIs’’ (Interview: Head office, 2004) 
 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, rather than using categories to sort client 
groups into a diagnostic inventory and then offer an appropriate response for 
each category, the Review identified complex needs tenants as those that 
seriously interfere with the housing service system. That is, tenants who have 
an impact on other tenants, staff, routines, families, community agencies or the 
community at large.  In order to understand and address the ‘problem with 
tenants’, the Review responded to the problem in two ways. Firstly, by 
understanding how difficult tenants interact with the housing system and, 
second, by altering the housing system to respond accordingly. As a result, the 
‘patch–based’ model was to be disbanded and replaced with a function–based 
model, constructed around three distinct function oriented teams, the support 
links team (SLT), the housing advisory and assessment team (HAAT) and the 
tenancy and property team (TPT). Managers at the Office of Housing had been 
charged with the design and implementation of a complex and comprehensive 
overhaul of the organisation’s team structure, work procedures and operational 
instructions.   
The members of each team were drawn from the existing workforce, allowing 
staff to ‘specialise’ in particular tenancy functions and work in areas that best 
suit their skills and interests. These teams were linked by ‘natural and 
purposeful’ connections (Office of Housing, 2004) and the proposed new 
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structure produced teams that, in theory, were intuitively interconnected by 
policy, tenants and function. The new function–based model proposed in the 
Review was structured as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. The three teams proposed under the new function based model. 
 
This new team structure was an attempt to address ‘problems with tenants’ 
through the delivery of ‘standardised services’ based around common and 
agreed organisational standards (Office of Housing, 2004). Staff in each of 
these new teams will be skilled (or trained) in particular tasks and be 
encouraged to further develop specialised tenancy management skills. My 
table below summarises the key tenant problems and the solutions proposed to 
remedy these problems: 
Housing Advisory & Assessment 
Teams (HAAT) 
What is the problem? 
 
What is the solution? 
Variations in the assessment of 
tenant applications. 
Team dedicated to assessment – 
standardised procedures and 
approach. 
Differing/conflicting information 
given to new tenants. 
Fully informed and dedicated staff 
providing comprehensive information 
to tenants. 
Complex and fractured 
understanding of the waiting list(s). 
Development and maintenance of 
waiting lists which are well 
understood and allow for the 
allocation of properties in a timely 
manner. 
Rushed and sometimes ad hoc 
needs assessment. 
Development of detailed tenancy 
files based on comprehensive needs 
assessment. 
 
Housing Services 
Manager (Local Office) 
Support Links 
Team SLP(3) 
Housing Advisory 
& Assessment 
Teams 
Tenancy and 
Property Team 
HSOs  
FSOs 
HSOs 
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Tenancy and Property Team 
(TPT) 
What is the problem? 
 
What is the solution? 
Significant and often ‘unworkable’ 
caseloads under the patch model. 
Manageable caseloads and a clearer 
role for HSOs. 
Reactive approach to ‘tenancies at 
risk’. 
TPT to take a proactive approach to 
sustaining tenancies through early 
intervention, referral and quick follow 
up. 
Unclear and inadequate 
understandings of property 
condition. 
New field service officers (FSOs) to 
provide up to date reports on stock, 
plan for up.rades and ensure that 
properties are ‘fit for purpose’. 
 
Support Links Team (SLT) 
What is the problem? 
 
What is the solution? 
HSO’s are faced with increased 
number of tenants with complex 
and multiple needs. 
Additional support and coaching for 
HSOs and their team leaders. 
Some positions and programs are 
disconnected from local offices. 
New SLT brings together the 
Housing Support Coordinator (HSC) 
and administrative and project staff. 
Repetitive transactional work has 
detrimental affect on HSO’s 
effectiveness. 
Administrative staff to assist 
managers in order to steamline the 
administrative work of the teams. 
 
Figure 3.5 Tenant problems and their solutions.  
 
At the time of writing, the outcome of this three team approach was not known. 
As my field work drew to a close, expressions of interest for team members 
was nearly complete, training and induction programs had commenced and a 
round of new staff recruitment had been undertaken, but time constraints 
prevented me from undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness 
of the new structure. But, the proponents of this new structure were confident 
that a move away from the ‘patch’ model will address the ‘problems with 
tenants’.  
 
Not surprisingly, this confidence was articulated in the Thomson Goodall 
Associates Pty Ltd ‘Review of Public Housing Advocacy Program’: 
 
One significant consequence of the review is the likelihood that the 
OoH will provide an enhanced response to tenants, more 
consistently providing information, advice and referring tenants to 
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other agencies which might provide assistance. (Thomson Goodall 
Associates Pty Ltd, 2005. pg. 6) 
 
As fieldwork progressed I came to understand that describing the workers 
perceptions around ‘disbanding of the patch’ and shifting to ‘function based 
teams’ was no simple matter; front–line staff described their position to the 
changes as (at best) reluctant and suspicious or (at worst) openly hostile and 
‘recalcitrant’.  
Income solutions: Home visits, follow up, and private providers 
The following section contains a synopsis of the recommendations proposed to 
remedy the problems with income and rent. The OoH has experienced 
declining income from the Commonwealth and State Housing Agreement and 
an accompanying decline in rental income from ‘seriously disadvantaged and 
marginalised tenants’ (Office of Housing, 2004).  The final report suggested a 
number of reforms to address these issues. The Review recommended the 
‘freeing up’ of staff through a reduction in transactional work, outsourcing 
repetitive work to call centres, expanding automated services and generally 
reducing the ‘low value’ tasks that diminished the HSO’s ability to commit to 
proactive rent recovery programs. The Review also signalled the potential for 
new models of management in public housing and reinforced the notion that 
housing co–ops and private providers were likely to play a significant role in the 
future provision of low–cost, social housing. It also looked at the mundane but 
important - proposing strategies to recover and prevent elevated rental arrears. 
 
The Final Report opened with a statement about further reductions in 
commonwealth funding: ‘Funding under the Commonwealth State Housing 
Agreement (CSHA) has declined over the past decade’ and the authors of the 
Final Report predict that a ‘continuing decline’ would compel the organisation to 
become a ‘lean and efficient’ service provider. Admittedly, the Housing Office 
Review does not directly address the issues of funding from the CSHA, but 
once again, the Review took a ‘systems approach’ to this problem, attempting 
to address ‘funding’ problems by exploring inefficiencies in the current system. 
The review examined current collection practices in order to identify more 
efficient rent collection procedures and proposed strategies to reduce arrears 
whilst staff work more efficiently and proactively to prevent the loss of future 
income.  The Final Report explained how the organisation might better utilise 
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its assets and explored which transactional activities might be centralised and 
delivered at a reduced cost. The final report recommended the introduction of 
new call centres, new team models, increased reliance on the direct debit of 
rent and new housing management software to ‘free up’ staff to undertake 
regular home visits in an effort to ‘build rapport with the tenant and discuss 
tenancy matters’, to intervene before arrears escalate to uncollectible levels 
that eventually result in eviction (Office of Housing, 2004).  
Asset solutions: Audit, record, understand and out–source 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Office of Housing had a number of 
problems with homes that were old, tired and beyond repair and the 
organisation has insufficient funding to build enough new dwellings. Like many 
problems in this chapter, this one was not new. In the most recent maintenance 
assessment, the Victorian Auditor General explained these problems: 
 
Until recently, very little strategic progress has been made to 
address the underlying concerns expressed in our earlier reports. 
Some of these concerns, for instance, over supervision of 
maintenance work, information on the condition of houses or poor 
tenant satisfaction, still remain. (Victorian Auditor General, 2004. pg. 
9/15) 
 
The solution recommended by the Review to remedy ‘asset’ problems such as 
the ones described by the Auditor General was to adopt a two–pronged 
approach to the problem.  Firstly, there was some urgency to immediately 
audit, record and assess the condition of the Office of Housing stock. Second, 
the Final Report recommended that the organisation formulate a plan of action 
to address its significant maintenance liability and to develop a long–term 
expansion plan to meet the property shortfall. The Auditor–General’s 
recommendations were qualified with a recognition that organisation faced 
ongoing, significant financial shortfalls. The Review raised questions such as: 
Is there a plan to develop a proactive replacement program? How realistic to 
expect consistent and realistic maintenance standards across a large and 
disparate organisation? How would such a scheme be funded? 
 
In an effort to address the enduring and persistent problems with assets, the 
Review proposed two significant measures to remedy the most pressing of 
these ‘asset’ problems, the first of which was well underway at the 
commencement of this research. 
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The introduction of the Maintenance Call Centre (MCC) 
In 2002 the Maintenance Call Centre (MCC) was introduced to take over the 
bulk of the transactional activities associated with responsive maintenance 
(that is, the day–to–day repair of buildings, plumbing, fences and many other 
issues that occur out of cycle). At the time of writing, the MCC had taken over 
240,000 calls since its inception, requests from tenants, HSO’s and other 
agencies. The Final Report described the MCC as a customer service initiative 
that aims to connect tenants with maintenance experts who are skilled 
maintenance diagnosticians devoid of the distractions of a ‘patch’ and the daily 
responsibilities of a local office (Office of Housing, 2004). The report from the 
Victorian Auditor–General outlines the reasoning behind the MCC: 
 
It did this [establish the MCC] to centralise the management and 
coordination of maintenance requests, and to free up housing staff 
from dealing with maintenance requests so that they could 
concentrate on developing and strengthening relationships with 
tenants. (Victorian Auditor General, 2004. pg. 54) 
 
The MCC had, to some degree, centralised the management and coordination 
of maintenance requests and introduced statewide benchmarks that are then 
applied in a standardised manner across each region. Proponents of the 
Review believed that these new benchmarks were easily scrutinised, readily 
reviewed and more quickly updated. From these benchmarks, a set of 
centralised and universal policies and procedures had been constructed, 
effectively limiting local office discretion in the repairs arena. As a result of 
these reforms, the introduction of the Maintenance Call Centre promised a 
number of efficiencies across the organisation, including: 
 
Increased time for front–line staff to visit. Managers at the Office of Housing 
estimated that, prior to the introduction of the MCC, local staff spent 19% of 
their day on responsive maintenance (Office of Housing, 2002a). One of the 
justifications for the introduction of the MCC was an assurance that, as a result 
of this reduction in transactional work, staff would be ‘freed up’ to visit tenants, 
intervene in rental arrears, respond quickly to tenants at risk, moderate 
disputes before they escalate, ensure that people understand and comply with 
their obligations as tenant and neighbour and allow HSOs to concentrate on 
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developing and strengthening relationships with tenants (Victorian Auditor 
General, 2004.). 
 
Centralised Repair Data. The staff working at the Maintenance Call Centre 
would work more efficiently because they have access to data from a number 
of sources. MCC experts would better understand the competence/skills of 
contractors, response times, the handling of complaints, the condition of 
properties and repeated damage by the tenant who ‘moves about’ in the 
housing system. The Review promotes the idea that a ‘single local phone call’ 
was one of the most significant improvements stemming from the MCC. Prior to 
the introduction of the MCC, maintenance data was spread across the 
organisation; it was located ‘in the heads’ of long–serving staff, as notices on 
pin boards, in local drives on PCs, scribbled in tenant files and reluctantly up 
loaded into the ageing computer package ‘ISIP’ (Integrated System for 
Information on Property). 
 
ISIP no more: HIIPs is the new software. One of the key improvements 
recommended by the Housing Office Review was the introduction of new 
housing management software, known as the Housing Integration and 
Information Program (HIIP). This HIIP initiative was accompanied by the 
development of a comprehensive Condition Report Database, used to describe 
and record the condition and amenity of each and every Office of Housing 
property in Victoria. One of the key functions of this new software is to better 
record the status and condition of housing stock. 
 
Staff told me that the main problem with the old ‘ISIP’ database was that it was 
inefficient, unreliable, out–dated and difficult to use. Research by staff at head 
office confirmed this view and, as a result of this consensus, managers 
proposed the roll–out of a new, up to date and modern housing management 
system: the Housing Integration and Information Program, or ‘HIIP’.  At the time 
of writing, this roll–out was still incomplete and this delay had resulted in a 
number of new problems. The existing system has deteriorated and staff told 
me that it is no longer allocated ‘meaningful IT support’ and the absence of the 
new software had left staff without an important management tool. One staff 
member called this ‘software no–mans land’. In their stories, staff told of 
mounting frustration with a perceived lack of action form head office, and as a 
result, they recorded only minimal data and refer to ISIP only when written 
 102 
records are not available. Ever changing ‘patches’, high staff turn over and 
many shorthand styles have further diminished the accuracy and reliability of 
the data.  The Auditor general describes the data reliability as ‘adequate’ but 
‘progress in addressing deficiencies has been slow’ (Victorian Auditor General, 
2004.). 
 
The database of all Office of Housing properties (and their condition) was an 
initiative with considerable potential for those at the ‘front–line’.  Currently, staff 
managing a new patch can only begin to understand the characteristics and 
condition of properties by driving around and performing what they called a 
‘curb–side evaluation’.  Sometimes, they can talk with another staff member 
about their recollections of that particular area and, in some offices, certain 
patches come ready labelled with preconceptions and opinions about the 
nature of tenants in particular neighbourhoods.  For most staff, comprehensive 
data about their patch was difficult to obtain, the number of properties in each 
patch was relatively easy for find out, and, likewise, identifying the number of 
bedrooms is simple.  But, accurate data regarding the condition of the walls, 
painting, curtains, the orientation of rooms, the condition of fences, 
outbuildings, fly–screens and other infrastructure was very difficult and 
sometimes impossible to obtain. 
Organisational solutions: New staff, professionalised staff and 
‘joined–up’ government 
The solutions proposed to remedy problems with ‘organisation’ included the 
implementation of new models of service delivery, professionalisation of the 
public housing industry, prioritising and resourcing staff development and 
revolutionising work practices, centralising recruitment and, eventually, ‘talking 
in the language of excellence’ (Office of Housing, 2006a). In ‘Organizational 
Change: A comprehensive reader’, this organisational dilemma is captured in 
the question ‘How can we help a variety of individuals in organisations learn to 
behave in ways that reflect a whole system’s perspective and increase 
collaborative effort?’ (Burke et al., 2006).  In order for the Review to be 
successful, housing managers needed an answer to this question, they needed 
to better understand the collaborative strength of local offices and to then use 
this understanding to manipulate the structure of the organisation. Long–
serving staff told me of a tendency to ‘tinker around the edges’, with little 
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understanding or recognition of the consequences that numerous, minor 
interventions have on housing work at local offices. 
  
In order to ensure that the Review was not perceived to be another ‘tinkering 
around the edges’, the Housing Office Review proposed a number of new 
approaches to organisational management. The Final Report recommended 
the return to centralised recruitment for new staff, revising the promotion and 
progression opportunities for HSOs and the introduction of a customer service 
model that included quality assurance, complaint procedures and intensive 
training and development. In addition, the Review proposed that the three team 
model (described earlier in this chapter) be implemented in an effort to develop 
better interagency liaison in order to ensure that tenants received the best 
possible service, delivered by ‘joined–up government’ (White, 2000). 
Conclusion 
Like the historical literature in Chapter Two, the Housing Office Review Final 
Report (and the documents that informed this review) made one thing very 
clear to me: public housing had changed.  Tenants have changed (as has the 
the discourse about them), tenants with ‘complex and multiple needs’ have 
replaced the ‘working poor’, a significant number of tenants live with drug and 
alcohol related issues, an increasing number of tenants are aged and infirm, 
there are a growing number of single parents (especially women) on the 
waiting list and multi–generational welfare dependant families have become 
increasingly common. Money is tight because the Office of Housing is 
increasingly reliant on rental income, the majority of which is derived from 
tenants who are very poor. Funding through the Commonwealth State Housing 
Agreement continued to decline, the cost of repairing and replacing housing 
stock had increased exponentially and the long–established practice of 
income–based rent setting resulted in reduced rental income and this already 
limited income no longer covers ‘real’ costs. Staff working for the Office of 
Housing find themselves increasingly called to ‘deal with’ anti–social problems 
in these complex and challenging communities, problems that, according to the 
Review, can only be remedied by  ‘joined–up services’ and a ‘whole of 
government’ approach. These ‘challenging communities’ were also part of a 
broader change to the public service: staff find themselves serving ‘customers’ 
who have the right to complain, appeal and question whilst they experience a 
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housing product that is ‘best practice’, ‘case managed’ and ‘exemplary 
customer service delivery’.   
 
Because the solutions proposed in the Final Report encompassed most 
operational facets of the organisation, it seemed logical that the Review would 
have a significant impact on the work life of staff at the front–line.  I was keen to 
find out how the many pages of recommendations about funding, staffing 
arrangements, training and development, team structures, new housing 
management software and the shift to ‘customer service’ was perceived by 
those charged with delivering these services. The Housing Office Review 
seemed a logical place from which to launch my ethnographic enquiry, and, as 
a result, most of my interviews are, to some degree, ‘all about the Housing 
Office Review’.  
 
The vast majority of the stories in my field work were concerned with how the 
staff experience and understand the Review and, as a result, I will tell the story 
of how housing workers (continue to) experience the major process of change 
from ‘public’ housing to ‘welfare’ housing. In the following chapters I will tell the 
stories of the workers, using the voices of four composites personalities, Phil, 
Sophia, Henry, Sara and retired Doug. In the following chapters you will read 
about the ‘smacker’, ‘the tenant from hell’, smoky home visits, the arrears 
tango, trashed homes, ‘lovely nannas’, good and bad staff training, positive and 
negative interactions with head office and the ‘daily grind’ for those who work in 
Public Housing in Victoria. In the pages that follow, you will read how housing 
services officers and senior managers both understood and experienced the 
major process of operational policy change recommended by the Housing 
Office Review, recognising that ‘public’ housing was, in fact, ‘welfare’ housing. 
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Chapter Four 
Problems with Tenants 
 
It’s a nightmare. I run from one tenant to the next. One problem to 
the next. Most of my tenants have a serious issue in their life, a 
number of them have many. Sometimes I feel like a just can’t cope. 
[Interview, Location one) 
Introduction 
This chapter explores how workers at the local, head and regional office 
experienced and understood the ‘problems with tenants’. The Housing Office 
Review formally recognised that the shift from ‘public housing’ to ‘welfare 
housing’ was evident in the composition of public housing tenants. No longer 
was the focus on housing the working poor as it had been in the the post–war 
years but was now on very low income people often experiencing other forms 
of disadvantage.  The Office of Housing was now formally acknowledging that 
a significant and growing number of its ‘clients’ had ‘multiple and complex 
needs’ (Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001).  This change in tenants 
had resulted in significant change in the nature of the work that staff in the 
Office of Housing were required to do and how they went about doing it. This 
was the case for staff at the front–line who interacted with tenants but it was 
also the case for staff in head office and the regional offices as they sought to 
develop and implement operational policy.   
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the way staff in these different parts of the 
Office of Housing relate to tenants in providing ‘welfare’ housing by drawing on 
accounts of staff in their day–to–day work providing housing for ‘very needy’ 
public housing tenants.  It highlights the distinct and different experiences of 
staff in local, regional and head offices and creates a dialogue between these 
three distinct locations.  The first voice, workers in the local office, the ‘front–
line’ in direct contact with tenants, tell me ‘what happened, what the problem 
was, what they did, what management did, and what it all means’.  The second 
voice, managers in head office with no direct contact, know about tenants 
through the stories they hear from local office staff and from reports, research 
and other written communication.  Occasionally, these voices will be 
supplemented by a third voice, stories from staff in the regional office who 
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listen to the other two voices and translate and sometimes mediate the 
messages they encounter. The resulting ‘dialogue’ between these voices 
shows how different members of the same organisation can have shared and 
contested accounts of problems and solutions.   
 
This three–way dialogue between local, head and regional offices provides a 
framework around which to develop ‘fine grained’ (Van Maanen, 1988) analysis 
of the ‘problems with tenants’ that was first identified through the Housing 
Office Review.  The focus is on four themes or issues that feature in the life 
world of front–line workers in the Office of Housing and in the final report of the 
Housing Office Review.  First, there is the lack of control that front–line workers 
have over their work.  There is no time in the working day to plan and be 
proactive. Instead they are constantly responding to the ‘little’ problems in 
tenants’ lives that result in challenges to the routine administration of housing 
provision.  
 
Second, workers are challenged by the circumstances and behaviours of 
tenants, many of whom are affected by mental illness and drug and alcohol 
use. The frequent use of the shorthand phrase ‘customers with multiple and 
complex needs’ is one indicator of this.  Third, there are applicants and tenants 
who become familiar with key features of the administrative system while trying 
to improve their circumstances: gain access to housing, transfer into better 
housing or lower their rent and so on. These are the ‘system workers’ who 
repeatedly engage with housing workers as they persistently press for 
entitlements within a resource–constrained system.  Fourth, coping with these 
problems requires skilled management and good administrative processes, and 
over the organisation’s history there has been constant experimentation and 
change in the system of administration that defines and structures relationships 
with tenants.  This includes changes in language, job design, organisational 
structures and projected alternative organisational cultures.  The promise is 
that these changes will lead to arrangements which will assist workers to cope 
and provide tenants with better services.   
Planning for the average day?  
Most participants in this study complained to me that developing work practices 
that were proactive, well planned and, as one staff member put it, ‘sequentially 
logical’ seemed to be an all but impossible task. In the final report of the 
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Review, this problem was cited as one of the primary motivations for 
organisational reform: 
 
Job roles, resources and team structures are no longer consistent 
across the regional housing network, leading to inconsistent service 
outcomes, uneven workloads and confused accountabilities. (Office 
of Housing, 2004. pg 6 )  
 
I asked the HSOs to talk about what might have led to these confused 
accountabilities, uneven workloads and inconsistent service outcomes. 
 
The answer is simple. We are required to do too much, to take on 
too many problems and, hell, some tenants have problems aplenty! 
Look at my day, by 4pm, I have been thanked, yelled at, called a 
turd and even given a pumpkin as a thankyou. I have made stacks 
of phone calls, offered a property, chased rent, attempted to get to 
the bottom of an anti–social complaint, chatted with a primary 
teacher who called to talk about issues with some kids sharing 
rooms. Now, I am grabbing lunch before heading out to drive past a 
property with a fence that has ‘accidently’ fallen down. (Interview 
Location one) 
  
One complaint common in all stories, such as the scenario described by the 
HSO above, was the frustration of working in an environment that is highly 
reactive and responsive. The HSOs told me that they were unhappy about their 
inability to balance and manage workloads because of ‘ever changing priorities, 
inconsistent targets and a constantly shifting focus on which KPI (key 
performance indicator) was this week’s hot button topic’. The discourse about 
workload planning and task management was consistent across all levels of 
the organisation, and early in my fieldwork I came to the realisation that the 
Office of Housing was a difficult place to work due in part to the highly reactive 
nature of the organisation. 
  
Not every–day was ‘unplanned and reactionary’, and, for most of the time I was 
with them, housing staff worked on routine and mundane tasks, they were busy 
performing responsibilities as specified in their job descriptions. According to 
their job descriptions, Housing Support Officers (HSO’s) are ‘required to 
demonstrate their ability to solve complex problems in a creative and customer 
focused way, work within a challenging and sometimes stressful environment, 
show initiative and be adaptable to new ideas’. (Department of Human 
Services, 2005. pg.3) 
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In practice, the ‘average day’ for HSO’s seemed to focus not so much on 
‘showing initiative and adapting’ but, instead, HSO’s told me that they spend 
most days ‘complying’. Complying with policy, implementing the procedures 
contained in large, white folders, they followed directions from line managers, 
negotiated requests to/from their peers, and responded to enquiries from 
tenants. On the whole, HSO’s depicted their work as relatively mundane, 
undertaking tasks such as rent rebates, ‘endless’ form–filling, frequent 
interviews, quotes for fences, attendance at the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (VCAT), staff meetings and chasing rental arrears. 
Interspersed through this mundane work are duties that require high–level 
communication skills. HSO’s would be called on to respond to tenants with 
‘complex and multiple needs’, they would spend time on the phone and at the 
counters talking to ‘young single mothers’, ‘the mentally ill’, ‘the cyclically 
homeless’, ‘recently released prisoners’, ‘the drug/alcohol effected’ and those 
who, as yet, have no clear and familiar label.  
 
HSO’s told me they frequently have to ‘desert their admin work’ to deal with 
anti–social emergencies. One HSO had to cancel an interview with me in order 
to intervene in a neighbourhood dispute that spanned years, a feud motivated 
by an event that occurred so long ago that details have been forgotten, only to 
be supplanted by a new set of issues and disputes. A newly appointed worker 
told me of how she was trying to accommodate a prospective tenant who wants 
to live in a particular neighbourhood, but is subject to three current and active 
intervention orders (AVOs) from female tenants in the vicinity. An older HSO 
told me that they felt pressured by their manager to swiftly house a difficult 
tenant, reluctantly placing this young ‘mentally ill and drug affected’ twenty–
year–old in a block of flats that is, in the main, made up of elderly persons. The 
workers at the Office of Housing felt that they provided a service that called for 
considered, well informed decision making but staff told me that they 
increasingly found themselves with no option but to react quickly, producing an 
expeditious and prompt action ‘to provide short term remedies to long term 
problems’ (Field note: Location one). 
 
It was immediately apparent to me that the daily work of the HSO is an 
incongruous mixture of mundane and repetitive tasks and yet, at the same 
time, solving problems that called for a considered and multifaceted remedy. 
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This seemingly contradictory ‘dull dynamism’ was captured in my observations 
recorded in the first few weeks: 
 
27th July 2004 
 
The front door is covered by graffiti – but someone has attempted to 
scrub the glass clean. 
On the way in, I witnessed a family, sitting in the waiting area, the 
parents nervously leaning forward and the two children on their ‘best 
behaviour’, sitting quietly and not moving at all. The overall feeling 
was that their public behaviour might somehow influence the 
outcome of what happens today. The TV in the waiting room is not 
properly tuned and the fuzzy picture gives off a pervasive and 
annoying buzz. (Later, I found out that it has been like this (off and 
on) for nearly 2 years now.) 
 
The office is relatively subdued and muted – occasional dialogue 
can be heard through the phone intercom – notifying HSO’s that 
their next appointment has arrived, or to forward an incoming call. 
The staff seem to be quite mobile, moving about the office, 
infrequently sitting at their workstation. They are constantly 
retrieving files, talking with workmates, shifting through their front 
desk roster and interviewing new and existing tenants. It seems that 
morning tea and lunch are informal events, a number of the female 
staff watch the ‘Jerry Springer Show’ in the conference room, some 
eat their lunch at their desk and then run errands over lunch and a 
smattering of individuals eat in the lunch room, reading novels or the 
newspaper. 
 
And a few days later: 
 
The staff wear no name tags or other identification. The staff located 
near my workstation always introduce themselves on the phone in 
the following manner: This is ____ from the Office of Housing and 
I’m ringing about ____. Their language is moderate, professional 
and ‘plain’, simple descriptive terms are used and repetition is an 
important part of their interaction. 
 
The walls are covered in an impressive number of whiteboards, 
some for repairs, cleaning, offers, appeals and hearings. Staff refer 
constantly to these whiteboards, updating and using them when 
unable to locate the HSO whose patch it is. I have yet to note any 
one person who takes responsibility for the boards as a whole. 
Today was slow and staff seemed to really flag at about 3.30pm. I 
was starting to yawn and by 4pm, the office was infected by 
sleepiness. It was a slow and plodding day at the office. (Field note: 
Location one) 
 
And yet a few days later, the calm seemed to dissipate and a number of staff 
told me that their productivity was low because of tenant behaviour: 
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19th August 
 
Disputes: A person was at the front desk complaining about a burst 
pipe at her property, she didn’t trust the Maintenance call centre, so 
she came into the office to “eye–ball one of you slackers”. I noticed 
how skilfully staff avoided being drawn into her comments about her 
new neighbours (also OoH tenants) she told of how she witnessed 
the woman move–in in the morning and later that afternoon her 
‘husband’ moved in (the property is ‘reserved’ for single parents). 
Allegedly, they both work and hold wild parties etc. It was ‘back to 
the water problem, back to the water problem, back to the water 
problem’. 
 
No shows: Early in the morning the HSO’s all experienced a number 
of no shows (people with appointments who do not attend or call to 
reschedule). One of the HSO’s told me that these ‘really give him 
the shits’ and are likely to make him less understanding next time. 
Today I watched Phil grow increasingly frustrated as his rental 
arrears interviewees for the morning failed to appear – ‘no shows’ 
as he calls them.  The 9.30am appointment simply didn’t appear 
and his 10.30am called to say that she was ill (it was her boyfriend 
calling) and last time she had car problems – this is the third 
interview she has failed to attend.  I spoke with Phil about what he 
might do next.  The approach (policy?) for the three times absent 
tenant would be: 
To seek an order of possession and should she fail to contact him in 
the next few days, he will progress to serving a warrant and move to 
eviction through VCAT.  The tenant has a growing arrears bill and 
Phil believes that she is using avoidance behaviour to deal with the 
issue. After lunch Phil’s 1.30pm called to say that her friend was in 
hospital after an over dose. 
‘It’s for her own good that she come to see me’ was his comment 
‘the arrears just keeps growing and the sooner we deal with it, the 
better.’ But this is typical arrears behaviour. (Field note: Location 
one) 
 
The 26th August was a busy day: 
 
26th August 2004. 
 
1) Younger, female staff member had an ‘incident’ with a current 
tenant who was displaying some ‘anger management issues’ and 
she felt that his attitude was due, in part, a response to her age and 
gender.  
The HSO was quite vocal: In her opinion, she feels that he probably 
beats his wife/girlfriend and his overpowering and controlling 
attitude is likely to be an antisocial issue very soon. 
One of the older, male members of staff is now dealing with this 
tenant, ‘calming him down’ and ‘attempting to guide his rages’.  
 
The female staff member was not entirely happy with this method 
but seems to accept it as the only reasonable way forward.  
Interestingly, the male HSO made a point of ensuring that the 
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female HSO didn’t perceive that her competence was in question, it 
was a tenant specific issue.  
 
2) Later that day, a tenant who appeared to be under the influence 
of drugs/alcohol ‘threw a wobbly’ in the interview room and when a 
staff member rang the police they were told to ‘arse him (the tenant) 
out’ and the police would call by his house and have a word. Staff 
were not happy with this response, but reluctantly accepted the fact 
that the shortage of police means that unless a weapon was 
involved, they were unlikely to respond. Later, in the tea room, 
Sophia joked and said that as this police shortage got worse, the 
police might even start to ask ‘How big is the knife? ‘coz we are only 
funded to respond to 10 or more inches of blade’. (all staff laugh). 
On the train home, I was amazed to discover that due to the number 
of signs around the office, I had subconsciously memorised the 
phone number of the local police station! 
 
3) One of the female HSO’s returned from a VTAC hearing, visibly 
upset and disturbed.  When she returned to her red licence plated 
‘govi–car’ (a state government fleet vehicle) there was a man 
leaning on the driver’s door and he would not move until she told 
him ‘why he couldn’t see his fucking kids’. This was a child 
protection issue, not a housing one, but the red registration plates of 
her car marked her as a public servant and this was sufficient 
grounds for the abuse she experienced.  At around 2pm, she went 
home ‘sick’. 
 
4) As I left for the day, I drove by the front door and noticed a 
woman and three school aged children, all shouting, swearing and 
kicking the now locked automatic doors. (Field note: Location one) 
 
Whilst at head office, I recounted my experience and asked managers what 
they thought about issues such as these and, more specifically, what might be 
done to solve these types of problems with tenants? Henry’s response was 
blunt: 
 
These issues go with the territory and no amount of organisational 
reform will make them go away. Imagine you are a teacher, every 
year you will have difficult students, a prison officer has good and 
bad inmates, etc. It is just part of your work life. What we need to do 
is support the HSO’s, train them and make sure we have the right 
sort of people working with tenants. We have to start at ground level 
and build capacity. 
 
Most managers agreed with the premise that ‘problems with tenants’ will not go 
away and the vast majority felt that, if anything, they will ‘get worse’. The 
problem for both managers and workers alike, was finding the time and 
resources to develop the organisational capacity and proactive work practices 
promoted by the Housing Office Review. Managers at head office also 
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complained to me about the fact that stories in the press, almost without fail, 
produced a ‘knee jerk’ reaction from the most senior managers and these 
panicked reactions ‘hijacked’ staff, preventing them from undertaking mundane, 
but important tasks and the work they had planned for the day. Like the HSO’s, 
they felt that the opportunities to ‘work smart’ were reduced by pressure to 
respond to ‘dumb things’. 
 
Managers told me that one of the biggest challenges facing those charged with 
the implementation of the Review is developing an understanding of work that 
is fluid, responsive and, at times, particularly difficult. The next challenge is 
understanding the changing nature of the tenants themselves, tenants that are 
presenting with increasingly complex and multiple needs (Thomson Goodall 
Associates Pty Ltd, 2001). 
Problems with ‘complex and multiple needs’ 
Part of the reason why housing workers feel like they are constantly called to 
respond to ‘highjacks’ and ‘kneejerk reactions’ is the ‘complex and multiple’ 
needs of the tenants they work with. The phrase ‘complex and multiple needs’ 
is used by government agencies and service providers to describe people (in 
this case, tenants) with physical, social, mental or economic problems. For 
some tenants, it’s all of the above.  It’s not a phrase used by HSO’s, but it was 
a reasonably common ‘catch all’ at head office. Just how significant is the 
number of tenants with complex and multiple needs (this report refers to these 
as ‘special needs’) is illustrated in the 2011 Productivity Commissions report on 
public housing (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service 
Provision, 2011).  
This review revealed that the number of tenants with ‘special needs’ have 
remained at around sixty percent of the tenant pollution: 
Year Proportion of new tenancies allocated 
to households with special needs (%) 
2005-06 58.9 
2006-07 54.5 
2007-08 53.2 
2008-09 63.5 
2009-10 60.5 
(Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2011) 
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Some idea of the extent of the challenge that the changing profile of tenant 
needs is presenting to housing officers is evident in the measure of ‘special 
needs’ tenants reported by the committee. The allocation data on its own, 
however, does not paint the full picture of the problem of changing tenant need. 
When you take the data in the table above and the summary of the ‘Total 
greatest need applicants on waiting list, including applicants for transfer, at 30 
June’ below, the picture becomes clearer (Steering Committee for the Review 
of Government Service Provision, 2011). 
 
Year Number of ‘special needs’ applicants 
on the waiting list 
2006 4331 
2007 4495 
2008 5401 
2009 7247 
2010 8777 
(Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2011) 
 
What is immediately apparent is the fact that the increasing number of people 
on the waiting list with ‘the greatest need’, means that the number of tenants 
with ‘complex and multiple’ needs, living in public housing, will continue to 
grow. In their stories, staff described this as a ‘tsunami of neediness, just sitting 
offshore, waiting to crash down on them’ 
 
In an effort to illustrate what it is like to work with (an ever growing number of) 
tenants experiencing ‘complex and multiple needs’, I have selected three 
simple front–line case studies from my field notes. Even though these stories 
are just three of many, they represent the diverse and sometimes unpredictable 
nature of the ‘average day’ for a housing worker as they respond to the 
sometimes precarious nature of tenants’ domestic situations. The first story is a 
one about a mother under stress. 
 
Case Study One: “The smacker” 
 
‘Sue’ is a (new) single mother presenting at interview to discuss 
housing, as her relationship with both her partner and neighbours 
has reached the point that ‘nothing can repair the damage’.  She is 
accompanied by her six year old son, an energetic and bored boy 
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who has just spent two hours at Centrelink. She is seen after a short 
wait and as she outlines her situation, she casually smacks her son 
for jumping around. After the HSO explains the procedure, what 
documents are needed and the likelihood of time on the waiting list 
before a permanent solution is found, Sue accompanies the next 
smack with the sentence “sit still, or this nice man won’t give us a 
house”. The jumping continues, as does the smacking until Phil tells 
her ‘not to worry about the jumping’, as it doesn’t bother him at all 
and it will have no effect on the outcome of the interview. 
As the interview draws to a close Sue begins to understand that she 
will not leave the office with her new keys (as she had hoped) and 
begins to direct her disappointment towards her son, roughly 
grabbing him and shouting “See, I told you that if you didn’t behave 
we wouldn’t get a house”. 
(Field Notes: August, Location one) 
 
Case Study Two: “He’s a little bit OCD” 
 
The tearoom is part escape, part strategy room and on occasion, a 
little uncomfortable as different groups attempt to read, watch Jerry 
Springer or simply zone out.  This lunchtime was a little different 
because Sophia told a story that held everyone’s attention. 
She had interviewed a tenant who wanted to shift houses (she didn’t 
inform the listeners why as shift requests were fairly common) and 
he was keen to tell her more about his request. So, the HSO 
grabbed his file, her coffee and showed him to an interview room. 
After introducing themselves and shaking hands they sat down to 
talk.  It became immediately apparent to the HSO that this tenant 
‘wasn’t a big showerer’ and the small, warm interview very quickly 
became smelly and uncomfortable. Keen for a speedy departure 
from the room, she attempted to move the interview at what she 
called ‘a cracking pace’. But the tenant’s behaviour caught her off 
guard: as she spoke, he placed his hands down the back of his 
pants, scratched enthusiastically and proceeded to sniff his fingers.  
Almost immediately, he repeated this action and it was at this point 
that she had three realisations. She remembered being told that this 
tenant was ‘a bit Obsessive Compulsive’; she noticed the significant 
discoloration of his fingers and recalled that he had shaken her 
hand with prolonged enthusiasm. For the rest of the day, one of her 
workmates deemed Sophia to be the new villain in a James Bond 
Film. She had become ‘Pooh Finger’. 
(Field Notes: August, Location one) 
 
Case Study Three: “The smoker” 
 
After some weeks of fieldwork, I was invited to ‘ride shot gun’ on a 
home visit with Phil and, like many home visits, this one was a 
‘friendly catch up’ with a tenant who was behind with his rent. The 
tenant was a retired biker (forcibly retired, due to a number of 
significant collisions) who described himself as not ‘unfamiliar to the 
check–in system of her majesty’s hotels’. He was also a keen and 
proud breeder of very sought after Mastiff/Rottweiler cross dogs.  
He met us at the gate, as he was returning from a walk to the shops 
to buy smokes. After introductions he showed us to the lounge and 
went to ‘put the jug on’. Two things happened whilst he was in the 
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kitchen. Firstly, I noticed that the coffee table was a large piece of 
glass being held up by a skilfully rendered life–size sculpture of a 
naked woman lying on her back. The second observation was that I 
had company on the couch; I had been joined by the largest dog I 
have ever seen. The coffee and chat lasted around twenty minutes 
and in that time he smoked a significant number of cigarettes, but 
how just many is hard to estimate due to the smoke, the dog saliva 
and the coffee table. At no stage was his arrears problem 
mentioned, instead the HSO decided that, after we returned to the 
office, he would send a letter in the post. 
(Field Notes: August, Location one) 
 
These three very different stories illustrate how interacting with tenants with 
‘multiple and complex needs’ can often be mundane, repetitive and yet 
exhausting. HSO’s talked at length about problems with tenants and Sophia 
told me that at times, she feels powerless to deal with the actions and 
behaviours of some tenants: 
 
There is a perception that complex tenancies are the mad, violent, 
psycho ones, you know, the ‘nutters’.  Sure, we have them, but 
they’re not the big problem.  We have good systems for them, bells, 
whistles, help and counselling. So, bizarrely enough, they don’t get 
you down – it’s the low level, relentless, hopeless ones that I hate.  
Issues that are too minor to trigger a formal response, but day after 
day, interview after interview, shit, they wear you out. (Interview: 
Location one) 
 
My field notes and interviews capture numerous interactions with the people 
Sophia referred to as ‘the hopeless ones’, so much so that the themes in my 
journal were often organised according to the dominant feature of each 
interaction. To do this, I used the lexicon of housing staff: ‘the shouter’, ‘the 
whinger’, ‘the basher’, ‘the perfect neighbour’, ‘the demander’ and ‘the silent, 
polite waiter’, ‘the deserving’ and many others. In general, most front–line staff 
felt that it was the mundane and repetitive transactions (the ones that offered 
little promise of a realisable and practical outcome) that made their work 
stressful and difficult. The HOR Final Report referred to this practice as the 
process of ‘exercising sound judgement where flexible response may be 
required’ (Office of Housing, 2004. pg 15).  Phil’s opinion about the type of 
response his work requires reinforced Sophia’s comments: 
 
…. we laugh at the madness of working here, but that’s just so we 
can cope. These sorts of incidences are really difficult, not major 
enough to send up a red flag and implement a formal staff support 
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response, but when you have more of these every–day, they pile 
up.  When the pile gets too big, that’s when sick leave kicks in and 
smoking goes though the roof. (Interview: Location One) 
 
After a few weeks at head office, I spoke with Henry about his thoughts about 
tenants with complex needs and he talked about the capacity of the 
organisation and the competency of HSO’s to manage ‘risk driven events’: 
 
Tenants with complex and multiple needs are the bread and butter 
of the business of housing; it’s about understanding the risk profile 
of the tenant and making a ‘best fit’ allocation at the outset. As 
managers we have to respond by building the human capacity of the 
organisation and developing a better understanding of our stock.  
(Field note: Location three) 
 
Sara’s perspective about complex needs was a little different. She believes that 
her perspective is informed and influenced by her experience as a HSO: 
 
After a while you don’t actually think about what it all means, well, 
you can’t really. I remember as a HSO the often–conflicting 
demands, often not being able to give people what they want and 
them kicking the office door in. But I was younger then and now I 
know about mental health issues that people have no control over, I 
don’t think I could do it again. (Field note: Location three.) 
 
(Retired) Doug, who describes himself as ‘being from a different age’, was 
blunt and pragmatic about the emergence of welfare housing and the creation 
of neighbourhoods dominated by tenants with multiple and complex needs. 
Here is what he had to add to the dialogue: 
 
You did, ask me, so here goes. Over the years I have come to the 
realisation that most of the savvy tenants have got the ‘suss’ that 
the government will take responsibility for everything. Can’t look 
after kids?  Have more and we’ll look after them. Take drugs, don’t 
pay your rent, no worries. Trash the place and piss off, VCAT will bill 
you three bucks a week for 25 years and you don’t even have to 
pay. Don’t get me wrong, there are seriously desperate and 
deserving people out there, but they get lost in the pile of grasping 
people who work the system. (Interview: Retired Housing worker) 
 
What is clear from this inter–office dialogue is that there exists a wide range of 
perceptions around the problem of tenants with multiple and complex needs, 
HSO’s are occupied with face to face interactions, regional staff attempt to 
diplomatically blend policy and practice and head office staff are concerned 
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with the organisation’s capacity to cope with increasingly complex demands 
(Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, 2001).   
 
Sometimes I wish we had a slightly better structure [sic] of clients to 
deal with.  It would be nice to not have people yelling and screaming 
when it’s not necessary. Sometimes I would love to say; “Enough 
now, settle down and let’s get on with it”. But this will never happen, 
because it’s not a luxury service we provide, we are not selling 
designer T–shirts here. (Field note; Location one) 
 
It seemed that individual perceptions about the problems with tenants were 
influenced by previous experience, position in the organisation, personal beliefs 
about just who deserves to be housed and how frequently you have direct 
interaction with these tenants. In addition to the many war stories, accounts of 
the mundane and tales of ‘endless admin’, there was a third–party story that 
caught my attention and, over twelve months of field work, many variations of 
this story were shared with me. The story was this: 
 
In the (X) office they had a female tenant who was mentally unwell, 
living on her own, with a few cats.  The front desk staff in the local 
housing office were receiving complaints about the smell coming 
from under her door and, after a number of unsuccessful phone 
calls and ‘no answers’ when they knocked, a HSO was authorised 
to use a key to gain entry. The HSO (accompanied by the police) 
knocked on the door and sounds could be heard in the flat.  When 
they entered the property they found the tenant distressed, barely 
clothed and unwell.  They also found that she had used her own 
faeces to cover (‘paint’ was the expression I heard most often) the 
walls and this was the source of the odour noted by fellow tenants in 
her building. The ‘authorities’ moved her to supported 
accommodation whilst her flat was cleaned, repainted and 
deodorised. The tenant recommenced her medication, reduced her 
alcohol consumption and started to eat more frequently. She was 
returned to her flat and (X) months later, the front desk staff in the 
local housing office started to receive complaints about the smell 
coming from under her door. (Field note: Location one, two & three) 
 
This story (or one very similar) was told to me on a number of occasions; I 
heard it in interviews, over a BBQ lunch, in the tearoom and whilst driving to 
home visits. Mostly, it was told as a ‘war story’, a form of narrative that uses a 
‘horror’ to illustrate how difficult and challenging housing work is. It’s an 
electrifying and gritty story, but my interest is not so much in the content of the 
narrative, but the discussions that followed the telling of the tale. Unprompted, 
front–line staff would discuss this story with enthusiasm. Some believed that 
this story beautifully illustrates how ‘fucked the system is’ and ‘how housing 
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workers end up with the consequences of these behaviours, with no power to 
deal with the cause’ (Chalkley, 2005a). The notion of ‘all responsibility and no 
power’ was really important to housing workers. The front–line staff used 
stories about ‘difficult and complex’ tenants to inform me of how they deal with 
the consequences of these tenants and their behaviour, and yet do not have 
the authority, skills or resources to deal with the primary cause of the problems.  
 
This feeling of immense frustration for HSO’s is the result of what Ranson 
(Ranson et al., 2009. pp 67-68) calls the ‘dependencies of power, the process 
where structuring is typically the privilege of some organisation’s actors. The 
meanings that shape organisational structuring are as often the source of 
cleavage as of consensus, bringing members into conflict’. The HSO’s told me 
that they find themselves constantly responding to negative housing events 
caused by mental illness, drugs, family breakdown, poverty and violence, 
dealing with events that can only be solved by the intervention of other, under–
resourced welfare agencies. One worker told me that ‘most senior housing 
managers make the classic mistake: thinking that the identification of a problem 
is the cure’ (Interview: Location One).  When I spoke with head office staff 
about this issue, a number of them told me that the first and most important 
step in the process of review was to understand the nature of ‘exactly what is 
under review’. One person told me that ‘the form of the cure will come from the 
process of identification’. 
 
People with complex and multiple needs are not the only problem facing the 
staff at the Office of Housing and, whilst I was on fieldwork, I heard about 
another type of tenant, one that manipulated public housing processes and 
procedures, and these were called the ‘system workers’. 
Problems with the ‘system worker’ 
The following section deals with people who might be considered the ‘system 
workers’, these are applicants and tenants who become familiar with key 
features of the administrative system and attempt to exploit them to improve 
their circumstances: gain access to housing, transfer into better housing or 
lower their rent and so on. HSO’s called them the ‘system workers’, tenants 
and applicants who repeatedly engage with housing workers as they 
persistently press for entitlements within a resource constrained system. 
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Earlier in this chapter, Doug described the ‘system worker’ as ‘a tenant with a 
semi–legitimate housing need and an excellent understanding of how to exploit 
the housing system for the best possible personal outcome’. The ‘system 
worker’ was a frequent theme of my discussions with HSO’s and as I listened 
back through my interviews I was reminded of an instruction I read in the 1967 
Estate Officers Handbook: 
 
Rental rebates give the Housing Commission tenant an advantage 
over those outside the Commission and we are therefore 
determined that this great privilege should not be misused or 
abused. Over the past, many instances of cheating have come to 
my attention, and I suspect that many other cases have happened 
where tenants are obtaining a rebate to which they are not entitled. 
(Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967pg. S4) 
 
So, the ‘system worker’ narrative was not new. In the 1930s and 40s a great 
deal of energy was expended ensuring that only the ‘deserving’ poor were 
allocated public housing and by 2007 this had not really changed. A significant 
commitment is made to ensure that only people with the most pressing needs 
are allocated public housing. When I questioned the HSO’s about the 
prevalence of ‘system workers’, the consensus was that the number of these 
tenants was actually very low, but the impact of these tenants on workers and 
their job satisfaction was very high. The managers at head office agreed, with 
one telling me that ‘as a percentage of the total tenant population, they are 
insignificant, but shit, when the media finds one, they dominate the place!’ 
 
As fieldwork progressed, it became increasingly apparent that though they 
were few in number, ‘people who work the system’ were a problem for most 
staff and, as a result, staff frequently discussed the ‘system worker’ as part of 
their stories. I was surprised to learn that ‘people who work the system’ were a 
problem for housing staff for a number of reasons, but by far the most common 
problem was the fact that HSO’s felt that the impact of these tenants was 
‘misunderstood’ by the staff at head office. Phil told me that, for him, the real 
difficulty with system workers was actually his manager’s perceptions about 
these tenants. Phil believed that the ‘further away you got from tenants, the 
less you understood the impact of a small handful of system workers can have 
on your patch’. Sophia agreed: 
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I remember when I was acting team leader, I was surprised to hear 
one of the regional managers and our local manager talking about 
the largest patch a staff member might be able to manage. It was so 
formula driven, I just wanted to shout, ‘Yep, great if you have 99% 
oldies. What about the poor HSO’s who get the patches full of 
druggies, young single mums and counter jumping anti–socials?’ I 
thought, shit, if our own manager has forgotten what it’s like out 
there, what must it be like at head office? (Field note: Location one) 
 
A number of staff also told me that, in general, there was a perceived division 
between the realities of their work and the understandings and expectations of 
their managers, particularly those at head office. I came to realise that, 
statistically, ‘people who work the system’ were actually a minor problem, but 
as this cohort of tenants could be distinctly categorised and clearly identified 
(by HSO’s), they provided an ideal exemplar of ‘how management doesn’t 
understand our work’. Stories about ‘people who work the system’ were really 
stories about workloads, performance measurement, stress and morale. Doug 
explained that this ‘division in understanding’ is not a new phenomena and he 
can recall years of frustration as a local office manager:   
 
It was frustrating at times. The amount of stuff that comes down 
from central shows how little they understand the dynamic nature of 
our work.  We were down to bare bones and we can barely do what 
we are mandated to do, but you put quality improvement, new 
models and new forms on to people under the pump, they will 
crumple. (Field note: Retired Housing worker) 
 
As her work at head office had significant impact on the work of HSO’s, I asked 
Sara about how she understood life at the front–line (and in particular, the 
impact of the ‘system worker’). 
 
To be honest, you have to divorce yourself from the actions and 
behaviours of individual tenants. As a former HSO, I hate to say it, 
but housing reform will never get anywhere if we continue to get 
bogged down in the stress caused by difficult individuals. It’s not 
popular, but we just have to push forward with policy reforms to the 
system and drag every one screaming into the next century.  We 
are never going to have the resources to respond to individual 
tenant needs in a meaningful way. We are all aware of the system 
worker and this will improve when we change the system. (Field 
note: Location three) 
 
In a particularly argumentative staff meeting, I experienced first–hand this ‘drag 
every one screaming into the next century’. This particular staff meeting was 
called to introduce a new complaints procedure, soon to be ‘live’ (made 
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available) to tenants.  A team of staff from head office came to the local office 
to inform the office staff that, like it or not, a new complaints policy from head 
office would be implemented and a new grievance procedure must be followed.  
Directly after the meeting, Phil came over to my desk for a chat about how this 
was a ‘win for the system worker’:  
 
Another example for your files! So now head office have declared 
open season on HSO’s!  Tenants can now complain about anything 
they like and will get a hearing, the ‘nutters’, the whingers and the 
serial complainers.  Fuck, do these people have any idea what it’s 
like? (Field note: Location one) 
 
Some weeks later, whilst visiting a different office, I made a point of catching up 
with a staff member who was part of the briefing team, the people visiting local 
offices and outlining the new complaints procedure. I asked ‘What impact might 
this new policy might have on housing staff?’ and ‘How might the system 
worker exploit this new complaints procedure?’ 
 
Our approach is simple, we just had to throw it out there and 
weather the storm. There is never going to be a good time to 
introduce this sort of policy, but this one was kind of urgent.  In 
a lot of the reports to the HOR, we were criticised for the lack of 
a decent complaints and appeals protocol.  Of course we knew 
it would be threatening to HSO’s, and we know some people 
(the system working tenant) will exploit the system for what the 
HSO’s called ‘revenge’. We told all the staff at the information 
sessions that this isn’t new; people already do this stuff.  
Haven’t they ever heard of ministerials? (Field note/Interview: 
Location three) 
 
At head office, the managers I spoke with told me that they were cognisant of 
the fact that any change, no matter how small, has a potential impact on front–
line staff. The perception that head office has ‘no idea what it’s like out there’ 
was not entirely accurate. At head office I observed and recorded a number of 
discussions and debates about how proposed changes to policy and procedure 
might impact on the work of HSO’s. The focus of a number of meetings was 
looking at policy revision to lessen the impact of ‘system workers’ and quite a 
few managers told me that one of the key roles of the new maintenance call 
centre was to centralise records and reduce the opportunities for tenants to 
‘work the system’. 
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In Chapter Three, I described how increasingly scarce public housing places 
are allocated to tenants with multiple and complex needs and, as a result, it 
seems increasingly probable that the ‘typical’ public housing tenant will have a 
mental illness, inter–generational poverty, ageing, domestic violence or one of 
many other welfare needs. This increasing pressure to allocate properties to 
only the most marginalised has been accompanied by another trend, the move 
to a public service model that instructs HSO’s to now consider tenants as 
‘customers’. A process referred to in the final report as ‘to implement a new 
service model in which an improved structure, clearer job roles and service 
improvements will ensure staff have greater job satisfaction; clients receive 
better service’ (Office of Housing, 2004. pg 14). I was interested to find out 
what the workers thought about this. 
 
Over a BBQ lunch, I was chatting with staff about this move to a ‘customer 
service model’ and Phil told be that he had ‘dealt with over one thousand 
tenants and not one of them were customers’: 
 
Now this one really shits me. “Customers?” Four years at uni and all 
that HECs debt and the best head office can manage is “customer 
service” (laughs). Too much time at Myers during long lunches it 
would seem (laughs). I’m working with people who are lucky to feed 
themselves, care for their kids and stay off the gear (drugs). And 
now they are customers!  Excuse me Ms Smith ‘Would you like a 
Versace or Prada concrete house?’ (all laugh). (Field note: Location 
one) 
 
Most staff at the BBQ enjoyed this light hearted and satirical tale of how head 
office seems to be disconnected from the reality of public housing work, but as 
the day progressed, most staff (including Phil) told me that it’s not actually like 
that and ‘there are some really good guys at head office’. Sophia had given this 
issue some thought and had a theory: 
 
Every–day I deal with difficult and challenging tenants, so I can’t 
forget them, I can’t make them just part of the bigger picture of a 
‘housing system under stress’ (a quote from her housing studies 
course).  At head office, this daily interaction is gone and tenants 
become an abstract idea on a page.  Having said that, we have 
some champions at head office, you know, people who have worked 
their way up and still aren’t afraid to visit the local areas and will 
change a procedure if it doesn’t work for HSO’s.  Then there’s what 
I like to call the ‘butt heads’. These are the head office guys who 
start each sentence like this: ‘I understand the pressure you are 
under, but…’  These are my ‘butt heads’. (Interview: Location one) 
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There is a logical and obvious reason for the perception that, at head office, the 
problems with tenants are represented and understood only in an abstract 
form. Head office, like most ‘non operational’ government departments, has 
little or no direct interaction with its customers and instead works like an 
inverted funnel, concentrating and refining the many operational procedures, 
issues and services into a shape that eventually becomes policy and procedure 
and then, the managers at head office ‘roughly point it in the direction of current 
government priorities’ (Chalkley, 2005b). I also found that this metaphor of an 
inverted funnel works in reality: the more floors you travelled up in the head 
office building, the more influential and powerful the staff. Ironically, these 
‘distant and removed’ staff (the people at the top of the building, the most 
influential and powerful people in public housing) seemed to be the ones most 
directly influenced by the negative portrayal of public housing in the press.  A 
number of the senior head office staff interviewed could predict the tenor of the 
day ahead, simply by reading the newspaper. Henry told me: 
 
I used to run in the early morning and would have to wait to cross 
the road near the newsagents and I remember one morning, 
glancing down at the Herald Sun and reading the headlines that 
said something like ‘Your taxes at work, this public tenant owns two 
cars valued at more than $60,000 and you pay his rent’. I just turned 
round, jogged home, showered and got an earlier train because I 
knew what was to come. (Field note/Interview: Location three) 
 
After spending some time at head office, I discovered that the perception that 
head office staff are disconnected (and protected) from the problems with 
complex tenants was not entirely accurate. Staff at head office were exposed to 
the impact of the ‘problems with tenants’ in different ways and are often called 
on to do two things. Firstly and most urgently, remediate the problem, solve it 
and brief the appropriate senior personal. For complex problems, this can be a 
lengthy process, requiring numerous updates and frequent briefings with senior 
managers. The second action is to then identify what/which parts of the system 
‘failed’ and allowed the problem to become a public concern.  Doug shared a 
‘problem with tenants’ story from the last few weeks of his time as a housing 
manager: 
 
The local rag started a campaign and, of course, it was a tenant that 
had a history.  This old guy was claiming that a particular part of his 
house was collapsing and we had first ignored him for months and 
then, done a crappy patch–up that had collapsed.  This was one of 
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those ‘full on’ stories with the sad looking tenant, the dog, the 
walking stick, the whole fucking nine yards. Oh, yeh and while we 
are driving around in (suburb) why not take a heap of shots and do 
a centre spread? So, we have front page of the (paper), a centre 
spread with old cars on lawns and kids that should be at school.  
And the shit hit the fan; the minister, the director, the mayor, head 
office and it ran for days.  What we knew was that this old bugger 
had pulled the stuff down himself and did again after we repaired it. 
After a week or so the dozy reporters got the drift and realised that 
this guy was nuts and just leading them on.  Next week – a story 
about how public housing estates are poorly managed and tenants 
are trashing your valuable taxpayer funded houses, with no 
consequences. We were always in the shit; it’s just the depth that 
varied. (Interview: Retired housing worker) 
 
The next time I spoke with Doug he had obviously spent quite some time 
reflecting on this particular incident and had come to realise that this problem 
had caused a number of different reactions, most of which seem to contradict 
each other. He recalls that the local office HSO’s felt particularly betrayed; they 
knew the ‘truth’ of the story and were unable (and forbidden) to respond to the 
stories in the paper and, to add insult to injury, Doug instructed them to 
supervise the repairs in a professional, timely and courteous manner. The 
Office of Housing contractor who had carried out the first repair felt slighted by 
the ‘fury of the media reports’ and also resented the silence from the Office of 
Housing. Constant questioning from the director made Doug feel like he was a 
‘poor manager’ and as a result of this incident he ‘almost threw it in’ and took 
an early retirement. The staff at head office asked Doug (and his staff) 
questions such as ‘What part of the system had failed?’, or ‘Which policy had 
been ignored?’ and ‘Which procedure had not been followed correctly?’  Doug 
knew that this was just another ‘media storm in a tea cup’ and would eventually 
blow over and go away, taking with it the interest of the director and head 
office. It did blow over and the local housing staff went back to assisting 
tenants, assessing applications, calculating rebates and managing their patch. 
But Doug thought that reaction of head office had done some damage: 
 
It was like head office didn’t actually care so much about the 
incident itself, but were more focused on making the problem 
disappear, and then pulling the engine apart to find the faulty part. I 
know that the director can’t get into a slanging match with a tenant 
and any comment in the papers just provides more fuel.  I think 
HSO’s know this too, but they do feel abandoned by the system 
when this sort of crap happens. (Interview: Retired housing worker) 
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I told this story to a staff member at the regional office and their response was 
interesting: 
 
Now this is a classical example of how head office and local offices 
don’t communicate very well – one is exclusively big picture focused 
and the other little picture focused.  They actually share the 
problem; it’s a public housing problem. What they don’t share is a 
context in which to solve the problem! When you look at these 
things closely, normally both the local and head office actually agree 
about the fix for the problem, but one party is speaking Greek and 
the other Sign Language. That’s were we can help. We understand 
the difficulties of the real world and yet have a good handle on head 
office stuff.  We could be the missing link that these two offices need 
to solve some of the problems with tenants. But, sadly, these ‘hot’ 
stories very often go (with little research or reflection) straight from 
the director’s desk to the local manager’s urgent file. (Interview: 
Regional office) 
 
This comment was insightful because it was the first clearly articulated 
observation that one of the biggest hurdles to solving the problems with tenants 
might be the absence of a shared organisational context in which to 
communicate about the nature of these problems. Staff at all levels in the 
organisation seemed to be talking about these problems, just not with each 
other! This suggested to me that one of the problems with tenants might also 
be the system and structures put in place to help staff respond to and cope with 
these problems. 
Problems with systems, support and coping with difficult work 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I described how there has been constant 
experimentation and change in the system of administration that defines and 
structures relationships with tenants. Over the organisation’s history there have 
been changes in language, job design, organisational structures and a number 
of proposed and enforced alternative organisational cultures.  The expectation 
has always been that these changes will lead to arrangements that will assist 
workers to cope and provide better services. As these promises have met with 
mixed success, I was keen to find out how modern day housing workers coped 
with the problems described earlier in this chapter and to uncover how much 
the systems of the organisation contributed to the act of ‘coping’. After a few 
weeks in the local office, I noticed that staff used both formal and informal 
systems to cope with their work and sitting at my desk I scribbled the following 
comment in my field notes: 
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“Phil, number 23 Norwood Ave is here to see you” – I note that the 
majority of staff use property addresses to identify people coming 
into the office or on the phone (which seems to be a logical way to 
work with changing tenants and patches). I wonder what staff think 
about this system? (Field note: Location one) 
 
During my next interview with Sophia I asked her about the practice of using 
the address to identify people at the front counter or on the phone: 
 
It’s not intended to be rude, it’s just that tenants move so often (or 
not often enough!) and our allocated patches change so much, it’s 
the only way to do it.  Sometimes HSO’s do make a title for an 
infamous tenant, but it’s rare and, to be honest, nicknames are 
kinda frowned upon. This sounds awful, but it also helps de–
personalise things too – you focus on the property, not the person. 
My patch has 260 properties, not 260 families. I could never look 
after 260 families!!’ [laughs] (Interview: Location one) 
 
Phil agreed with Sophia, but added that this had changed from when he started 
with the Commission: 
 
I used to have a much smaller patch [at the time, due to staff 
shortages, Phil was covering 387 properties], I knew a little more 
about my tenants, I knew that Mrs Jones’ husband had been laid off, 
her son was coming out of prison and her daughter had done well in 
her HSC.  Now it feels like, I just know the squeaky wheels and 
nutters and the rest have to be ‘addresses’, or even worse, a court 
or block of flats. (Interview: Location one) 
 
It seemed that one of the simplest coping strategies was the use of de–
personalised language around the office. Using a street address instead of 
identifying tenants by name is a good example of this. There were other 
strategies. A number of staff used humour to debrief and recover from serious 
and disturbing events, some staff used their interviews with me as a type of 
catharsis, and some staff concentrated on the success stories, channelling 
their energies into serving ‘nice’ tenants and ignoring, for as long as possible, 
the ‘nasty’ ones. Some long–serving staff had worked hard to craft ‘patches’ 
that were mostly ‘easy’ tenants (especially the elderly) and some told me that 
they switched ‘on’ and ‘off’ as they entered and exited the office. Staff also 
employed an interesting ‘coping’ mechanism in response to anti–social 
incidents. After an incident, I observed that HSO’s worked together to re–
establish a ‘cadence’.  
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The concept of a ‘cadence of care’ was used by Fry (in her ethnography of 
triage nursing in emergency departments of public hospitals) and is useful here 
because it describes how, after a critical event, staff work to re–establish a 
harmony of practice, reclaim control of their office and re–synchronise their 
work patterns. Fry describes this phenomenon as ‘reclaiming the rhythm of 
work, goal fulfilment, decision–making and the accomplishment of routine 
tasks’ (Fry, 2004). Very often incidents involving tenants with ‘multiple and 
complex needs’ disrupt this rhythm and disconnect staff from their ‘cadence’. 
The HSO’s, as did head office staff, worked together to debrief the staff 
involved, alter rosters, change priorities, renegotiate deadlines and generally 
attempt to return the office to the stability experienced immediately prior to an 
incident. 
 
Another coping strategy I observed was ‘to assume that you wouldn’t be a 
housing worker forever’. A number of staff told me that they had a ‘best before’ 
date in their head and were cognisant of the fact that they could (and would) 
only do this job for a certain length of time. Earlier in this thesis, I described 
how the final report of the Housing Office Review cited an urgent need to 
address ‘the high attrition rate of staff’, and this will prove to be a significant 
organisational challenge when this attrition is, in part, a coping mechanism 
used by staff as they attempt to manage the problems with tenants. When it all 
gets too much, staff leave. In the six months of local office fieldwork, I attended 
eight farewell morning teas, and on a few occasions at head office, I had to visit 
other government departments to interview (former) housing workers. 
 
Interested in how this problem is experienced in other parts of the organisation, 
I asked a number of head office staff how they ‘coped’. A number told me that 
they had ‘survived the problems with tenants by moving to a job at head office’. 
Henry’s early comments touched on how staff at head office ‘systematise’ 
difficult tenancies, but he also told me that: 
 
I use physical distance to gain a perspective that is just not possible 
at the operational level. It’s up to us to help HSO’s cope with these 
tenants, in theory; we have the headspace and distance to put 
tenant behaviour into the larger context. In practice, we lack the 
resources to harness this perspective. Like the HSO’s ‘on the run’ 
from the problems with tenants, sometimes I feel like I’m on the run 
from the problems of HSO’s!  (Interview: Location three) 
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Sara’s history as a HSO and her contact with local offices produced a slightly 
different perspective about responding to the problems with tenants: 
 
I can’t hide from these problems.  I do quite a bit of training with 
different HSO’s and always, without fail, they want to talk about 
problems with tenants. If we are training for software, it’s difficult 
tenants, training in rebates, it’s difficult tenants and so on. I’ve 
started allowing extra time for this, they talk to each other, share 
and off we go.  I cope by allowing them to talk and sometimes, bring 
their comments back into the training.  It sounds wanky, but I use 
the problems with tenants as a resource, because it’s common 
ground that all HSO’s share! (Interview: Location three) 
 
The disparity between the HSOs perceptions and those of ‘head office’ is a 
result of what Henry called ‘the blatantly obvious’: 
 
I don’t think it’s just housing that has this issue – talk to the 
managers down in child protection, I bet they have a very different 
perspective from the guys in the field. It’s just the nature of a 
‘centralised management by policy’ model. (Interview: Location 
three) 
 
One of the limitations of ‘centralised management by policy’ is that different 
staff produce different definitions and constructions of what are the ‘problems 
with tenants’ and, as a result, individuals will always apply some discretion 
when following central policy and mandated procedures. The concept of 
‘centralised management by policy’ is important in the thesis and, as a result, 
will be explored further in ‘Problems with Organisation’.  
 
When I directly asked HSO’s how they coped with the most extreme problems 
with tenants, most answered ‘in theory, we have the HSC to do that now’. I was 
interested in how this specialised housing worker (known as the HSC) might 
assist HSO’s with their difficult tenants. One of the earliest implementations in 
the Review was the employment of a specialised Housing Support Coordinator 
for each office (at the time of this study, one had been appointed for each 
larger office) whose job it was to support the HSO’s with difficult and complex 
tenancies. Due to the fact that these positions were very easily identified, I 
made a point of interviewing a number from across the state, attending their 
meetings and chatting with individuals on the phone. I have merged their 
stories and interviews into one narrative, using one voice to demonstrate the 
frustration and unhappiness of (most) individuals performing this role: 
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It’s shit.  The position description told one story, the managers have 
a different story, the HSO’s think that we are a dumping ground for 
their toxic tenants and most of us are trained social workers, with a 
very different framework to HSO’s. I hate this job and wish I had 
never taken it. (Interview: Multiple locations, HSCs) 
 
And this comment from one of the HSC’s who believed that they had made a 
real effort to make this ‘poorly thought out and hastily implemented HOR 
position’ work: 
 
I am planning to leave and have some other work on the horizon, so 
I have developed some perspective about what has happened here.  
You have met quite a few HSC’s, and you probably noticed that 
most have a social welfare/justice background and this influences 
their beliefs and practices. Suffice to say, not many others in the 
organisation have this perspective, so as a single staff member in a 
large office, we are isolated, unsupported, bullied and ostracised. 
HSO’s thought we were being sent from head office to take all their 
shitty tenants off their hands and when we told them that this was 
not the case, but instead, we were here to help them work with 
these tenants, the response was “What the fuck use is that?”  
Things went downhill from there. (Interview: Multiple locations, 
HSCs) 
 
When I asked head office staff about the success or otherwise of HSC 
innovation, most managers frowned and scratched their head, unsure of whose 
idea it was and where it ‘sprang’ from.  Henry told me: 
 
I think it is a classic example of good idea, poor implementation. I 
think (and I may be wrong because it pre–dates me) that this was 
an idea to respond to the jump in tenants that had special needs, to 
support the HSO’s and start a local dialogue with Centrelink, the 
salvos and other agencies.  There’s no doubt it’s failed – I attended 
a meeting the other day and most of the managers couldn’t agree 
on exactly what a HSC does.  What hope have the local office staff 
got? (Interview: Location three) 
 
The data includes many hours of interviews with (and about) the role and 
contribution of HSC’s in the development of a simple and efficient case 
management model to link tenants, HSO’s and welfare agencies together. The 
rough consensus was that one single, isolated worker (the HSC) would not 
have the resources, influence or any meaningful organisational support to do 
this, and once this realisation became public knowledge, both the HSC’s and 
HSO’s largely abandoned the position, leaving most HSC’s feeling rejected, 
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unsupported and in some cases a failure. This discovery was a direct 
contradiction to what I had read in the HOR final report: 
 
Feedback from regional offices indicates a high level of satisfaction 
with the performance of these positions in responding to the growing 
complexity of customer needs and assisting staff to sustain 
tenancies. (Office of Housing, 2004. pp 21-22) 
 
At the regional office I asked staff if they agreed with these comments. Here’s 
what they told me: 
 
Initially, when these comments were written, yes. These positions 
were useful and did make a difference, but only to a handful of 
cases. Then what happened was a classical example of unclear 
roles and murky boundaries. I also suspect that at the local office 
the ‘soon to arrive HSC’ was sold as some sort of miraculous 
problem solving messiah! So, some HSO’s came to see the HSC 
position as a dumping ground for shitty, belligerent tenants, the 
HSC’s felt undervalued and a vicious cycle began. (Interview: 
Regional office) 
 
Now aware of the difficulties with the front–line implementation of the new HSC 
role, I asked staff about how they used their own personal connections (with 
local support agencies) to do the sort of ‘whole of government’ work the HSC 
was promoting. Did they really need the HSC? Phil’s response summed up the 
problem: 
 
Look, it’s not a personal thing.  I have a relationship with, say, home 
help that lasts as long as the problem lasts, we don’t ‘do coffee’ and 
go to Pilates together like head office dreams we would. Interagency 
and joined up government for me means screaming into the dark for 
help and listening carefully for a reply. It’s not formal and mostly we 
walk around the office when we need help, asking each other ‘Hey, 
have you got a good person at the RSPCA I can ring, ‘cause Mrs X 
has had a fall and her cat needs looking after’. (Interview: Location 
one) 
 
This issue was one of the few issues that enjoyed some organisational 
consensus; the idea of ‘joined–up government’ and specialised workers to 
facilitate interagency cooperation to better support complex tenancies was 
ideologically sound, but poorly implemented. Staff told me that the most 
successful interagency connections are those that have a specific ‘problem 
solving’ activity as the basis of the relationship and a ‘whole of government’ 
approach (Office of Housing, 2004) works best when the linkages between 
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departments are natural and intuitive. Sophia told me that her interactions with 
external support services have a ‘use by date’ and, after the problem is 
remedied, she sees little use in ‘artificially’ continuing the relationship. She 
didn’t need a HSC to do that on her behalf. She wanted them to free her from 
dealing with the really ‘bad’ tenants! This presents a major challenge for those 
responsible for the implementation of the Review recommendation to develop a 
‘whole of government approach to the delivery of housing support’ (Office of 
Housing, 2004). 
Conclusion 
Reading and listening to the participant stories about their problems with 
tenants, I was able to identify a number of key interpretations about how the 
different staff experience and understand these problems. Here is what I found: 
 
There is no such thing as an average day. Understanding the ever–changing 
and highly responsive nature of housing work is a problem for the organisation. 
Some HSO’s told me that they found the dynamic nature of the work both 
rewarding and exhausting, managers found that they too were often called to 
‘drop everything’ in order to undertake tasks that might not be ‘high on their 
own list of priorities’. Reforming an organisation with what one staff member 
called ‘slippery’ job descriptions is a significant hurdle for those implementing 
the housing office review. 
 
Multiple and complex needs makes for needy customers. Most of the HSO’s 
and managers I interviewed displayed a very clear understanding of what 
defines a tenant as having complex and multiple needs, they understood with 
some clarity the impact these tenants have on their work and the housing 
system more generally. Most participants in this study accepted that this cohort 
is now dominant in public housing applications. I also observed that most head 
office managers were more concerned with how tenants with ‘complex and 
multiple needs’ might impact on the broader housing system.  
 
If you have a system, people will ‘work it’. Even though ‘system workers’ have 
an impact on individual workers, the perception at head office is that these 
people have little impact on the system. This changes when incidences of 
‘system working’ is reported in the popular media. Managers believe that the 
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revisions proposed in the Review will diminish opportunities for working the 
system. HSO’s are not so confident.  
 
Organisational change makes sustained support difficult. It became apparent 
that Office of Housing staff experience problems with tenants in many different 
ways. Staff at the front–line were concerned with ‘the impact on my KPIs’, ‘my 
stress levels and job satisfaction’ and some staff felt ‘under siege from difficult 
tenants’ backed by managers ‘who had little idea of how hard it is to just stay 
afloat’ (Chalkley, 2005a). The more senior managers at head office were 
concerned with ‘overhauling the people culture and systems of the 
organisation’ in an effort to ‘move to a model of customer service thinking’ and 
‘implement best practice for housing policy and procedures’.  It seems that 
HSO’s are concerned with the impact of difficult tenants on them, and senior 
managers more concerned with the impact of these tenants on the system. 
 
Further compounding these problems is the fact that front–line staff felt 
disconnected from the other components of the welfare system and, as a 
result, disconnected from the agencies with the resources to assist them with 
these problems. Manager’s told be that, somewhat paradoxically, the process 
of remedying the complex and multiple problems with tenants requires a 
complex and multifaceted organisational response.  
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Chapter Five 
Problems with Rent 
 
It’s the poverty that really wears you down, the cycle of arrears, 
payment plans, failure to follow the plan, the dodged phone calls, 
the tears, the kids with nothing and the mums who really can’t afford 
rent, no matter how cheap it is. (Interview: Location one) 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explain how rent is a problem for the Office of 
Housing. I will describe how a history of problems with rent continues to 
challenge and frustrate the staff (and tenants) at the Office of Housing. In the 
preceding chapters, I described how a history of complex and sometimes 
imperfect policies and procedures had a deleterious effect on the work of staff, 
the revenue of the organisation and the finances of tenants. This chapter 
revisits these problems and uses them to better understand how modern day 
problems with rent might compare and contrast with those described in the 
organisational artefacts and, in particular, the documents of the Housing Office 
Review.  
 
I have organised these data around the three central frameworks employed in 
the previous chapters, and once again used this framework to create a 
‘dialogue’ between members of the organisation, being the local office, head 
office and, where appropriate, the regional office. In this chapter I use the 
voices of staff to explain how they understand the problems with rent 
(described earlier in Chapter Three); namely, declining income from both 
government funding and rental income from tenants, complex rent setting 
procedures, especially the calculation of rebates, a significant and increasing 
level of arrears and a multitude of problems stemming from the collection of 
monies from households with very low income. As was the case in the previous 
chapter, here the stories will be told using the composite characters - The first 
being stories from the front–line as told by the composite HSO’s, Phil, Sophia, 
and stories from the composite head office workers, Henry and Sara.  Joining 
them is Doug, the composite who represents the voice of the now retired 
housing workers. The final ‘voice’ is that of the organisational artefacts; here 
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they are employed to confirm, contradict and contextualise the stories from the 
local, head and regional offices. 
 
The emphasis of this chapter is on the persistent rent problems in the stories 
told to me by housing workers and managers at head office; these were the 
problems that ‘came up’ most often and featured more prominently in the 
narrative of participant’s. The first section is concerned with problems 
stemming from a long established procedure for determining a fair and 
equitable rent for the tenant, a process known by staff as ‘rebating’. I attempted 
to calculate a rebate, failed, and went on to talk with staff and managers about 
how and why this might have happened. The second section is loosely titled 
‘arrears’ and it is here that the stories of the retired workers and the 
organisational artefacts join with the voices of staff across the organisation to 
share stories about their different constructions of ‘the problems with rental 
arrears’. The third and final section continues the discussion about arrears, 
describing a new set of problems encountered by staff as they attempt to 
‘action’ (or not) the collection of these arrears. The data is presented in a 
manner that reflects the many understandings around the problems with rent 
and offers a range of discussions and arguments about the effectiveness of the 
programs implemented to remedy these problems. 
Problems with rental rebates 
One of the first questions staff asked when I arrived at the local office was 
‘Have you tried to work out a rebate yet?’  I was curious to explore this 
‘initiation by rebate’ and after a couple of weeks I sat down beside one of the 
HSO’s and attempted to replicate a rebate reassessment he had finished 
earlier.  This took me some time to do, as the other HSO’s made a point of 
interrupting me, making me go to the counter and dropping notes on my desk, 
instructing me to ‘Call tenant X urgently!’ The reason behind their faux 
interruptions was to make a point: they wanted me to understand that these are 
the conditions under which they are expected to process complex and 
complicated rebate applications.  
 
Not surprisingly, after struggling with the fifty–six types of assessable income 
and fifty–two types of non–assessable income (Office of Housing, 2006b), I got 
it ‘wrong’, as did the HSO who later showed me the correct way to process an 
application. The same rebate application with three different administrators 
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produced three different rebates, how can this be? Reading through ‘The index 
of the Rental Rebate Manual’ provided me with an insight into the complexity of 
rebating; the index lists close to four hundred variables that may or may not 
apply to rebate applicants. The Office of Housing has used a rebate system for 
in excess of seventy years and yet rebating is still an awkward, time–
consuming and judging by my attempt, less than accurate process.  
 
In his thesis ‘Ideology and Public Housing Rental Systems’ McNelis argues that 
one of the reasons for this complexity is the fact that the current (and previous) 
rebate systems were underpinned by the principle that the level of rent for 
tenants should be generated in a manner that ensured ‘equity of cost’ (McNelis, 
2000b). He found that as a result, an enduring objective of the rent rebate 
policy and procedure was to guarantee rental equity between households. 
McNelis cited two important distinctions in the definition of ‘equity’ when it 
comes to rent: ‘horizontal’ equity (households with similar circumstances 
should pay similar rent and ‘vertical’ equity (households with higher and 
increasing income should pay higher rent). The organisational artefacts 
exposed the fact that the long standing pursuit of ‘horizontal and vertical rent 
equity’ for tenants has meant that rebate complexity is not a new problem, in 
1942 Barnett and Burt warned of the need to review the rebate process: 
 
In the opinion of the Authors the rental rebate system adopted in 
Victoria has disclosed inherent defects: (a) it is not directly related to 
subsistence requirements of the tenant for the reason that the cost 
of living and the basic wage varies considerably from time to time; 
(b) it presents difficulties in administration; and (c) it is not easily 
understood by tenants, thereby tending to create dissatisfaction and 
misunderstanding. (Barnett and Burt, 1942) 
 
As Phil had been a HSO the longest, I asked him to talk about his experience 
with rebates; 
 
I never got any training in rebates, and I would like to say that this has 
changed, but look at (name), she has been here five weeks and had no 
training in rebates (or much else). Sure, we help her out, but we stuff 
them up too – it’s the blind leading the blind. I wish that there was a 
simple system for rent – like ‘this amount for this house’ and Centrelink 
pay the rent directly to us. (Interview: Location one) 
 
These comments resonate with Retired Doug’s reflections about his thirty years 
of working with rebates: 
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Rebates!, What a nightmare. One bloke and I spent the best part of 
a day trying to work out what to charge this woman. The manual 
was pages and pages long, filled with descriptions of circumstances, 
rules and tens of variations to each rule.  We just settled on what we 
thought she looked like she could afford. (Interview: Retired housing 
worker) 
 
Staff told me that they find rebates to be time–consuming, difficult to 
administer, easily exploited and relentless. Staff frequently told me things like 
‘No sooner have you done a rebate and someone gets a little bit of work and 
it’s useless’. As a result, some staff place rebates at the bottom of their ‘to do’ 
list, further exacerbating the problem by waiting until the application is ‘urgent’. 
In the middle of August 2004, I observed another problem with rebates: 
 
18th August 2004 
 
Centrelink payments have gone up (including Youth Allowance, 
New Start, Parenting Payment etc.) and this means that the majority 
of tenants in this area will receive between fifteen and thirty dollars 
more each fortnight.  This has two consequences – the increased 
income has auto–generated rebate review letters for a significant 
number of tenants and they are now ringing or coming into the 
office, some quite agitated and upset. These letters have been sent 
directly from head office and HSOs’ were unaware of the post–out. 
The staff are equally upset about the panic and angst these letters 
have caused.  The second problem was actually picked–up by 
Sophia. As the extra centrelink payments were slow in being 
processed (the increase was due in early July), tenants have 
received nearly six week back pay. Sophia called head office and 
asked: ‘does this mean that tenants have been in arrears for the 
past six weeks because their rebate was calculated on the old 
payment?’ It would appear that ‘yes, probably, maybe’ is the 
answer. The staff are now doubly angered and the smokers have 
bolted to the back door! (Field note: Location one) 
 
Workers told me that the number of tenants dependent on social security 
payments compounds the problems with rebates; in particular the provision of 
Commonwealth provided income support for those with a disability or chronic 
illness (generally referred to as ‘sickness benefit’). Phil told me how he sees 
the welfare system as both the tenant’s worst enemy and best friend: 
 
Ok, if I was a tenant, there is no way I would try to get a job, 
especially a casual one. The system punishes you! Make a little 
extra, pay more rent.  Make too much, no longer eligible for public 
housing, but you won’t have enough to survive in the open rental 
market. I understand why we have three generations of welfare 
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dependant families – there’s little support and no incentive to work – 
the rebate system just adds to this. (Interview: Location one) 
 
Staff told me that the rebate system is complex, less than accurate, open to 
exploitation and disliked by tenants and staff alike. Rebates are prone to 
influence by outside agencies (in particular, changes to welfare payments), 
require constant review and revision, and can act as a disincentive for tenants 
who might want to work. McNelis described how, in spite of the fact that the 
system has long been complex, confusing and difficult to administer, housing 
staff have always relied on the rebate system to deliver rent affordability 
(McNelis, 2000b). So, why is the rebate model still the cornerstone of the Office 
of Housings rental system? At head office, I asked Henry what he thought 
about rebates; 
 
I know they are really difficult – we have a rebate hotline to help with 
the really tricky ones and the rebate team here work very hard to 
make the process work as well as it can. To be honest, we have a 
rebate system because it’s the only fair way to work out a rent that 
works for the individual. From a schematic point of view, rebates are 
really sound, but sadly they are difficult to apply in the real world. 
(Interview: Location three) 
 
The suggestion that the rebate procedure at the Office of Housing might be 
‘schematically sound’ but imperfect when implemented in the ‘real world’ is 
important because it illustrates a problem that was repeated in a number of my 
interviews: ‘how policy and procedure can make perfect sense at head office 
and yet make no sense at all by the time it reaches the coal face’ (Chalkley, 
2005a). Rental rebating, on paper, presents as an equitable and flexible 
system to generate a ‘tenant by tenant’ rental charge that starts at full 
economic rent and systematically reduces to a predetermined proportion of the 
tenants’ weekly income. An enduring premise in the rent setting process is to 
use rebates to bridge the gap between the ‘difference in economic rent’ and the 
tenants capacity to pay (McNelis, 2000b. pg.46). In theory, rebating should be 
straightforward and easy to manage, but in practice, it’s not. It’s a ‘wicked’ 
problem. 
 
The problems with calculating housing rebates can be treated as a microcosm 
of a larger set of issues to do with what is increasingly referred to as ‘ wicked 
problems’ (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007). The phrase, ‘wicked 
problems’ (and what this represents) is slowly but increasingly being legitimised 
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by the way public service managers use it. Eventually, ‘wicked problems’ will 
be adopted and sedimented into the talk of front–line workers themselves, but 
my experience with local housing workers suggests that this is some way off. 
The essence of wicked problems are summarised in the 2007 report by the 
Office of the Australian Public Service Commission: 
 
Wicked problems are difficult to clearly define. 
Wicked problems have many interdependencies and are often 
multi–causal. 
Attempts to address wicked problems often lead to unforeseen 
consequences. 
Wicked problems are often not stable. 
Wicked problems usually have no clear solution. 
Wicked problems are socially complex. 
Wicked problems hardly ever sit conveniently within the 
responsibility of any one organisation. 
Wicked problems involve changing behaviour. 
Some wicked problems are characterised by chronic policy failure. 
(Australian Public Service Commission, 2007. pp 3-5) 
 
The calculation of a rental rebate (and the many other rent–related problems 
discussed here) fits neatly into this description. Problems with rent do not sit 
conveniently within one government department, housing problems are broad 
and hard to define, they are unstable and due to the complexity of tenant’s 
income and domestic life, and they have no clear solution. Framing the 
experience of calculating housing rebates as a wicked problem makes the 
larger point, that initiating a process of organisational policy or operational 
change encounters a fundamental problem. That problem is that there is 
already a culture of practice, a body of experience, practical dispositions and a 
rich sediment of stories about ‘what we do and why’. This observation is 
grounded here as I ask how well able were housing workers to address the 
ongoing wicked problems generated by declining income, increasing 
maintenance liability, and issues arising out of increasing rental arrears? How 
do staff experience and make sense of an increasing maintenance liability and 
a chronic shortage of appropriate properties?  
 
The ‘reality’ of these problems need not be doubted; the Office of Housing and 
its predecessors had long struggled with a situation in which demand for 
housing outstripped supply, largely as a consequence of poorly targeted and 
inadequate capital investment (Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 2003). To 
this could be added constant criticism that the Office of Housing was guilty of 
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poor customer service delivery, inconsistent standards and an under–
resourced maintenance program (Victorian Auditor General, 2004.). Some 
managers at head office agreed with this position, most workers disputed it. 
 
My research suggests that these workers experienced first–hand the 
consequences of insufficient funding, complex rebate procedures, and ongoing 
arrears problems, and I discovered that most housing staff have little 
opportunity to develop deeper knowledge of the tenants in their frequently 
changing patch. This chapter confirms similar research by Saugeres in the 
United Kingdom. In her work she described how workers in the British housing 
system were required to ration scarce resources, place people and their 
problems in predefined categories, evaluate them and convert these personal 
problems into ‘categories for action’ that may, or may not, meet eligibility 
criteria (Saugeres, 1999). This is also an accurate description of the function of 
the Housing Services Officers in this study. 
Problems with arrears: Poverty and paying the rent 
The most obvious problem with collecting rent from tenants is fairly 
straightforward. Most public housing tenants do not have sufficient income to 
meet their financial obligations. As of June 30th 2011, low-income households 
as a proportion of all households in public housing made up 98 percent of the 
population (with ‘low income’ defined as those in the bottom 40% of equivalised 
household disposable income) (Steering Committee for the Review of 
Government Service Provision, 2011). They never have had sufficient income 
and as a result, can sometimes fall behind in their payments. As noted earlier 
in this thesis, as far back as 1939 those eligible for public housing were 
‘persons of limited means’ (Barnett and Burt, 1942) and, in 1967 the criteria 
had not changed: ‘section 21 states: Eligible Person means a person who, in 
the opinion of the Commission is, or was at the time of his first becoming a 
tenant of a house under this Act, by reason of his financial circumstance, in 
need of assistance’(Housing Commission of Victoria, 1967).  
 
In order to apply for public housing in 2007, applicants must be ‘on a low 
income and cannot find suitable housing to rent privately’ (Office of Housing, 
2007. ). As stated above, the majority of tenants do not have sufficient income 
to ‘meet their obligations’ and in the context of the Office of Housing, this 
means that most of them cannot afford to pay ‘market’ rent.  However, tenant 
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poverty creates another problem for the organisation ‘the overall consequence 
has been for SHA revenue to increase more slowly than total costs, moving the 
authorities from a position of moderate operating surpluses into rising structural 
deficits’ (Hall and Berry, 2007. p 1). It seems that public housing is ‘welfare 
housing for the poor’. 
 
Providing ‘welfare housing for the poor’ requires staff to engage with an array 
of seemingly unrelated problems with income. Comments in my field notes 
capture these problems: ‘tenant is unable to repair car’, ‘child hospitalised and 
cost of medication is impossible’ and ‘son’s mates nicked food money’ were 
examples of the issues I overheard around the office (Chalkley, 2005a). On the 
whole, HSO’s were aware of their client’s poverty and were cognisant of the 
difficulties most tenants experienced covering the costs of rent, utilities, food, 
transport and general living expenses. Some staff told me that this daily 
exposure to the personal reality of impoverished tenants influenced their work: 
 
Shit, I hate it. One day I had interview after interview with mums 
who were doing it really hard. No hot water because they had turned 
off the gas to save money, no veggies or fruit for kids, no school 
uniform, no lunch and ridiculous repayments to those shonky loan 
places. In the end, I just told most of them that we could work out 
their arrears when things improved, knowing full well that they will 
never improve. (Interview: Location one) 
 
Sophia told me that she knew that the official line from head office was that her 
actions ‘aren’t doing anyone a favour’ (Chalkley, 2005c).  She simply deferred 
the problems and, in all likelihood, would revisit these problems when arrears 
reached a level that caught the attention of her manager and/or placed the 
tenancy at risk. Sophia and her HSO colleagues told me that they often felt 
powerless to act in situations such as these. Even though the tenant had food 
vouchers, petrol vouchers and a concession card, the duration of and deeply 
entrenched nature of the tenant’s poverty had a ‘snowball effect’ and Sophia 
was reluctant to ‘be the straw that broke the camel’s back’ (Chalkley, 2005a). 
Phil had a different perspective about these problems with rent. He had been a 
HSO for some years and had been ‘burnt by tenants doing a job on him’: 
 
Yep, I agree, most tenants are very poor, but some have a strange 
idea of priorities.  I once visited a tenant to talk about their arrears – 
a polite, preventative home visit to try and bring down the grand or 
more he was behind. He was pleased to see me, because he had 
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purchased a new TV and needed a hand to get it out of the box. So, 
here I am, talking about ‘how does an extra $10 rent a fortnight 
sound?’ while heaving a $2,500 plasma from a Harvey Norman box. 
Priorities, people, priorities! (Interview: Location one) 
 
There was a good deal of apprehension about the poverty of tenants and the 
HSO’s capacity to apply discretion with the payment of rent. Some told me 
stories of ‘the brand new Commodore in the driveway’ and some told me 
stories of ‘houses without fridges or food’ and some HSOs told me both kinds 
of stories. One of my key observations about the ‘problems with rent’ is an 
acknowledgement that rent policy and procedure, no matter how well 
constructed, will be reinterpreted and selectively applied by the worker who is 
responsible for policy implementation and compliance. 
 
The policy and procedures for the collection of rent and the recovery of arrears 
were quite clear and prescriptive. The rent policy is outlined in detail in the 
housing manual, discussed at most staff meetings and, on the whole, seemed 
well understood by staff.  Compliance only becomes problematic when HSO’s 
sit down to talk to real people, with real problems and find that the strict 
application of policy might produce an outcome that puts the tenancy at risk 
and places the staff member in a position where harm, aggression and abuse 
are possible outcomes. It is at this point that HSOs make a decision to provide 
a short–term solution to enduring and protracted problems, knowing that their 
actions may not be ‘entirely in keeping with policy and operational standards’. 
This is another example of the distinction between those who work on the 
‘public housing system’ and those who work in the ‘public housing system’. 
 
When I asked head office staff to talk about rental arrears, their focus was 
different. Henry, who had no first–hand experience with arrears, but had been 
to many meetings at which arrears dominated the agenda, had this to say: 
 
We are slowly changing the collection system to better reflect the 
lifestyle of the tenants. We know they place rent low on the list of 
things to pay, we know that even with a direct debit set up, they can 
empty their bank accounts the night before. As a result we are 
talking with Centrelink about payments, we are training HSO’s to 
work in a more proactive manner and we are encouraging tenants to 
rethink their obligations. But, sometimes, in spite of all these efforts, 
eviction is the only option left to us. (Interview: Location three) 
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A number of head office staff told me that ‘better and more’ training and 
‘overhauling the system’ are key to solving the organisation’s wicked problems 
with rent, but, as an ex–HSO herself, Sara’s comments were slightly different: 
 
OK, I did use to leave arrears until absolutely last, as it is a crap job 
to do. It is horrible and nine times out of ten it ends in tears. Most 
HSOs would like rent to just go away and at training sessions they 
ask questions like  ‘Why doesn’t the government simply add up how 
much the rent is for all those on benefits and just increase our 
budget by X percent?’ But rent is about developing independence 
and living skills and I guess most of us here at head office believe 
that paying rent and budgeting might help people get out of the 
poverty trap, might make public housing more like the private rental 
sector. (Interview: Location three) 
 
Similar to a number of other housing problems I encountered, there seemed to 
be a disconnect between how workers understand their experience with ‘rental 
problems’ and how staff at head office view the same problems. 
Problems with arrears: The collection of rental arrears 
As my fieldwork progressed, I began to suspect that, for most staff, the 
problems with arrears are woven into each and every housing problem and, in 
their stories, staff told me that it felt like the collection of arrears seems to 
dominate their work.  In their interviews, HSO’s regularly talked about arrears.  
They discussed tenant attitudes, priorities and behaviour, they told me about 
their manager’s reaction when arrears levels climbed, the effect of arrears on 
budgets and the consequences on their work load when they were instructed to 
‘madly chase a few dollars’. Tenants with ‘multiple and complex needs’ often 
fell behind in their rent, tenants in properties in need of major repair ‘don’t race 
to pay their rent’ and the very poorest tenants met their more pressing 
sustenance needs first. Some arrears were the result of drug and/or alcohol 
problems. Equally, staff had come to expect spikes in the level of arrears 
around Easter and Christmas, particularly on the part of tenants with children. 
At the weekly staff meeting, arrears were a regular agenda item and, after a 
few weeks, I noticed that the stories about arrears seemed to vary little from 
week to week. Sophia (and most of her colleagues) told me that: 
 
Arrears are the one of the worst parts of this job, I hate pestering 
poor tenants with little money, chasing those that ‘work the system’ 
and the endless ‘cat and mouse’ of making a time, making an 
excuse and making another time.  This is made worse by the 
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panicked reaction caused by head office and regional office calling 
for action because arrears have reached critical levels.  There has 
to be a better way of collecting debts! (Interview: Location one) 
 
At one staff meeting, I observed that the senior staff seemed particularly 
disconcerted about the arrears level, as it had climbed several thousand dollars 
from the already ‘moderately high’ level flagged at the last meeting. 
  
November 18th  
 
This mornings staff meeting was concerned with two things: how to 
cover people’s ‘patches’ with so many staff on leave in the next 
eight weeks and how to get the arrears down. It would appear that 
the managers and team leaders are ‘getting some heat’ about the 
level of arrears – this office is not the highest, but it’s close, and the 
level has increased to tens of thousands of dollars.  Staff got hostile, 
the management team responded and some staff attempted to calm 
the waters with suggestions of a way forward. Interestingly, the main 
motivation for chasing arrears was simply to get head/regional office 
off their back! Some of the HSO’s told me (after the meeting) that 
this was a cyclical event and if they dropped the arrears level just 
enough, head office would ‘piss off again’ for a while. Over lunch, 
Phil and a few others told me that this cat and mouse is all part of 
the job and it’s not personal. ‘It’s not actually about the lost income 
of arrears; it’s about the need to appear to be doing something’. 
Ouch! (Field note: Location one) 
 
Some weeks later, at the regional office, arrears came up in an unrelated 
discussion and, when I told the staff member the ‘cat and mouse’ story, they 
shook their head and laughed:  
 
Tragically, the HSO’s are kind of right.  There is no meaningful 
reason for HSO’s to chase arrears. They don’t get extra places, or a 
bonus, or money to repair properties in their patch.  They just get 
threatened with failing to meet their KPIs.  I guess its not very good 
practice, but they have their ‘cat and mouse’ and we have our 
‘carrot and stick’.  Actually, mostly ‘stick’. (Interview: Location Two) 
 
At head office, I was interested to find out more about how the organisation 
might begin solve the ‘cat and mouse’ and ‘carrot and stick’ problems with 
arrears and asked a number of managers ‘What do you think motivates HSO’s 
to chase up arrears?’ Sara told me something interesting about her experience 
some years ago whilst working at a regional office: 
 
One of the main jobs of my old office was to supervise the local 
office arrears. Most were OK, but some offices with really difficult 
areas really struggled.  It’s mostly fine if the majority of tenants were 
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oldies, or migrants – they have a different attitude to bills – rent first 
and other bills next.  If you have a huge number of tenants who are 
single mums or druggies or younger adults, the approach is smokes 
first, drugs first, grog first, petrol first and rent last.  As a manager 
you have to be aware that not all patches are the same, not all 
neighbourhoods are the same and not all offices are the same. 
Unfortunately, targets and key performance indicators are blunt and 
don’t see arrears in such a tailored way. (Interview: Location three) 
 
This was the first mention of the possibility of the distinction between head and 
local office attitude/understanding of the payment of rent. As this comment 
came near the completion of my placement, I did not have an opportunity to 
ask many HSO’s what their thoughts were.  But some weeks later, I returned to 
the local office for a staff farewell and made a point of asking Sophia about it: 
 
This makes sense.  Actually it makes sense for nearly everything we 
deal with.  I have a block of flats that are a dream – the oldies 
sweep the stairs, pay their rent, keep flowers in pots and are polite 
and lovely to deal with. Three streets away I have court with hotted–
up cars, drugs, punch ups, fires in wheelie bins (a recurring problem 
for some HSOs), heaps of anti–socials and large arrears. The 
arrears policy treats all tenants the same, but I don’t; I will go harder 
after the troublesome tenants because they make my life hell. 
(Interview/Field note: Location one) 
 
This comment, whilst certainly not representative of all participants, is an 
interesting one. It makes sense that HSO’s will apply some discretion around 
why, when and from whom they will chase arrears. The challenge for managers 
charged with implementing the housing office review is how to regulate and 
make consistent the practice of preventing and following up tenants who fall 
behind in their rent. It too is a wicked problem. 
Conclusion 
The staff who work for the Office of Housing face a number of ‘wicked 
problems’ with the calculation and collection of rent and arrears. Some 
problems are significant and wide reaching, such as insufficient income to 
cover its costs, and some problems are deeply entrenched, such as the poor 
understanding of property conditions and a general acceptance by staff that the 
supply of public housing is not ever going to be adequate to meet present or 
future demand. Managers and operational staff now work with declining income 
due to the reduction in Commonwealth funding and increasingly find 
themselves reliant on the rent generated from tenants with very low income, 
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with the majority of tenants living on social security benefits. As a result of the 
enduring and persistent nature of these ‘wicked’ problems, members of the 
organisation have developed a number of strategies and patterns of action to 
address and resolve the problems. In this chapter I revealed that whilst some 
procedures might be ‘schematically sound’ when developed at head office, they 
experience imperfect implementation at the front–line. I found that rental policy 
and procedure, no matter how well constructed, was reinterpreted and 
selectively applied by the agent responsible for policy implementation and 
enforcement.  
 
This chapter also describes a division between those who work ‘on’ the public 
housing system and those who work ‘in’ the public housing system and 
illustrates how this division can sometimes lead to multiple understandings of 
the same problem.  I found that the HSO’s in this study agreed with and 
understood the need for improved housing standards, but, almost without 
exception, they also believed that on some occasions these standards should 
not apply. A number of senior managers told me that ‘common sense’ should 
also play a role in the resolution of problems with rent.  
 
After some twelve months of fieldwork I found the problems with rent to be 
deeply ingrained into the organisational fabric of the local office, and the 
number of informal and unsanctioned procedures developed by staff to solve 
these problems is understood by managers as a significant impediment to the 
success of major operational policy change as the Office of Housing shifts from 
‘public’ housing to ‘welfare’ housing. 
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Chapter Six 
Standards, Assets and Waiting Lists 
 
Maintenance can’t be separated out, in black and white terms.  The 
tenants are as much part of maintenance as the buildings. Head 
office surveyed us and as a result found that 20% of our work is 
maintenance related.  So, they [head office] think that the Call 
Centre will reduce our workload by 20%. Ah, the joy of maths and 
magic! (Interview: Location one) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter tells of how the ongoing shortage of good properties, rudimentary 
and incomplete records of the condition of the current properties and the 
pressure of continuous maintenance for ageing houses impacts on the work of 
housing staff. The authors of the organisational artefacts in Chapter One 
described how, even at the height of the construction boom, the Office of 
Housing never had sufficient stock to meet demand.  The archive of 
maintenance audits from the Office of the Auditor General (Victorian Auditor 
General, 2004.) highlighted a number of ongoing problems with ageing 
properties, the appropriateness of stock to meet present and future needs, and 
raised a number of concerns about a general lack of record keeping around the 
holdings and condition of housing stock in Victoria. The aim of this chapter is 
use stories from both local and head office to explore how present–day housing 
workers experience problems such as those described above.  
 
As a result, this chapter includes a comparison of how problems with ‘assets, 
standards and waiting lists’ are understood across the organisation and 
continues to use the model of a three–way dialogue to explore how housing 
staff understand and make sense of working with insufficient, old and ‘tired’ 
housing and how they respond to the limited budget with which to maintain 
these houses. The HSO’s, Phil and Sophia, explain how they have heard of 
people who work ‘around the system’ and how at one staff meeting they were 
told to let a property that was considered ‘substandard’ because, as their 
manger put it, ‘your standards are not their standards’. The voices of the 
composite characters will tell stories of how long waiting lists impact on them 
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and the organisation, how their job requires them to deal with activities that 
range from preventative maintenance to responding to malicious damage. The 
final component of this dialogue is the stories from managers at head office, 
telling us how they understand and respond to the problems with assets, 
standards and the waiting list. 
Problems with standards 
In their stories, managers and HSO’s told me that one of the most challenging 
parts of their work is understanding, measuring and maintaining ‘standards’. I 
discovered that ‘standards’ have a powerful influence on the work of HSO’s.  
Their work is governed by the need for compliance with standards; they have 
arrears standards, maintenance standards, re-letting standards, property 
condition standards and many other mandated standards. The Office of 
Housing expects staff to familiarise themselves with these standards via a 
series of lengthy policy documents that ‘set out housing standards policy 
applicable to all properties under the care, management and funding of the 
Office of Housing, with the intent of providing a framework for cost effective and 
practical standards for all Office of Housing properties’ (Office of Housing, 
2006a).   
 
Whilst at the local office, I noticed that when HSO’s were called on to interpret 
and act on a particular standard, they followed a common pattern of action. 
Firstly, they referring to the Housing Policy Standards Manual, secondly, they 
wrote notes in a file or on a ‘sticky’ note, looked at photographs and, finally, 
conferred with other HSO’s. The next stage in the interpretation and application 
of standards was the HSO leaning over the low walls of their workstation and 
asking a fellow HSO; ‘Hey, does this sound right to you?’ and ‘I think I’m on the 
right track, but before I go to the team leader, could you run your eye over 
this?’ I observed that HSO’s seemed to find the closely dictated and clearly 
defined standards relatively easy to apply. For example, a broken hot water 
service gets replaced in a pre–determined time frame and a damaged fence 
eventually gets repaired or rebuilt. More difficult were repairs to assets that 
meet the Housing Policy Standards, but did not meet the standards of the 
HSO’s or tenant.  Over a coffee, Phil told me about his biggest frustration with 
standards: 
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… take kitchens for example. I have tenants in 1950s places with 
old, tiny kitchens. Low, narrow benches and oven/cook tops that are 
over twenty years old, but because the tenant is careful and tidy, the 
majority of the bench tops are un–marked, the stove works and the 
cupboard doors open and shut, it meets standards. Therefore, it is 
very low on the replacement plan.  The next door neighbour is as 
rough as hell and gets a replacement kitchen because the doors 
drop off and the bench tops are not cleanable due to pot burns. Try 
selling that standard to a tenant. (Interview: Location one) 
 
These frustrations with standards were shared by his workmate, Sophia: 
 
Painting! Mine’s painting.  I have seen ‘vacants’ (empty properties 
being prepared for re–letting) where one wall in a room is painted 
and the other three walls (which are rough) are left because they 
are not scuffed enough to meet the ‘scuff per metre’ standard 
needed to require re–painting.  For god’s sake, just paint the whole 
room! (Interview: Location one) 
 
As an outsider, I assumed that the application of standards would be a 
straightforward process, requiring little or no interpretation. This assumption 
was incorrect. I discovered that HSO’s apply personal discretion to the 
interpretation of standards and, as a result, use their agency to seek the best 
possible outcome from sometimes imprecise and ambiguous standards. At a 
number of staff meetings, I observed and recorded heated contestation around 
standards, and conflict seemed to be most pronounced on the part of staff who 
were preparing a number of properties for re–letting. One staff meeting was 
particularly memorable because the monthly arrears were high, several HSO’s 
were on extended sick leave and two staff had resigned to take other jobs: 
 
Staff Meeting – Thursday, 10.45am. 
 
Interesting discussion today; X has three ‘vacants’ with very old or 
no curtains.  She is keen to get them replaced (or in some cases, 
new ones installed on the bare windows) and told the meeting how 
one curtain had filled the room with powder as it disintegrated in her 
hands. Her difficulty is that the senior managers have clearly 
articulated the fact that ‘we have no money’ and instructed the staff 
to re–let the properties without window covering and ‘let the tenants 
deal with it’.  Outraged, the HSO replied that she was not happy to 
do this – ‘Would you want a house with no curtains? I have curtains, 
I expect curtains, so should tenants!’ She was told that ‘Your 
standards are not their standards (that is, public housing tenants)’ 
and until the budget improves, little action could be taken.  This 
chilly meeting came to a rapid close as the staff finished the other 
agenda items. (Field note: Location one) 
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The sentence ‘Your standards are not their standards’ caught my attention, not 
because of the value judgement it implies, but because this sentence exposed 
a deeper, more ‘personal’ element to the problems with standards. ‘Your 
standards are not their standards’ illustrated to me the potential conflict 
between the standards of front–line staff, the expectations of tenants and the 
legislated/mandated standards of the organisation. A social constructionist 
account would make explicit how HSO’s use personal experience, their own 
socio–economic background, perceptions, and many other signs and symbols 
to construct an understanding of ‘public housing standards’.  HSO’s use 
agency to construct (and deconstruct) consensual understandings around 
housing standards and they draw on their experience (and the experience of 
others) in order to contribute to shared narratives about how to renegotiate and 
reinterpret legislated standards. Boden describes this phenomenon as the 
seemingly illogical process by which ‘actors choreograph elaborate 
organisational agendas to the apparent beat of many different drummers’ 
(Boden, 1994. pg 30). At head office, Sara described this process of 
renegotiation and reinterpretation as ‘the way HSO’s skate around the edges, 
near the thin ice, but rarely over it’.  
 
Figure 6.1.  Ageing, empty, ‘torched’ and uninhabitable (Chalkley, 2005a) 
 
In the ‘Problems with Tenants Chapter’, that ‘agential’ quality was clearly 
evident when I described how HSO’s use their discretion in an effort to solve 
the ‘problems with tenants’ and their approach to ‘the problems with standards’ 
is no different.  
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When I spoke with head office staff about the application of policy around 
‘standards’ they told me that, for most, this was an area of significant 
frustration. Henry told me that ‘ We have standards for a number of reasons; to 
set benchmarks, to ensure a certain level of quality, and most importantly to 
ensure that we spend within our budget. One of the most powerful ways to 
review and restructure the OoH is to update and enforce those standards. This 
is bloody hard work.’ Another senior staff member told me that ‘Unless the 
HSO’s fall in behind and follow the new standards, the Housing Office Review 
will not be successful’. 
 
As I spent longer and longer at head office, more staff told me that the Review 
is concerned with the revision of standards. All the HSO’s in this study seemed 
to agree with and understand the need for improved housing standards, but, 
almost without exception, they also believed that on some occasions these 
standards should not apply. Aware of the complexity of standards and the 
power of human agency when applying standards, I asked a number of people 
at head office what their understanding of standards might be.  In a 
conversation peppered with often–contradictory comments, Henry told me this: 
 
I [we?] expect the staff to work to the Housing Policy Standards 
Manual, otherwise why have them?  We can’t have every HSO 
making a call about what needs painting, when a new fence is 
appropriate and what constitutes an ‘un–repairable’ kitchen. Two 
things would happen: tenants would pester them to death and the 
budget would be blown in the first quarter.  It’s not just about 
compliance; it’s about resource management too. Having said that, 
the HSO who strictly sticks to policy and standards ‘no matter what’, 
is a pain in the arse as well. We sometimes/often have to respond to 
complaints to the director or minister about cases that we think, 
“Why the hell didn’t the HSO or manager just make an exception 
and meet the tenant half way?” So I guess I am saying, stick to 
standards, but not all the time.  Staff need to use common sense as 
well. (Interview: Location three) 
 
Standards were a challenge for both individual staff and the managers working 
at head office. The organisational complexity of the Office of Housing makes a 
set of ‘common’ standards very difficult to determine or apply, while the 
decentralised and disconnected nature of the local offices allows for a 
regionalised set of standards and, most importantly, individual staff apply their 
judgement to the interpretation of standards in order to respond to housing 
problems, especially the problems with assets and income. As a result, I 
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observed and recorded a broad range of often ‘unwritten’ local property 
standards. This phenomenon was eloquently described by way of a film 
analogy from Sophia:  ‘Think of The Matrix, you know, the film with Keanu.  We 
have the Housing Policy Standards Manual as the head office reality, and 
running alongside it is the invisible matrix of standards, the ones that only the 
office staff can see!’ After viewing the film again, this comment made some 
sense! 
Problems with assets: Damage and ways around the system 
 
 
Figure 6.2 A tenant renovates for ‘open plan’ living. (Chalkley, 2005a) 
 
In addition to the issues with ‘standards’, the Office of Housing faces a number 
of other assets and income related problems. The income from rent is not 
sufficient to cover operational costs, the arrears level is quite significant and 
funding from the Commonwealth Government continues to decline (Office of 
Housing, 2004). Like its tenants, the Office of Housing is poor. This 
organisational poverty has produced a number of interesting responses and 
one of these is a process HSOs’ called ‘repair by stealth’. A number of staff told 
me stories about ‘repair by stealth’ but, as these stories were often contentious, 
most HSO’s were quick to point out that they personally had not actually done 
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these things themselves, but had only heard of other HSO’s successfully 
subverting policy whilst being seen to comply. The first example is taken from 
my notes following a conversation with Phil, as he confessed that on occasion 
he had some success with this approach: 
 
18th August 2004 
 
“5” Rating; this is the rating given to houses/flats that are too old or 
in poor condition to renovate or re–let when vacant. In the (Local( 
area, the concrete houses are mostly ‘5’s and HSO’s must get 
manager’s approval to undertake even the most minor repairs or 
updates.  The managers are reluctant to spend any of their very 
limited budgets on ‘5’s, so ‘NO!’  is the usual answer. Some of the 
HSO’s told me of a way of getting around this problem. At the time, 
the maintenance call centre had no idea of the rating of properties 
and tried to get tenants off the phone as fast as possible, so, if the 
tenants themselves phoned the call centre, they often processed the 
requests and organised the work requests to fix these houses. So 
HSO’s would help tenants with what to say and get them to call the 
MCC. Repair by stealth! (Field note: Location one) 
 
This ‘repair by stealth’ was seen by most staff as a reasonably acceptable 
practice because it was a positive response to a tenant request, while it kept 
the local budget in check and exploited a weakness in the maintenance call 
centre system. The disclosure of this practice created a number of issues for 
me, because the majority of staff asked me not to discuss this ‘policy 
subversion’ at regional and head office. Honouring my promise, I didn’t.  As a 
result, I am not sure if this is another ‘worst kept secret in public housing’ as I 
was unable to compare and contrast the perceptions of different staff across 
varying levels of the organisation. Fortunately, another example of ‘repair by 
stealth’ was uncovered late in the fieldwork and, this time, HSO’s were happy 
for me to disclose this one. Sophia told me that she had never done this 
herself, but that she had heard of other HSO’s successfully employing this 
method of ‘repair by stealth’: 
 
To do the work needed to get a vacant property ready, you can’t go 
over $1,200. There’s no budget around this and $1,200 goes 
nowhere nowadays.  So what people do is put up a ‘TR’ (‘Tenant 
Responsible’ for the costs), then get all the repair work done, 
knowing there is a big time lag between generating the TR and 
going to court. Then, just before the tribunal (VCAT), they take off 
the things that are not the tenant’s responsibility and it looks to the 
rest of the department like the tribunal has refused to acknowledge 
these things. But what in fact the HSO has done has got the repair 
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work done without all the budget hassles. It’s an absurd way to 
work. (Interview: Location one) 
 
I asked other HSO’s if they were familiar with this technique and, almost 
without exception, they had heard of ‘someone who had used this approach’. 
No one would actually acknowledge that they personally had utilised ‘repair by 
stealth’, but the simple logic and likelihood of success made this a potent and 
popular narrative. HSO’s used this ‘repair by stealth’ narrative to illustrate to 
new staff and outsiders ‘how little money is available and bad the system is’.  
At head office, I asked Sara about what she knew about this ‘repair by stealth’ 
technique: 
 
I’ve heard this story, many times. I think it’s part truth, part urban 
myth and the possibility that it would work makes it so powerful.  I 
have certainly stood outside the (suburb( court and crossed stuff off.  
Not to trick the system, just because some of the judges [sic] were 
real shits and you knew that they would ask a thousand questions 
and eventually say, “I’m not entirely convinced that this damage was 
not pre–existing” and they would then wipe it off.  It was easier to 
just cross the stuff off that you knew would be contested and have 
less agro in the tribunal. But, I wasn’t trying to rip off the system; I 
was just trying to make everyone’s day in court a little easier. 
(Interview: Location three) 
 
As Henry had little direct experience with tenants (having come to housing from 
another government department) I was interested in his perspective about this 
practice of ‘repair by stealth’: 
 
I have heard this one from a mate in the (department( team, as they 
have a lot of contact with HSO’s and help them solve the hard 
problems, so the HSO’s quite readily disclose stuff to these guys. 
First up, it would work in theory, but I’m sure that pretty soon VCAT 
would get ‘the suss’ and not tolerate it.  But, you’ve been with HSO’s 
to court, it’s like a factory line, next hearing, bang! Next hearing, 
bang! And tenants rarely turn up, so this ‘repair by stealth’ could fly. 
But it should be unnecessary; if HSO’s are doing their job properly, 
undertaking home visits and staying on top of their patch, a house 
should never get so bad it needs more than a tidy up. It’s not the 
system at fault, it’s the fact that some HSO’s don’t care about their 
patch, don’t home visit and only find out that a property is fucked 
when they generate an order of possession. $1,200 should be more 
than enough. (Interview: Location three) 
 
The above commentary was one of the strongest criticisms in this study, and, 
as a result, I transcribed the comments verbatim. This comment is important 
because it provides an extreme example of the discordance between the 
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perceptions at head office and those at local office. Some staff at the local 
office told me that policy was ‘letting them down’; however, some staff at head 
office believed that HSO’s were ‘letting policy down’. The final chapter of this 
thesis deals with how the Office of Housing is working to address the significant 
problems caused by this ‘perception discordance’.  
 
In his comments above, Henry touched on the concept of ‘staying on top of 
their patch’ and in the following section I ask, ‘Just how well does the Office of 
Housing understand the size, age, condition and use of its properties?’ Just 
how well can/do staff stay ‘on top of their patch’? 
Problems with assets: Understanding and ‘staying on top of’ your 
patch 
Two of the most significant difficulties with ‘staying on top of your patch’ are the 
sheer size of individual patches and wide range of responsibilities for members 
of the organisation. The Victorian Office of Housing is a large organisation and, 
according to their web page, the ‘Office of Housing is Victoria's largest landlord 
with a housing portfolio of around 73,000 properties. These comprise 
approximately 23,000 houses and units in regional towns and rural 
communities, around 7,000 inner city high–rise flats, over 40,000 houses, units 
and flats across suburban Melbourne, around 1,700 rooming house rooms and 
1,800 moveable units’ (Office of Housing, 2007). 
 
The size and scope of public housing became obvious to me when I arrived at 
the local office:  around the walls of the office were large whiteboards with 
closely packed notes and comments, one whole wall of the office was 
dedicated to a compactus filled with tenant files, each desk had a PC and most 
staff had a pile of files on their desk. The phones rang constantly, the fleet cars 
were often booked out for a week or more in advance, tenants would often be 
waiting for staff as they unlocked the front doors, and the reception area was 
rarely empty (Chalkley, 2005a).  From the outset, it was clear that this was a 
busy workplace. I asked a number of staff how many properties was this office 
responsible for?  Most people told me that it was thousands, three or four 
thousand perhaps. (According to the 2005 ‘Dwelling Type by Area Office within 
Region’ data, the office manages 4,056 properties (Housing and Community 
Building Division, 2007).)  I was surprised to find that a number of staff were 
equally unclear about the size of their patch. Sophia told me: 
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Don’t laugh at me, but I think it’s around 240 something at the 
moment. Or 260 maybe, I would need to look it up for you. After last 
week’s staff meeting, we have ended up with some changes. Every 
time someone leaves or goes on Workcover (the Australian Workers 
Compensation scheme), we have a reshuffle and your patch shifts a 
bit, so you never really know your patch very well. Next week when 
(name( goes on leave, I will cover her patch too, so ask me then 
and I will look like a real hero! (Interview: Location one) 
 
To an outsider, it may seem odd that HSO’s have only a basic understanding of 
their patch, and initially I was a little taken aback by a tacit acceptance of the 
fact that staff would have little time or resources to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of their tenants, properties and neighbourhoods. After some 
weeks in the field, I changed my mind. I now began to understand how and 
why HSO’s develop only rudimentary understandings of their patch. The first 
and most obvious reason I discovered was that most ‘patches’ are 
geographically too large to get to know in a physical sense (after a full morning 
in the car with one HSO, we had driven past only 40 or so of the 300+ houses 
in his patch). The second reason HSO’s developed only a basic understanding 
of their patch was because patches are subject to constant change.  Of all the 
staff meetings I attended, only one didn’t involve some sort of patch re–
distribution (Chalkley, 2005a). The third and most contentious reason was an 
acceptance (by most HSO’s) that you didn’t really need to ‘know your patch 
very well, in order to do your job very well’. Phil told me: 
 
This is certainly not the ethos of the department, so keep this quiet, 
but patches are so large that you only ever get to grease the 
squeaky wheels – the druggies, the nutters, the bashers, the rent 
problems, the anti–social and the whingers. Head office likes to 
dream about HSOs driving around their neighbourhoods like Mr 
Whippy [an ice–cream vendor not unlike The Good Humour Man in 
the US] home visiting.  Bullshit!, we have no time for this. As long as 
you are aware of the difficult areas and drive through every now and 
then, you can keep a lid on things. (Interview: Location one) 
 
If staff can meet their key performance indicators and ‘do their job’ without 
really understanding the condition of properties and people in their patch, why 
does the final report of the Housing Office Review place such a premium on the 
need to develop this understanding? The final report argues that one of the 
primary drivers for this major operational change is to be: ‘better informed 
about households’ needs at application so inappropriate allocations are 
avoided, getting to know our tenants better through home visits, ensuring our 
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properties are safe and well maintained and being proactive in avoiding risk of 
rental arrears’(Office of Housing, 2004). The front–line staff laughed at this idea 
and told me that this was just ‘head office dreaming’. Whilst at head office, I 
asked Henry if he thought that HSO’s could have little understanding of their 
patch and still do a good job. 
 
What a difficult question to ask a housing manager! My official 
answer is, no. Not very well at all.  My ‘off the record’ answer is yes, 
a clever and resourceful HSO could still be effective, never leave 
the office and not even see their properties. But now I will qualify 
those comments; most HSO’s are not like that, they are interested in 
looking around their patch, driving around and home visiting.  It’s a 
job that involves engagement, not just asset management. 
(Interview: Location three) 
 
Once again, due to her status as an ‘ex–HSO’, Sara’s perspective was slightly 
different: 
 
Not all patches are the same, not all offices are the same. I was 
lucky because my office was part of the complex that was next to 
the high rise. I pity those staff with broad acre (i.e. detached houses 
in suburban streets) patches, because it’s so hard to actually get the 
time to go out to them.  With the high rise, you saw tenants all the 
time, walking by, or at tram stop or in the park.  I stepped out of the 
office door and I was in my patch, could home visits like that [clicks 
her fingers] and I kind of knew the pulse of the place. Because of 
the range of patches, it’s hard to make an asset protection policy 
that works for all staff. (Interview: Location Three) 
 
Understanding that that most HSO’s needed only a rudimentary understanding 
of their (ever–changing) patch, I was interested to know how well housing staff 
really understood the physical condition of the individual houses in their patch. I 
was also keen to see if I might corroborate the four major asset problems 
identified by the Victorian Auditor–General with the management of assets: 
 
a) The lack of an effective preventative maintenance program. 
b) Inadequate records about the physical condition of the properties. 
c) The lack of a centralised and coordinated asset management 
strategy. 
d) Poorly trained staff and a lack of accurate maintenance data. 
(Victorian Auditor General, 2004.) 
 
The first and most predictable finding was that, on the whole, HSO’s did not 
have the time or resources to inspect or record the condition of each individual 
property in their patch. Phil described his ‘patch’ knowledge: 
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I’m probably a little different because I have been around so long. I 
have, over the years, started to know a little about each patch. I 
know which houses were probably close to ‘5’ last time they were 
let, the facilities services officers tend to touch base and tell us what 
they have found and I know which streets are most likely to be 
trashed. It takes years to get to know just a little about each patch. 
Every HSO knows what their ‘vacants’ are like, but a few weeks of 
tenancy can change the condition. (Interview: Location one) 
 
It was harder for Sophia to summarise her patch, as she was new and had 
already experienced a number of patch variations: 
 
Like most new HSO’s, I started with an absolute shocker of a patch; 
really spread out over two suburbs, loads of ‘concretes’, two 
buggered walk–ups (low rise buildings without lifts), it had arrears 
aplenty due to the HSO’s who had it before me and it was bogan 
central–bogans, bogans, bogans. I feel like I own my new patch a 
little more, but think probably most houses are OK, tenants don’t 
complaint too much. But I do miss the maintenance stuff, it was a 
good way to keep on top of properties, but I don’t want all the paper 
work back that the MCC does! (Interview: Location one) 
 
Another common reason cited for HSO’s having only a rudimentary 
understanding of the condition of their patch was the absence of accurate and 
efficient record keeping tools. Phil spent most of one interview talking about the 
lethargic implementation of a new housing software package: 
 
This really shits me. ISIP [the current housing management 
software: Integrated System for Information on Property] has been 
failing for years, woefully slow, with minimal functionality and full of 
system errors. So, for the last few years, we have been promised a 
new system. Last year, this promise got a name: HIIP [Housing 
Integration and Information Program]. Plenty of pomp and 
ceremony, but no product, one year later the pomp has gone and 
still no HIIP. What’s happened as a result? Well the powers that be 
have let ISIP fall into a heap and HSO’s stopped imputing any real 
data in ISIP when HIIP was promised.  Two years later it’s the same 
old crap software and piles of sticky notes ready to be typed into the 
new system.  This is shit. (Interview: Location one) 
 
I was interested in the impact of the problems with the ‘delayed software 
delivery’ on how HSO’s develop an understanding of their patch, so I asked 
Phil to talk about it: 
  
We don’t use this package very well, mostly because it has never 
really worked; well, maybe it did at the very start, so we talk to each 
other.  Take my current patch: I just go and talk to (X) because they 
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had it before me, or (Y) because she had it before (X).  It’s word of 
mouth, the chats with FSO’s [facilities services officers], knowing 
how old the houses are and tip offs from other tenants.  How much 
does the software help me understand the condition of my patch? 
Can you have less than zero percent as a measure?! (Interview: 
Location one) 
 
The lack of reliable and effective data recording and an increasing reliance on 
informal ‘word of mouth data’ was a major annoyance to one of the local 
managers’ and at the weekly staff meeting they made the following request: ‘I 
know that ISIP is falling over, but please record somewhere the stuff you deal 
with.  Tell the team leader and write it in the files because we look ridiculous 
when we get a ministerial and can’t find anything’ (Chalkley, 2005a). Sophia 
told me that the above problems with understanding your patch were further 
exacerbated by excessive workloads and a sense that HSO’s just ‘race from 
one place to the next’: 
 
If I go out to home visit, it will usually be before or after VCAT, it will 
be focused on one area and often as a response to a complaint or 
order. I will be on the mobile, talking to the office, talking to a tenant, 
looking at a fence and on the way back drive past 120 things that I 
should action. I think ‘I must write that in the file when I get back to 
the office’. Two hours later and my head’s done in. (Interview: 
Location one) 
 
At the completion of my fieldwork in the local office, I recorded four important 
observations about the impediments that prevent HSO’s from developing a 
comprehensive understanding of the houses in their patch. Firstly, to do their 
job, HSO’s have (and need) only a basic understanding of the general 
condition of their patch. Secondly, staff have developed informal social 
networks to store and disseminate data about the condition of each patch. 
Thirdly, the introduction of the Maintenance Call Centre has eased some of the 
transactional workload for HSO’s but it has also disconnected them from their 
patch. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the absence of a satisfactory 
housing software package has resulted in the potential loss of data and 
information about the properties in this office. To me, this seemed to be a 
significant problem and, when I commenced my head office fieldwork, I asked 
the staff about ‘how head office understood the condition of its 73,000 
properties and if the criticism of the Victorian Auditor–General might have some 
basis in fact’  
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But what about head office, how did they understand the ‘problems with the 
patch’? Sara, like a number of head office managers, was normally quite 
reserved and qualified in her comments, but dropped her guard and was 
brutally honest: 
 
We have absolutely no idea really. We have good records about the 
really new stuff and the stuff that comes out of the projects, say, the 
Kensington site.  But ask us about the weatherboards in Morwell or 
the walk–ups in Heidelberg and we have no real idea. The current 
records are out of date, some were inaccurate to start with and don’t 
have any data about changes/updates/renos.  How many properties 
need new kitchens in the next five years? How many need new 
gutters now?  Fucked if we know. (Interview: Location three) 
 
Whilst I was at head office, I engaged in discussion with the staff member who 
was working on the development of a new database of public housing 
properties in Victoria.  I interviewed him over a cup of coffee, but, as he was a 
lone staff member working a very specific job and very easily identified, I have 
excluded his comments from this thesis.  But in my notes I did pen this 
comment ‘Met (X) today – he is driving/flying Victoria: developing a huge record 
of the properties – using photos, local records and actually going out to 
properties. He looks exhausted’ (Chalkley, 2005a). 
 
The commitment of a single staff member (albeit with some occasional 
assistance) to such a monumental task seemed to contradict the Auditor–
General’s recommendation that the Office of Housing urgently needs to 
‘provide adequate housing stock management systems (including 
comprehensive condition reports and an up to date data base of properties 
currently owned and managed by the state)’ (Victorian Auditor General, 2004.). 
Interested in finding out why property data was so difficult to gather, so hard to 
organise and problematic to disseminate, I asked a number of senior managers 
what factors mitigate against the development of a repository of property 
condition, renovations required/undertaken and planned replacement? In 
summary, here is what I recorded: 
 
In part it’s due to the central/decentralised system.  We hope that 
the regions are looking after it and they hope that local managers 
are looking after it and they hope that HSO’s are looking after it. It’s 
a history of hope and not a lot of action.  
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We discover the lack of data when we have a situation such as, the 
director needs information for a press release or some other urgent 
situation. Lots of jumping up and down and foot stomping, but 
nothing happens in any meaningful way.  HSO’s are busy enough, 
they have no time to inspect and record on the 300–odd often 
changing properties they have in their patch. 
 
It’s labour intensive and we are under–staffed in housing. Also, no 
one I can think of desperately needs this info to do their job. I don’t 
need it, HSO’s would probably like it, but have scrapped by for 
years without it and, let’s face it, what director really wants to have a 
printed, public record of how bad the stock is? Better for everyone to 
have very little knowledge. 
 
This is exactly why the HOR was implemented.  Soon we will have 
new software and focused and dedicated teams. The TPT (Tenancy 
and Property Team) will be all over this sort of stuff, they won’t be 
trying to be all things to all people like the current HSOs.  They will 
have properties squarely in their sights and use HIIP to know them 
well. (Field note: Location one/two/three) 
 
After twelve months of research, I found that most staff agreed with the 
Victorian Auditor–General’s finding that, without accurate data describing the 
condition of their properties, the Office of Housing ‘cannot be certain of its 
maintenance requirements, including the estimated level of backlog 
maintenance. The extent to which properties have been maintained to the 
OoH’s standard can also not be reliably determined.  Progress in addressing 
this deficiency has been slow’(Victorian Auditor General, 2004. pg. 2). The 
reasons for this inertia are quite simple. Staff have developed a set of practices 
that do not rely on this data to ‘do their job’ and, as a result, HSO’s have well–
established informal strategies for sharing data or, in some cases, working 
without it. Equally, information about property condition is time consuming and 
laborious to collect and the organisation has not allocated resources to make a 
meaningful commitment to the task. Finally, no particular department has 
ultimate ownership of this data and the promise of new and improved software 
has resulted in a lengthy disruption to the preservation of data about OoH 
properties. As a front–line worker, Phil was all too aware that his own practices 
were contributing to what the Auditor General had described as ‘Inadequate 
records about the physical condition of the properties’: 
 
Like a few of us, I have got slack, waiting for HIIP to arrive. Why 
would you keep all the stuff up to date on ISIP when you will 
probably have to re–enter it anyway? I have heaps of sticky notes 
and have made comments in the files.  Now we wait. (Interview: 
Location one) 
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Figure 6.3 A concrete house some fifty years post–construction.(Chalkley, 2005a) 
 
As an informed outsider I was privy to secret stories of ‘repair by stealth’ and 
‘new carpet through VCAT’; staff told me stories that illustrate ‘how little money 
is available and bad the system is’.  I discovered that housing workers can 
meet their key performance indicators and ‘do their job’ without really 
understanding the condition of the properties or the lives of the people in their 
patch. As a result, they need develop only a rudimentary understanding of the 
dynamics of their patch. They can do this because most ‘patches’ are 
geographically too large to get to know in a physical sense, and secondly 
because patches are subject to constant change. I discovered too that the long 
absence of a competent and accurate housing management software system 
has resulted in staff developing sophisticated, localised and often informal 
social networks to store and disseminate data about the condition of each 
patch.  
 
Understanding your patch was a problem for staff, but workers told me that this 
was overshadowed by a much larger problem: insufficient capacity in the 
existing patches meant that potential tenants, assessed as not requiring 
immediate allocation, were placed in a ‘holding pattern’ known as the ‘waiting 
list’. 
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Problems with waiting lists: ‘They politely call again the next week 
and the next until the anger builds and the shouting begins’ 
The shortage of suitable properties was another of the long–standing and 
enduring problems faced by state housing authorities. Public housing workers 
in Victoria had struggled for decades to manage progressively lengthening 
waiting lists, ageing stock and an inadequate level of new property 
construction. By 2005, the waiting list had reached (as described by a head 
office staff member) ‘unrealistic and impossible’ proportions and, at the time of 
writing, the Office of Housing had over thirty thousand eligible families on its 
waiting list. At the local office, Sophia told me that one of the ‘worst kept 
secrets’ was the fact that the vast majority of those on the waiting list would 
never be allocated public housing: 
 
I see the waiting lists as profoundly unfair. The new applicant is told 
that they ‘are eligible to go on the waiting list’ and you can see the 
hope in their eyes.  I often want to tell them that unless they are 
mentally unwell, or an ex prisoner, or escaping domestic violence, 
or drug fucked or desperately homeless, you will never, never get a 
place.  Instead we have this ridiculous little charade and a week or 
so later, they ring and ask if they have moved up the list. And again 
the next week and the next until the anger builds and the shouting 
begins. (Interview: Location one) 
 
Phil, a little bolder in his comments, due to ‘his age and maturing 
superannuation’, had this to say: 
 
I tell it like it is! We have about (X( number of vacancies and 30,000 
people on the waiting list. You do the sums, if you are number 
29,999 on the list it will take roughly twenty–five years to get to 
number one!  Oh, did I tell you that people (in segment one) can 
jump in front of you? I recall telling a sixty–year–old woman that the 
waiting time is going to be at least ten years and she would be 
seventy before a property might be available. She burst into tears 
and told me, “I will be dead”. It’s hard to support the segmented 
waiting list when a paedophile, recently released from prison, gets a 
house before this old lady. [Note; At the time, there was much talk in 
the press about how a recently released sex offender had been 
allocated public housing in regional Victoria]. (Interview: Location 
one) 
 
The waiting list was, for most of the time, a little like background noise.  
Everyone was aware of it and occasionally it would get louder, but mostly 
HSO’s told me that it wasn’t a big problem in the repetitive and mundane 
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elements of their daily work.  But a simple letter from head office could change 
that, and very early in my time at the local office this happened: 
 
9th July 2004 
 
My first visit to the office was to chat with the manager and, as I had 
arrived a little early, I took some time to sit in the waiting area and 
observe the first of many interactions between staff and tenants. A 
HSO was explaining to a Somali family that the letter they received 
was not an offer of housing, but a simply a review form. This form 
was ‘posted centrally’ and simply asked the applicant to confirm 
their details. Even though the HSO’s approach was both 
professional and kind, the family’s disappointment was hard to miss. 
When I later left the office, an older man had the same letter and a 
different HSO was having the same conversation. (Field note: 
Location one) 
 
Some weeks later, I remembered this observation and as I walked around the 
office, I asked the HSO’s about it. This is a summary of what they said: 
 
Centrally generated review letters are a nightmare, especially if they 
go to people on the waiting list.  Some just get thrown out, but, 
without fail, we get a rush at the front desk, and you have to tell 
people (often with very basic English) that this is not an offer letter.  
And the heartbreak starts again, and then the anger and the 
frustration. Bloody head office, making more unnecessary waiting 
list work. (Field note: Location one) 
 
Whilst at head office I asked around about waiting lists and centrally generated 
correspondence. Sara’s reaction was resolute, if defensive, in her response: 
 
The people on the waiting list aren’t invisible and we aren’t on the 
run from them.  Sure, we would like to house them, but I think that 
HSO’s need to be aware that people are missed by the system for 
really simple things like an out of date address or incorrect phone 
number.  HSO’s don’t have the time or resources to keep details 
updated, but we do. If they come into the office as result of a letter, 
this is good, the staff might find out something new about the 
applicant, something that the system hasn’t picked up. (Interview: 
Location three) 
 
Later, when I spoke with HSOs about the proposition that ‘any’ form of contact 
with tenants might be useful, they agreed that, occasionally, centrally 
generated correspondence can be beneficial, but overwhelmingly it creates 
more problems than it solves. The more senior HSO’s told me that this problem 
was a good example of the disconnect between the understandings of workers 
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at the front–line and staff working at head office, detached from the life world of 
tenants.  
Conclusion 
The three–way dialogue used in this chapter exposed a number of parallel and 
occasionally conflicting constructions around ‘what are’ the problems with 
standards, assets and waiting lists. Front–line staff told me that the process of 
dealing with insufficient, ageing and sometime very run–down properties 
through the application of policies and standards was both frustrating and 
exhausting. The ongoing shortage of properties and an ever–lengthening 
waiting list further compounded their frustration. As a response, staff invented 
ways around the system, some simply ignore the problem and some ‘bend’ the 
standards in an effort to produce a ‘positive’ outcome, an outcome that is 
sometimes ‘not in keeping with policy’.  Managers at head office understood 
the complexity of the problems with assets, standards and the waiting list, but 
have different constructions of the best way to remedy these problems.  
 
For staff at head office, standards were about pointing the whole organisation 
in the same direction; assets needed to be fairly distributed and activity 
managed and waiting lists were a device with which to impartially ensure that 
scarce housing resources were distributed to those most in need. The HSO’s 
told me that they did not necessarily dispute the validity of these aims, they 
simply disagreed with the way in which the aims were turned into action. The 
process of turning ‘aims’ into ‘actions’ is also a prominent theme in the 
following chapter, a chapter that explores how staff experienced and 
understood the  ‘problems with organisation’. 
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Chapter Seven 
‘Mostly it’s self evident’. Problems with Organisation 
 
Some staff here mistakenly think that management are aware of 
their workload, understand the various roles and care about the 
complexity of their work. Every time head office send out a new 
directive, or place a band aid on a big problem or berate them for 
arrears, one more HSO thinks, ‘oh, what the fuck, if this is their 
attitude, I’m just going to turn up and do the basics’. (Interview: 
Location one) 
Introduction 
This chapter describes how ‘organisational’ problems are experienced and 
understood by staff at the Office of Housing. Here you will read stories about 
how front–line staff ‘feel’ about changes to decision–making, communication, 
resource allocation, priority setting, staffing and a number of other 
‘organisational’ problems. As in the previous chapters, I draw on a range of 
field notes, interviews and documents to continue the three–way dialogue 
about how workers inside the Office of Housing experienced problems with the 
organisation, and the remedies proposed by the HOR to address them. In 
particular, I want to explore how communication, managerial practice, the 
professionalisation of housing work, staff recruitment, staff morale and, more 
generally, the ‘workplace culture’ at the Office of Housing has contributed to the 
construction of ‘problems with organisation’. In this this chapter, I compare and 
contrast the stories of workers and managers, looking at the various 
constructions around what are ‘the problems with the organisation’.   
 
Language is particularly important in this chapter and, by examining commonly 
used phrases such as ‘workplace culture’, ‘open and honest communication’, 
‘meaningless job descriptions’ and a ‘negative organisational climate’, I 
describe how HSO’s and managers alike use these expressions to portray ‘the 
health and climate’ of their workplace. Phrases such as these were used by 
staff to represent how ‘valued’ they felt, to share their perceptions about ‘how 
management understood (or didn’t) the complexity of their work’ and, in very 
broad terms, to represent their thoughts about the ‘organisational health’ of 
their workplace.  I will also re–examine the organisational artefacts to explore 
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how the same phrases were also used by tenants, consultants and housing 
theorists to articulate how, in the past, a negative organisational culture has 
had a deleterious impact on service delivery, interaction with tenants, 
workplace morale, staff absenteeism, corporate knowledge and staff attrition.  
 
This chapter is structured around staff’s understandings of the following four 
key organisational problems:  
 
The first ‘problem’ is concerned with ‘management’ and ‘leadership’. The idea 
of ‘management and leadership’ suggests how managers in the organisation 
struggle to consistently administer and supervise a highly localised 
organisation. I use stories to explain ‘how senior managers responded’ to the 
reactions of front–line staff as they confronted the dismantling, restructuring 
and reorganisation of familiar, even long–entrenched work arrangements. 
 
The second problem focuses on the idea of ‘teams’. The Office of Housing 
relies on teams and teamwork in most facets of its operation.  In their stories, 
staff talked about the ‘allocations team’, ‘rebate team’, ‘admin team’ and many 
other work collectives. The Review proposed a number of significant reforms to 
the structure of teams and I use first–hand accounts to explain how HSO’s 
responded to these proposed reforms. 
 
The next problem, ‘staffing’, explores the challenge of simultaneously 
improving prerequisite skills and formalising qualifications for staff in order to 
‘professionalise’ housing work, whilst recruiting, training and retaining adequate 
staff to cover the ongoing workloads.   Managers at the Office of Housing were 
confronted by a number of problems with staffing, good staff were difficult to 
attract, training staff was expensive and time–consuming, and retaining skilled 
and competent staff proved to be an ongoing challenge for local office 
managers. The front–line staff experienced this as increasing workloads and 
ever–growing patches. 
 
The third problem, ‘clarifying roles and responsibilities’, refers to the daily work 
of housing staff, and here I explore how workers experience the problems with 
workloads, ambiguous performance indicators, and working with tenants with 
‘complex and multiple needs’ and I attempt to reconcile the reality of day–to–
day work with the perceptions of senior managers working at head office. 
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The final problem incorporates facets of all the housing problems discussed in 
this thesis - the problem of communication. Like most large bureaucracies, the 
Office of Housing communicates with many different stakeholders and my data 
recorded staff communicating with tenants, staff, other agencies, non–
government organisations and numerous other groups and individuals, too 
extensive to list here. The Office of Housing has had mixed success with its 
communication, and, in the final part of this chapter, I use first–hand accounts 
to portray the some of the problems with communication and to explain how the 
Review proposed to remedy the problems with communication.  
Problems with management (or is it leadership?) 
Any reference to the problems with ‘management’ is a collective reference to 
how senior housing workers use policy and procedure, key performance 
indicators and many other devices to try and ensure consistent leadership and 
‘standardised customer service’ across a highly regionalised business.  
‘Management’ includes leading, directing and guiding the day–to–day work of 
staff whilst attempting to change the perceptions of individual staff to more 
positively embrace management–led reform. By far the most challenging 
responsibility for managers at the Office of Housing was communicating how a 
significant organisational and cultural change - Housing Office Review - was to 
be implemented. 
 
Phil (and a number of his peers) told me that ‘being a manager/leader at the 
Office of Housing isn’t easy’. He described how senior housing staff are 
responsible for policy compliance across a large and diverse workforce. They 
also have to ensure that individual staff and teams meet key performance 
indicators and they have to lead organisational change by ensuring that all staff 
work towards the broader goals of the organisation (Bryman, 1996). In his very 
first interview Phil described his initial perceptions about the conflict between 
the lofty nature of ‘broader organisation goals’ and the mundane and stressful 
minutiae of a HSO’s day–to–day work. Phil believed that he experienced a 
‘culture shock’ when he moved from the community welfare sector to his 
current job in public housing: 
 
It was like being on Mars! I was used to identifying a problem, 
talking to my manager and getting on with it.  But here, the process 
is so cumbersome; the place is rich in written policy and poor in 
clear direction and leadership. I understand why, eventually, 
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innovative people are strangled by frustration. (Interview: Location 
three)   
 
Phil’s experience was not uncommon. A number of HSO’s described how they 
felt ‘immobilised’ by the fact that ‘the Office of Housing manages procedures 
and processes really well and manages relationships really badly’ (Chalkley, 
2005d). One staff member was quite outspoken about the ‘management ethos’ 
of those higher up in the organisation:  
 
No decent person could go to sleep at night knowing that you have 
imposed these intrusions into people’s lives – taking 25% of 
children’s income, expecting paint and carpet to last seven or more 
years of hard use and bullying people to take houses or lose their 
place on the waiting list. Worse still, managers making us do their 
dirty work while they sit at head office, safe from the wrath of 
tenants. (Interview: Location one) 
 
Getting the staff to talk about ‘leadership’ and ‘management’ was quite easy. 
Most of my interviews elicited long narratives about the issues with, and short 
comings of, management. Front–line staff talked at length about the physical 
separation of head office. They highlighted the heavy burden of security at 
head office, they joked that if a tenant walked into the foyer of head office, 
senior managers would ‘crap their pants’ and, without exception, staff told me 
at least one account of a situation that had (in their opinion) been poorly 
handled by ‘management’. For the most part, these stories were ‘off the record’ 
and the majority of staff (including those at head office) seemed reluctant to 
disclose specific details in their stories. The majority of participants cited two 
reasons for their reluctance to disclose. The first and most obvious was fear of 
retribution from ‘management’. A number of staff  were also concerned about 
the potential readership of this work and the possibility of placing at risk their 
career opportunities and prospects for promotion. This was a particular concern 
for staff at head office. 
 
Irrespective of their position or role, the majority of staff talked to me about the 
importance of a ‘good management style’. The staff at head office often 
discussed their own (and colleagues’) ‘style’, senior managers told me about 
the ‘style’ of their teams, and the local office staff used personal experiences to 
illustrate incidences of ‘poor management style’. Some HSO’s used the 
construction of ‘head office’ as an actor, represented as a controlling, obtrusive 
and disruptive individual. Bryman describes this focus on ‘style’ as the 
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examination of leadership in, rather than of an organisation and, as a result, 
large and fragmented organisations such as the Office of Housing struggle to 
produce a coherent representation of organisational leadership. Typically, 
workers focused their attention on the personality of their most immediate and 
visible manager (Bryman, 1996). At head office, Henry told me that one of the 
most difficult tasks for him was attempting (and failing) to develop a 
sustainable, sincere management ‘style’ whilst working in a highly reactive and 
responsive job: 
 
I really try to replicate the practices of the good managers I’ve had, 
the people that were really nice to work for.  You just don’t get the 
head space here to do much more than jump! jump! jump!. I used to 
plan and think ahead, but it’s not worth it.  I’m sure the people who 
work for me think I’m a nice guy, but see me as poorly organised 
and all over the shop and a dizzy manager. (Interview: Location 
three) 
 
A significant number of staff at head office cited the ‘reactive nature of the 
department’ and the ‘frenetic nature of their work’ as obstacles to developing a 
compelling and individualised management style. These staff told me that, 
instead, they traded on their personal relationships with HSO’s and the good 
will of colleagues in an effort to meet their KPIs and to simply ‘get the job done’. 
In order to successfully reform the culture of the organisation, to move from this 
‘simply getting the job done’ and to disentangle ‘confused accountabilities’ 
(Office of Housing, 2004), Henry told me that he (and a number of his peers) 
need to overcome a number of significant ‘leadership’ hurdles. The first hurdle 
is the fact that the Office of Housing has a long history of managers as 
‘supervisors of tasks and jobs’ - managers are the gatekeepers of resources 
and the appraisers of performance (working as leaders in, rather than of the 
organisation). The culture of manager as the ‘boss’ is deeply entrenched at the 
front–line and the stories of Henry (and others) suggest that the reactive nature 
of housing work is likely to provide limited opportunities for leaders to develop 
as ‘producers of meaning’, exemplars for change and to act as skilled 
transformative leaders (Bryman, 1996).  
 
The second problem facing senior housing staff is how do you encourage and 
facilitate managers (who are ‘profoundly busy with operational work’) to act as 
skilled transformative leaders? I noted that the managers and supervisors 
identified to me as the ‘most respected’ were known for their ‘good 
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management style’ and most likely to enjoy a high level of compliance and 
commitment from staff. It was no surprise to discover that those were the 
managers who were physically present in the local offices more often, or those 
who had frequent telephone interaction with those at the front–line. This style of 
‘hands on’ management was common to the training staff, the policy hotline 
staff and the regional office staff, and these leaders were perceived to be the 
best listeners, to activity learn from interaction with HSO’s and were more likely 
to instigate dialogue about ‘boring’ and ‘contentious’ operational problems 
(Clegg and Hardy, 1996).   
 
My research shows that perceptions are an important enabling device at the 
Office of Housing and, in their stories, staff spoke readily about how the 
representation of management dramatically influences how they accept (or 
reject) organisational change. Amongst the staff at one local office, the regional 
office manager was well respected because he would often call in to the office 
and ‘help’ on the front desk, have a coffee in the tea room and would rarely 
email; ‘He rang to talk with you and always called you back, even with shitty 
news’ (Field Notes: Location One). Head office staff expressed the desire to be 
‘good managers’ and HSO’s at the front–line shared this view. 
Problems with teams 
One of the key roles of ‘the manager’ at the Office of Housing is the ability to 
lead and supervise teams. At head office, I frequently observed managers 
promoting teamwork (in most activities, such as staff training, neighbourhood 
projects, new initiatives to equitably distribute repetitive and mundane tasks) as 
the most effective way to manage the day–to–day delivery of public housing in 
Victoria (Office of Housing, 2006a). Yet, some managers told me that they had 
three major concerns with the organisation of teams. Firstly, what happens 
when long–established team structures were challenged, changed and 
dismantled? Second, what were the consequences of relying on individual 
performance as indicator of success, yet promoting teamwork as an important 
work practice? Finally, how did staff react to the implementation of strategies to 
promote ‘stronger team structures’ (Office of Housing, 2004) as proposed in the 
Review? The problems with teams and teamwork were difficult to discretely 
identify because the effectiveness of teams was influenced by the range of 
problems described in the later parts of this chapter. The fact that teams and 
teamwork was interwoven into the fabric of daily work was also a problem for 
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those charged with implementing this part of the Review. Here’s how one 
manager put it: 
 
The review calls for an overhaul of teams and the way they work. If 
only it were so simple; on paper it looks like our teams are self–
contained little units, working away at a particular function. In reality, 
that’s wrong. They are all connected and all dependent on each 
other. Screw with one team and you screw with them all. This is 
much more complex than it looks! (Interview: Location three) 
 
So what were the problems with these interdependent and interwoven teams? 
The first problem I observed was mentioned in the preceding chapter and it’s 
the vastness of each team’s range of responsibly. 
 
I describe the first problem staff had with teams as the ‘paradox of the patch’. 
This is a situation where the diversity of the duties makes each day interesting 
and lively, providing staff with a relatively high degree of independence, but this 
independence is diminished by the volume of information, the diversity of tasks 
and complexity of knowledge required to effectively manage your patch has 
become ‘impossibly vast’ (Chalkley, 2005c). 
 
Sophia explained how she experienced and understood the ‘paradox of the 
patch’: 
 
The patch model is designed like a one–stop shop – the idea is that 
I’m able to help every tenant across a range of services, no matter 
what patch they are in.  I’m a bit worried that the new model will 
result in the de–skilling of us staff; you will be parked in one area 
and just get stale very quickly. I have a sense of pride in my patch, I 
have some ownership of it and this energises me. The thought of 
allocation after allocation, day in day, out really depresses me. But, 
by the same token, I can’t keep working like this, it’s just too much. 
(Interview: Location one) 
  
This view was repeated many times. In meetings, staff discussed the 
probability that the reforms to team structure as proposed in the Review, would 
result in them working on a ‘public housing production line’.  In the tea room, a 
number of them openly criticised the proposed new team model. In their 
interviews they told me of a reluctance to surrender their love/hate relationship 
with the patch model. Due to the diverse (and often contradictory) opinions 
about the patch model, getting a consensus about the value, strengths and 
weaknesses of ‘the patch’ was very difficult.  Most HSO’s acknowledged that 
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the patch made them very busy and ‘burnt them out’, but, at the same time, the 
variety of tasks was invigorating as ‘no two days were ever the same’. At head 
office, staff seemed cognisant of the barriers to the successful reorganisation of 
housing teams and a number of managers described the immense difficulties 
they faced when attempting to move individuals and teams from ‘preservation 
of the patch and continuation of the status quo’ to the ‘self–innovation of work 
practices’ (Weick and Westley, 1996). 
 
At head office, Sara remembered her own time as a HSO working in a local 
office team and recalled her own love/hate relationship with the patch: 
 
It’s true what the HSO’s say, no two days are the same and that’s a 
good and bad thing. The variety of the tasks really is spread across 
a wide range of operational elements of the business. This means 
that you are “jack of all trades”. What has happened as clients [her 
word] changed and patches got bigger and houses got older and 
…HSO’s became master of no trade. Everyone agrees that the 
HSO’s work is out of control and something needs to be done.  The 
big job for us here at head office is to convince the HSO’s that the 
new model will work, they will still have some freedom and their job 
will still be varied and interesting. The absence of information about 
the HOR has meant that rumours abound and wild urban myths 
have become ‘the truth’ in some offices. (Interview: Location three)  
 
This is how Doug put it: 
 
The first draft of the HOR came out a year before I retired and, once 
it had sunk in, the HSO’s started getting stroppy – they hated the 
workload of the patch and at the same time didn’t want to be 
subjected to what they called the ‘factory’ work of function–based 
teams. The HSO’s version of what they wanted from the HOR was: 
1)  More HSO’s, 2) less shit from head office, 3) better tenants, 4) 
no new policies and procedures and 5) less properties in each 
patch. (Interview: Retired housing worker) 
 
Doug’s sentiments were repeated in the local offices.  In their discussions with 
me, front–line staff described a ‘love/hate’ relationship with the patch model 
and one staff member believed that a large part of the ‘hate’ was due to the 
volume of ‘self–promotional, verbose and bullying head office communication 
that typifies how we are treated and blights the relationship between HSO’s 
and senior management’ (Interview: Retired Housing Worker). HSO’s told me 
that they want the volume and complexity of communication to be ‘fixed’, but 
not by capitulating the interesting and ever–changing parts of their job. 
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After many hours of interviews, observation and numerous tea room 
discussions, I am able to confidently state that most staff believe that 
‘something’ needed to change with the demanding and hectic patch model, but 
getting a consensus on what exactly this ‘something’ might be proved to be 
almost impossible. 
  
The second problem with teams was perceptions about the equitable 
distribution of tasks, the delegation of responsibility and the supervision of 
individuals (and their performance) within teams.  The distribution of work and 
compliance with deadlines was a contentious issue, a ‘hot button’ topic for 
almost all front–line participants.  
 
Phil became quite animated when we discussed this topic:  
 
Some people work really hard and the slackers exploit this.  I myself 
hate it when you fall behind or people don’t bother with their bit of 
the job and just wait until other suckers like me panic and do it for 
them.  The managers don’t care, they just want the job done and will 
often ask the hard workers to ‘help out, do a favour or get them out 
of a jam’. Team supervision is very poor here and I think that it’s not 
the team leaders fault - they are often really good HSO’s who just 
get promoted because someone is needed to fill the seat! 
(Interview: Location one)  
 
In the Housing Office Review Final Report (Office of Housing, 2004), senior 
managers were advised to consider a number of major reforms to the current 
housing team structure in order to replace the 1990s Neighbourhood Team 
structure, which attempted to provide a ‘one–stop shop service model, with a 
client–based service delivery model comprising three specialised teams’ (Office 
of Housing, 2004). In their interviews, most front–line staff viewed statements 
such as this with some scepticism.  Long–serving staff told me that it was an 
example of ‘what is old is new again’.  More recently appointed staff were 
concerned that they might become ‘drones, mindless public servants doing the 
same job over and over’.  Phil told me that ‘This isn’t revolutionary!  When I 
started, we had function–based teams – I worked for a while with the 
allocations guys, then did some rent stuff. It’s just the same old things with a 
new name’ (Interview: Location One). The more I talked with HSO’s, the more it 
became apparent that their concerns about the proposed changes to teams 
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weren’t actually so much about teams, but more about placing at risk their 
independence and reducing the diversity and variety of their work.   
 
A number of staff acknowledged that at least with the proposed function–based 
teams, ‘the slackers and lazy will not be able to hide in the busy muddle of the 
huge, ever–shifting patch and neighbourhoods. If they don’t do their specific 
task, it will be immediately obvious because others will depend on them’ (Field 
notes: Location One). A number of staff commented (often after my recording 
equipment was packed away) about the fact that every office seems to have 
‘dud’ staff, underperformers who, in their opinion, were largely left to their own 
devices and delegated ‘low risk’ work to ‘fill in their days’. A number of HSO’s 
told me that under the new three team model the protection for these ‘dud’ staff 
would be reduced and the ‘dud staff’ would be exposed, eventually forcing 
them to depart, move to another office or ‘pull their socks up’.  At head office, I 
told Henry about the HSO’s speculations about this: 
 
I agree, this new model should allow for much closer and focused 
scrutiny of individual performance. That’s not to say that it will 
become a ‘police state’ with head office monitoring every action.  
We couldn’t even if we wanted too, you have seen how few staff we 
have working with local offices. But, I have to say that the 
‘protection’ of dud staff is a localised issue, often it’s the local 
managers protecting these guys, compensating and shifting their 
work around. And it’s not just a housing department issue, I’m sure 
you could have this conversation downstairs [in the other state 
government agencies who share the building]. (Interview: Location 
three)  
 
I number of the people I spoke with felt that Henry was right. Under the new 
three teams model, the localised supervision of day–to–day work was unlikely 
to change and perhaps the reforms would ultimately do little more than ‘shift 
the chairs on the Titanic’ (Interview: Location One). 
 
I asked Doug about this issue. Was he aware of ‘dud’ staff when he was a 
housing manager? What (if anything) did he do about them? 
 
[Laughs] Most are now at head office! Seriously, though, every 
single manager has someone like this on their staff. I am a little 
ashamed to say that I, like most managers, largely ignored them 
and when forced to do something, it was usually a sweeping reform 
to the entire team.  I know, I know, it’s shitty to do this, rather than 
face the nastiness of dealing with an under–performer, I would 
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change everything, effectively penalising all those that were doing 
OK. Don’t we do this to tenants? Punish all arrears, even the pissy 
little ones, because we can’t fix the real hard ones? Get stuck into 
tenants with long lawns because someone trashed a house and it 
was in the newspaper? This approach didn’t fix the shithead tenants 
and the HOR won’t fix the under–performers. I don’t think anyone at 
central thinks that what it’s for. (Interview: Retired housing worker) 
 
How did staff perceive and understand the proposal to move their relatively 
independent work in the ‘independent island’ that was their ‘patch’ to an 
‘integrated system’ of a client–based customer service delivery model 
comprising three specialised teams? (Clarke and Clegg, 2000; O(Office of 
Housing, 2004) In their stories, HSO’s described their patch as an island over 
which they had a reasonable degree of control and autonomy; Phil was ‘on top 
of the goings on in most of his streets and courts’ and Sophia was ‘largely left 
alone to manage her patch, just so long as things went well.’ At the time of this 
research, the average HSO was working with nominal supervision in a busy 
environment. There was some anxiety around proposed organisational change 
but, for the most part, I observed that staff just ‘got on’ with the business of 
managing public housing. The more competent and confident staff constructed 
for themselves a semi–autonomous role and worked at overseeing their patch 
with minimum intervention from management.  Most staff felt that they ‘did a 
fairly good job’ and would continue to do so under the new structure, 
irrespective of what form it would take. The majority of staff told me that their 
main concern was the slowness of reform, the ‘stop/start’ of new initiatives and, 
as one HSO humorously put it; ‘a seemingly endless stream of powerpoint 
presentations and unfulfilled promises’ (Field Notes: Location One). 
 
At the regional office, one of the staff told me that this ongoing speculation 
about the nature of the new function–based teams of the HAAT (Housing 
Advisory and Assessment Team), the TPT (Tenancy and Property Team) and 
the SLT (Support Links Team) had resulted in some anxiety about ‘benign, but 
ever present surveillance’, ‘a decline in job satisfaction’ and ‘the removal of the 
discretionary power HSO’s have at present’ (Chalkley, 2005d). 
 
Due largely to an absence of specific information about the ‘how, what and 
when’ of the new team structure, I often observed HSO’s speculating about the 
possible changes. The slow pace of reform and lack of clarity around the 
specific details of the review allowed staff to speculate and hypothesise, 
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crafting a series of narratives about what the ‘HAAT’, ‘TPT’ and ‘SLT’ teams 
might be like, inculcating new staff and treating with scepticism the irregular, 
often post–hoc, communications about the HOR.  The ongoing delays in the 
implementation of the HIIP (Housing Integration and Information Program) 
software further compounded this problem and, in an effort to cope with the 
department’s ageing and poorly maintained computer system, HSO’s 
developed highly individualised systems to record and recall data. I observed 
‘sticky notes’ on files, people printing emails and placing them in files, staff 
sending reminder text message to themselves whilst on home visits and most 
HSO’s discussed with me their own individual coping strategies. Some of the 
solutions to this I.T deficit were quite innovative even though the vast majority 
of these techniques were not ‘in keeping with policy’.  
 
Workers told me that the failure to implement the Housing Integration and 
Information Program in a timely manner had exacerbated the problems with 
teams.  It effectively meant that the Office of Housing missed a number of 
opportunities to use ‘common information technology architecture in an 
enterprise to facilitate greater openness, cohesion and team development’ 
(Clarke and Clegg, 2000).  As a result of this inaction, I departed the final field 
location myself unclear about how staff understood the proposed changes to 
teams.  The lack of factual information, combined with many hours of 
speculation had resulted in an environment that might be described as ‘blithely 
distressed’. HSO’s were very concerned about the changes to teams, but as 
they were privy to very few of the finer details of the proposed changes, HSO’s 
told me that the HOR felt like the ‘sword of Damocles’, a disaster waiting to fall.  
Problems with staffing 
Like the other problems that were to be remedied by the Review, the third 
problem, ‘staffing’, was not new. For the period of its existence, the Office of 
Housing (and its predecessors) has experienced fluctuating success attracting, 
recruiting, training and retaining staff.  Howe (Howe, 1988b) described the 
range of remedies applied to fix this problem, the majority of which have met 
with little or limited success.  In the 1950s, in order to attract quality draftsmen, 
the Commission did not disclose its identity when advertising for architects (as 
housing commission design work was perceived to be formulaic and dull). In 
the 1960s prison officers were actively encouraged to seek promotion and 
better working conditions by pursuing a career in public housing (Dalton, 
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1988. ). Whilst at local and regional offices, I observed a number of 
discussions about how managers might recruit more/new staff. At one office I 
was ‘semi–seriously’ offered a job, starting the following day if I wanted. The 
retired housing staff interviewed for this research told me that, on occasion, 
they themselves had offered jobs to tenants who displayed some drive and a 
little ambition!  (Chalkley, 2004a) 
 
It was apparent from both the literature and fieldwork that ‘good’ housing staff 
were difficult to attract. Workers told me that often their colleagues moved 
onwards, upwards and away, the work is challenging and at times stressful, the 
rate of pay was reasonable (but not as good as in some other government 
departments) and, most importantly, recruitment continued to stall due to the 
frequent stopping and starting of the centralised recruitment scheme. Whilst at 
one of the local offices, I was approached to see if I knew anyone who might be 
looking for work (myself included) on offer was a short contract for a few days a 
week. One of the retired housing staff described this phenomenon as the 
‘desperate quest for someone warm and upright’ (Chalkley, 2004b). The 
statement ‘I came for two weeks to answer the phones and never left’ 
frequently came up in discussions with staff, and, in every interview, all but one 
response was analogous - the motivation to work in the Office of Housing (or 
more generally, the public service) was one of need, not desire. More than one 
person told me something like this: ‘I was home and my neighbour worked for 
the housing commission and asked if I wanted some work now the kids were at 
school’. This employment with the Office of Housing, as a ‘need’ not a ‘desire’, 
is characterised in Lipsky’s description of public servants as the ‘accidental 
guardians of public resources’. Most of the HSO’s in this study told me that 
they were quite shocked to find themselves ‘accidentally’ responsible for the 
provision of public benefits like housing and the maintenance of public order 
(Lipsky, 1980). 
 
On occasion while at head office, I discussed my discovery of the ‘accidental 
HSO’. Managers told me that they were not surprised to hear that the majority 
of participants in the study did not intentionally pursue a career in housing. In 
fact, a number of senior managers told me that they themselves had 
‘accidentally’ come to work in housing and were ‘bemused’ to find, some year 
later, they were still there. This ‘accidental career’ presents a major challenge 
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for the Office of Housing. If the employment motivation of staff was primarily 
need, not aspiration, what impact might this have on staff development, career 
planning, retention, key performance indicators, staff leadership and the 
professionalisation of housing work at local office level?  
 
I’m a little like a tumbleweed, I just blew here. (Field Notes: Location 
One) 
 
I noticed that housing officers, irrespective of how they ‘got there’, tended to 
approach their career in a number of ways. Some treated it as a series of 
obedient adaptations to a set of rules and policies (Berg, 2004), others as the 
opportunistic pursuit of personal goals, to bring action to their commitment to 
welfare reform and, for some, it offered  an opportunity to develop a 
professional practice that was informed and influenced by their own experience 
as a public tenant. Whilst staff may not spell out their motivation for undertaking 
a housing career all that clearly, they did approach this career with what Berg 
calls ‘a set of cultural alternatives of action’, working as isolationists, 
traditionalists, individualists or innovators (Berg, 2004).  
 
As a relatively new HSO and on her sixth short–term contract, Sophia had 
adopted what she called a ‘no–nonsense approach’ to her career.  ‘This is just 
a stepping stone for me, I will try five or six different jobs and, if I like housing 
best, I’ll come back to it.  You may have noticed that we aren’t exactly over 
staffed and we haven’t got world class applicants beating the doors down; 
that’s the tenants!’ [laughs]. Phil, an older, permanent and ongoing staff 
member with a mortgage and family, felt a little ‘stuck in housing’. He had 
unintentionally invested a significant portion of his work life in a position he 
accidentally took for ‘a couple of weeks, until he could find another job’.  It was 
Phil who first introduced me to the concept of the ‘accidental HSO’; he 
described to me a staff member who takes a casual job answering the phones 
for a couple of weeks and some years later finds themselves still working for 
the Office of Housing. 
 
In my observations, I noted that one of the biggest challenges for those 
charged with the implementation of the Review was this ‘accidentalness’ of the 
front–line workforce. The staff I spoke with described a workforce where people 
randomly ‘tumble’ into a housing career and will often ‘tumble’ out when the 
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work becomes too stressful, complex and difficult. Phil summarised this 
problem when he told me ‘it’s not like being a doctor – thinking in Year 12 “I 
want to be a doctor” and going to university and eventually, after hard slog, 
you’re are a doctor! My motivation? I needed a job. Full stop’. (Interview: 
Location One) 
 
Managers at head office were well aware of this problem. Because of her 
experience working in/on the central recruitment scheme at head office, Sara’s 
thoughts about the organisation’s problems with staffing were informative and 
insightful: 
 
I am very aware of what I say here.  I came to housing simply 
because it offered enough flexibility for me to look after the kids and 
work, I was committed to the job and worked hard, but I never 
thought of it as a vocation or career. That kinda typifies the OoH 
workforce – with exceptions of course. Most HSO’s have a job, not a 
profession. My nurse friends and I used to laugh and say that 
nursing was “a career for life, or at least ‘til you have kids”. But in 
the last ten years, Nursing has been professionalised, Uni’s now 
teach it as a degree and it seems that a growing number come to it 
as a career – start as a basic nurse who over time, train to be more 
and more specialised; you know what I mean, kids, or the elderly or 
births.  Housing needs to professionalise as a matter of urgency; 
have a mandatory entry qualification, legislate for compulsory 
annual training and link with the existing para and professional 
service provides used by our tenants.  This process is 
embarrassingly slow here’. (Interview: Location three)  
 
If any one organisational problem dominated my research it was the fact that 
the managers at Office of Housing may well want to ‘professionalise’ the 
workforce, but a number of significant obstacles are preventing this. Even 
without ‘entry standards’ and ‘minimum qualifications’, it is difficult for 
managers to recruit sufficient numbers of skilled staff to cover workloads. 
Retention of these staff is tough, training and motivating a diverse work force is 
no easy task and, to be blunt, many of the people I interviewed didn’t approach 
their work in housing as a profession - they simply came because they needed 
a job. Henry summed up this problem when he told me that: 
  
Local managers are so short staffed they will take anyone just to 
cope; the pay rates don’t exactly shout ‘profession’ and we at head 
office want to set higher standards and expectations for new staff in 
order to ‘professionalise’. I can’t see a resolution any time soon 
because this is ‘chicken and egg’ stuff here. Chicken and egg’. 
(Interview Location three) 
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Over a coffee, Doug told me that one of the most difficult things for him (in 
addition to feeling perpetually under–staffed) was the arrival of the ‘professional 
public servant; bred in captivity and trained from birth to be an arsehole. HSO’s 
often referred to these professional public servants as “the suits” (Interview: 
Retired Housing Workers). Doug felt that the combination of bureaucratic 
ambition and an absence of ‘real world public housing experience’ made this 
sort of manager difficult to work with because their directions to staff ‘might 
make sense in the composed, controlled environment of head office, but were 
impractical and unrealistic in the gritty world of public housing estates’.  In the 
1990 report, the Australian Housing Research Council anticipated Doug when it 
had this to say: 
 
Such managers have no experience or feel for the functional tasks 
of the organisation, say public housing, but have a ‘business 
administration’ degree with an associated ‘private sector’ 
management philosophy often embedded in such degrees. Such 
appointments place greater pressure on more junior staff to have 
the ‘functional’ or issue knowledge within the organisation. The 
same philosophy can also result in an almost incessant process of 
organisational restructuring in the elusive search for the optimally 
efficient structure’. (Australian Housing Research Council, 1990. pg 
87) 
 
This Australian Housing Research Council report suggests that problems with 
staffing are complex, persistent and not easily remedied.  The 
professionalisation of the workforce from the ‘top down’ creates a new set of 
problems: the wide range of career aspirations across a large workforce make 
it difficult to (as Doug put it) ‘get the troops pointing in the same direction’ and 
the narrative of ‘head office managers verses local staff’ is ingrained in the 
process of inculcation for new Housing Services Officers. Most managers I 
spoke with felt that in order to reform the staffing model at the Office of 
Housing, first they must address the existing, long–standing and entrenched 
problems with the current model. This was no easy task. 
Problems with roles and responsibilities 
The fourth problem is not exclusive to the Office of Housing; Sandford (2000), 
Lipsky (1980) Lamertz (2002) and Kent and Hamilton (1990) have all described 
how most organisations and, in particular, those government departments 
responsible for the provision of social services, struggled to define the 
boundaries of their organisation’s services, roles and capabilities (Sandfort, 
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2000, Lipsky, 1980, Lamertz, 2002, Kent and Hamilton, 1990. ). One of the 
most basic and yet significant ‘problems with organisation’ seems to stem from 
a lack of clarity around exactly what services the Office of Housing should (and 
can) offer, and confusion about the role of staff as the providers of these 
services. HSO’s told me that they feel torn between ‘caring’ for the welfare of 
poor and precarious tenants (‘holding one hand’) and being an effective and 
efficient landlord for the State (‘slapping the other’). Saugeres described this 
problem when she wrote ‘According to dominant housing management 
discourse, organisational reality is objective and rational, while tenants’ reality 
is subjective and irrational’ (Saugeres, 1999). Historical research described an 
organisation (the Office of Housing) that has, for quite some time, struggled to 
define ‘appropriate and rational’ roles and responsibilities for workers as they 
attempt to remedy the ‘subjective and irrational realities of their tenants’.   
 
I was interested to discover what workers thought about this part of their work. 
How realistic is it to expect housing workers to ensure that tenants comply with 
laws, rules, and regulations? Are housing authorities responsible for tenant 
education, community development and social guidance? The literature was 
unclear. Different managers have different opinions and the front–line staff ‘are 
often too busy to care’ (Chalkley, 2005a). One HSO told me that the easiest 
way to understand the function and role of public housing was to watch the 
newspaper ‘because they will tell you what you haven’t done!’ 
 
In their stories, local office staff described how another, more personal element 
exacerbated this lack of clarity around ‘what services the Office of Housing was 
obliged to provide’. I observed that the background, ethos, culture and beliefs 
of staff had an effect on individual understandings of standards and 
expectations of what is ‘customer service’. At one staff meeting, I recorded the 
following observation about staff roles: 
 
August 14th 2004 
 
It would seem that after some weeks here, I can see clusters 
developing: on the window side of the conference room, sit the 
long–serving HSO’s who have some experience, a little distance 
and think of their tenants in a very pragmatic way – not enough 
houses, not enough staff, not enough funding = the real world, get 
on with it. When asked to report on their patch, they occasionally 
told horror stories of ‘the tenants from hell’. Not cold hearted, just, 
blunt. Along the back, sit the HSO’s more engaged with the ethos of 
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social justice and welfare.  A number of these staff are part time or 
job share and regularly state that they feel disconnected from what 
is happening around the office, as decisions are made and not 
discussed, just actioned.  These ‘back rowers’ would occasionally 
participate in discussions with questions about ‘how these problems 
might be solved and more lives improved’ and, when asked to report 
on their patch, would often share a positive story of a recent 
placement. Nearest to the exit sat the admin staff, managers and 
those that were largely silent; last in, first out. What really caught my 
interest is the lack of consensus about what level of service the OoH 
(especially this local office) should and does offer. (Field Notes: 
Location one) 
 
Over the months, this seating arrangement stayed more or less constant. As 
new staff joined the office, they slowly aligned themselves to a particular group 
and began to express similar opinions and ideas.  This observation is 
significant because it provides the reader with an insight into how one office, 
consisting of many individuals with very similar job descriptions, the same 
performance indicators and fundamentally the same tenants, can construct any 
number of understandings about the nature of the products and services they 
should be offering their customers. On more than one occasion discussions in 
these staff meetings included statements like, ‘That’s not our job’. Managers 
used this statement to shut down debate and workers used it to ‘draw a 
perimeter’ around the scope of their work. 
 
Like so many of the housing problems I have discussed, confusion about roles 
and responsibilities is not new. Across some seventy years of housing work, 
complete with many changes in government priorities, rich with the experiences 
of generations of housing workers, the Office of Housing has yet to provide a 
meaningful answer to one important question: ‘Is it possible (and appropriate) 
for one agency to perform two very different tasks; facility management and 
social welfare?’ 
 
In addition to my observations about how workers struggle to understand the 
parameters of their work, in their stories, many staff told me that they struggled 
with the dichotomy of the property manager/welfare worker role. One HSO 
went as far as to describe her solution to the problem in terms which Burrell 
and Morgan called ‘trained incapacity’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1980). This HSO, 
facing what appears (to her) to be insurmountable problems, found herself 
increasingly resorting to ‘compulsive adherence to bureaucratic rules and 
regulations’ and as her inventory of housing problems grew, her bureaucratic 
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behaviour and operational compliance became increasingly ritualistic in nature 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1980). As a response to the property manager/welfare 
worker conflict (and the many other stresses of housing work), this HSO turned 
into the ‘policeman’, retreated to the world of rules and regulations, reduced her 
time fraction to go to part time and was ‘always on the look out for another job’. 
(Interview: Location One) 
  
In one of his interviews, Phil described how he has, over the years, come to 
understand and rationalise the contradictions in his work: 
 
I could come in here (the office) at 7am and leave and 10pm for a 
year and there would still be stuff I hadn’t done.  I have learnt over 
the years that we can only please some of the people some of the 
time, but always please your masters first.  What I realised fairly 
smartly was that no matter how great a HSO you are with your 
tenants, it doesn’t count for shit if you failed to meet your KPIs.  Now 
some staff (and I won’t name names) waste energy banging their 
head up against KPIs, saying they don’t accurately measure 
performance, and they don’t.  But, I just meet these KPIs and what 
time is left, I use to be what I think is a good HSO. You can never, 
ever get all the work done. (Interview: Location one) 
 
Sophia too felt that the workers at the OoH faced an almost impossible job, a 
job that, at times, senior management was ‘not all that clear about’. 
 
You’ve been to staff meetings – one week it’s rent, arrears, 
jackboots and VCAT.  Next week, it’s head office and the sustaining 
tenancy road show, the week after, attacking vacancy rates and to 
been seen to reduce the waiting list.  Then, the meeting finishes 
with a front desk roster bun–fight and the pressure of the additional 
work you cop because we have to cover another patch with no staff 
member to look after it.  What services do I provide (this was the 
question I asked) to tenants?  Most of the time, good service, some 
times really inconsistent and on the run service!’ (Interview: Location 
one) 
 
Some months later, when I was at head office, I asked Sara what she thought 
the role of the OoH was in the welfare system and, realistically, what services 
could the ‘increasingly resource constrained’ Office of Housing provide?  
(Office of Housing, 2004). She told me: 
 
Well, our charter is simple really. To provide low cost 
accommodation and affordable housing to disadvantaged people 
(this is almost the OoH vision, verbatim).  But you’re not going to be 
happy with that answer are you?’ [My body language betrayed me 
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here, and after years of assessing people Sara spotted it straight 
away]. 
 
Off the record, I think that the minister, then the director, and finally 
us, the managers, have been under increasing pressure to be seen 
to be fixing the ‘crisis’ with public housing, without actually 
understanding what the crisis is, or even if there is a crisis. Some 
people might say that over the years we have re–structured, 
changed priorities and piled new work on top of old without 
shedding enough.  I guess the HOR actually does shout ‘Stop!’ look 
at what we are doing! As a HSO I remember the phone calls from 
tenants about illegal activities, domestic violence and social security 
payments. All these things I had no power or control over, but all 
had such dire housing consequences. (Interview: Location three) 
 
Sara’s comment about all the things she had no power or control over, but all 
had such dire housing consequences, is really important because it succinctly 
identifies the root cause of most of the service/role confusion for HSO’s. It 
became quickly apparent to me, as an outsider, that HSO’s were telling me that 
they felt that they (and the OoH) were perceived to be responsible for elements 
of the housing system over which they had no ownership or control; anti–social 
tenant behaviour was a prime example. Here’s what Sophia told me on her last 
day at the local office: 
 
I’m about to leave, so here’s both barrels. For fuck–sake, I have 300 
odd properties and a handful of them house tenants that are beyond 
help. Then the newspaper runs a ‘slow news day story’ of how a 
family is forced to live in squalor – their own fucking squalor I might 
add – and the minister’s on fire, head office is on fire and before 
long my arse is on fire. Suddenly, their lifestyle is my problem. I 
can’t make nice people.  I can’t make civilised and socialised 
people. I just house people and un–house them when things get too 
bad.  I can’t cure them and fix their broken lives.  So, the press runs 
a story and head office makes us chase our tails’. (Interview: 
Location one) 
 
At the completion of my first period of fieldwork, I was left with the feeling that 
there was something missing from this story. At this point, I realised that there 
was another element to this ‘local verses head office’ dichotomy - the regional 
office. The regional office accommodated housing workers with wider, non–
operational responsibilities, they ‘look after’ staffing, training, performance 
management and many special projects. The regional office was considered by 
most Housing Services Officers to be the ‘middleman’, a place where the 
dictums from head office were re–interpreted, filtered or enforced. It also 
presented as a security–conscious workplace. 
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Prior to arriving at the regional office, the significance of locks, doors and codes 
was explained to me by a number of HSO’s at the local office. A large part of 
this security consciousness stems from the fact that the building is home to a 
number of service providers including housing, school nurses, child protection 
and a number of other agencies. Some of the regional office had previously 
worked in local offices and it was apparent that strong connections and 
linkages exist between the two locations. In their stories, HSO’s revealed a 
high level of trust in the regional office staff (laced with what Phil calls ‘a 
healthy degree of scepticism’) and front–line staff seem more likely to accept 
and comply with instructions and feedback from this office. I was told by HSO’s 
that I would be welcome at the regional office, even though the security might 
make me think otherwise! 
 
I spent a number of days at the regional office and, whilst there, I asked all the 
staff how they understood their role in the organisation. Most mentioned words 
like ‘mediator’ or ‘go–between’, but one person told me a great story about how 
they feel like they are a mythological fish that, when placed in the ear, 
translates all languages: 
 
Our job, on paper, is to act as a coordinator for projects and assist 
the local offices with operational issues.  Our unofficial role is 
translating.  Seen that film ‘The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy’? 
Well, we are the kind of like the Babel fish. So much stuff arrives 
here from head office, if it was all passed on, the staff would die.  
We sort it, filter it, translate it and make it digestible – both ways 
actually. (Interview: Location one/Regional office) 
 
An important and largely unrecognised component of the work of regional office 
is to sort, filter and translate the material that ‘cascades’ (an expression used 
by a senior manager in a presentation to local staff) from head office. At the 
completion of my fieldwork I was left with the perception that some staff felt that 
regional offices were a largely unrecognised and relatively underused resource 
which might be more effectively employed to assist HSO’s understand their 
complex and changing role and to assist staff like Sophia with ‘fixing broken 
lives’. One head office manager told me that regional offices were perhaps ‘a 
little bit invisible and their role was not well understood’ and, as a result, 
seemed to be unrecognised as a potent agent for implementing organisational 
change.   
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It would seem that some of the organisational problems described in the 
Review might be due in part to highly localised and inconsistent work 
procedures, the under–utilisation of the resources and skills of regional offices 
and the perception that HSO’s are subject to fickle and often changing head 
office priorities.  This results in two smaller problems. Firstly, HSO’s told me 
that they ‘never get time to develop a decent understanding of what services 
are most important’ and, secondly, they don’t get ‘left alone long enough to 
provide them!’ (Field Note: Location One) 
Problems with communication 
My research points to two persistent problems with the Office of Housing’s 
organisational communication. The first is problems with ‘communication with 
tenants’ and the second is problems with ‘communication with/by staff’. In order 
to capture, represent and analyse the workers’ stories about communication, I 
used a number of ethnographic devices to describe in detail how these 
communication problems manifested in the work of housing staff. I collected 
artefacts (for example, memos, posters etc.), exemplars (copies of rent arrears 
mail–merge letters) and case studies that I observed or were disclosed in 
interviews. 
 
As is the case with many of the housing problems in this chapter, 
communication with tenants was also not a recent problem, nor was it 
restricted to any particular operational activity. In 1989, the arrears panel found 
that ‘there are currently deficiencies in style, content and format, all of which 
constrain the capacity to achieve the intended purpose of the communication’ 
(Ministry of Housing, 1989). Some fifteen years later, the Auditor General found 
that the Office of Housing ‘needs to develop a communication strategy to plan, 
deliver and evaluate its communications with tenants’ (Victorian Auditor 
General, 2004., Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 2003). Logic would suggest 
that the problems with communication concern only the most complex and 
difficult cases, but, in reality, I found that it was the transactional and mundane 
communication that caused most problems for HSO’s.   
 
As the source of thousands of items of communication per year, the Office of 
Housing still relies heavily on a conventional communication tools, especially 
letters. Below is an account of how one of these letters was received and 
understood: 
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Case Study: ‘The letter’. 
 
Early in the fieldwork, I spent some time sitting in the waiting area, 
occasionally talking with tenants, but mostly waiting in silence, 
staring at the television that was on. On this occasion, a Somali 
family arrived at the counter. Both the parents and the children were 
immaculately dressed and seemed to be in high spirits. The father 
was carrying a letter.  It became obvious that their English was very 
basic. The father seemed to be the family spokesman and after a 
few minutes and some negotiation it became apparent that the letter 
he was holding was assumed to be a letter of offer: a house! 
 
The staff member at the counter asked to see this letter, and after a 
few moments of considered silence, set about explaining that this 
letter was a ‘merge’ letter – one of many centrally generated 
‘update’ letters that ensure that the department has up–to–date 
family contact details. 
 
The response of the family was palpable – the older daughter began 
to weep, their mother gazed out the window as the father carefully 
re–folded the letter and placed it back in the envelope.  They left the 
office. When I went out for lunch, a different staff member was 
explaining the same letter to a different ‘waiting list dweller’. (Field 
Note: Location one)  
 
I was reminded of this occurrence when, a few weeks later, I observed Sophia 
at the front counter talking to a clearly disturbed and aggravated tenant who 
was waving her copy of a rent review letter. Later in the day, I leant over the 
low wall of Sophia’s’ cubicle and asked her what this was all about. I asked her, 
why had a simple letter created so much ‘agro’? 
 
Fuck, fuck, fuck. It’s the giants at head office again, deciding that we 
can’t possibility be doing our jobs properly, so they stir the pot. Let’s 
post out a few thousand letters and not tell anyone, that’s a good 
idea!  Don’t write that down. [She was not serious, so I did make 
notes] I’ll tell you about that particular tenant. We [myself an one 
other HSO] had been working with her for months, she’s had a shit 
time, splits up with violent husband and then allows violent boyfriend 
to move in, drugs, the kids in and out of care and her rent was so 
behind she didn’t know how to start. Slowly we have got her on a 
payment plan, we’ve tricked the MCC into fixing her place up a bit 
and she’s’ off the gear and on to a methadone program of sorts. 
She has really basic literacy and thought that the rental rebate 
review letter was us “coming after her”, even though she was really 
trying. In the end, I ripped the letter up in front of her, she finally 
laughed and calmed down. (Field Note: Location one) 
 
These two related ‘mail out’ stories encapsulate a number of key problems I 
observed with the way the ‘Office of Housing’ communicates with its tenants. 
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Firstly, I noted frequent interactions where reception staff were unaware of a 
particular correspondence to tenant’s from central/regional office, and their first 
task was to borrow the tenants’ letter and read it themselves. The second 
problem was more complex. I noted (and HSO’s told me) that a number of 
tenants (and applicants) experienced some difficulty in understanding and de–
coding the message or directions in official correspondence. In the 1990 report 
‘House Rules’, Kent and Hamilton signal that this is a communication problem 
for most state housing authorities ‘Housing staff indicate that clients often 
misunderstand correspondence and details of eligibility, wait time and rent 
assistance’ (Kent and Hamilton, 1990.  pg 78). 
 
The HSO’s in this study told me that this miscommunication occurs for a 
number of reasons. For some, English is a second (or third) language, tenants 
might have very basic literacy, failing vision or, in one case, receive three 
slightly different letters pertaining to the same matter, all with vaguely different 
messages. It appears that the volume and complexity of Office of Housing 
correspondence produces a raft of problems of its own and I wondered if this 
might be another of those enduring and persistent problems. I called Doug, the 
retired housing manager, and asked about his years of experience with letters 
to tenants: 
 
My god, you have made my day, I never have to deal with that 
again! [Doug, retired for some time, had managed to forget about 
department letters.] We used to bring this up with central all the 
time; they would produce this absolute tripe! Poorly written, rude 
and abrasive stuff and post it to every bugger in the state and tell no 
one at the local level. Pleased to hear that hasn’t changed. I 
remember having a good week, rents on target, staff happy, getting 
ahead with records and just being pro–active, and central would 
send out a letter and bang! By Wednesday arvo, the front counter is 
being thumped and HSO’s have tearful nannas on the phone and 
single mums outraged that we had claimed they had shacked up! 
Occasionally you would get a switched–on monkey at central who 
would at least have the courtesy to tell the regional managers about 
a major mail out. They just had no idea of the busy, nasty, non–
productive work these letters could generate. (Interview: Retired 
housing Wowker) 
 
Doug told me that he disliked centrally generated mail outs for two reasons. 
Firstly, they often created unproductive transactional work at the front counter 
and, interestingly, he recalled that, on the whole, they are poorly worded and 
rarely told the tenants what action (if any) they needed to take.  Aware of the 
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comments of Doug and Sophia, I asked Henry at head office what his thoughts 
were about the way the Office of Housing communicates with tenants, and in 
particular, did he think that the staff attitudes and perceptions about the value 
of centrally generated communications might vary across the organisation? His 
answer displayed a clear insight into some of the ‘downstream’ problems with 
mass mail–outs: 
 
I can guess what the HSO’s have told you about this matter. You 
will have noticed that they aren’t exactly shrinking violets when it 
comes to getting their opinions across. [laughs] Mail outs aren’t 
perfect, they are a blunt tool, we know that. This office is getting 
much better at the way we manage mail outs – it used to be that the 
rebate team would do a mail out, the minister might do a newsletter 
and the MCC mailed out about, say, hot water units or such. All in 
one week and all the messages got lost. Not so much of this 
happens anymore. I know that letters flush people out – but I think 
this is a good thing. Letters get tenants on the phone to their local 
office and in at the counters talking with staff.  Any [his emphasis] 
interaction with tenants is a good thing, so these letters actually 
make the HSO’s do their jobs better. This is not likely to be a 
popular view, but it is good customer service’. (Interview: Location 
three) 
 
Henry’s statement ‘Any interaction with tenants is a good thing’ caught my 
attention because it seems to contradict the comments made by both Doug and 
Sophia about how ‘actions at head office can inadvertently produce 
unproductive transactional work’ and ‘result in interactions that put at risk 
already precarious relationships with tenants’ (Chalkley, 2005d). In their 
stories, HSO’s described how their job required them to carefully manage 
fragile relationships with increasingly ‘unstable’ and disadvantaged tenants. 
Staff used expressions such as ‘keeping a lid on things’ and ‘staying afloat’ to 
describe this ‘careful management’ and most felt that indiscriminate letters 
‘parachuting down’ from head office resulted in unnecessary and sometimes 
volatile disruptions to their already hectic work. 
  
When Doug told me that ‘Occasionally you would get a switched–on monkey at 
central who would as least have the courtesy to tell the regional managers 
about a major mail out. They just had no idea of the busy, nasty, non–
productive work these letters could generate’, he touched on the second 
communication problem. Issues with communication with and by staff. One of 
my earliest observations concerned the adversarial nature of communication 
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between head and local office. After a few weeks at field site one, I noted the 
following: 
 
19th August 2004:  
 
What becomes immediately apparent (even after visiting only three 
local offices) is the entrenched adversarial relationship of head 
office vs. local office. In their stories, staff told me that ‘head office 
doesn’t listen to what we say’ and that they ‘mostly take the orders 
from head office with a grain of salt’. Interestingly, staff frequently 
talk about communication from head office as ‘orders’, ‘directives’, 
‘ministerials’ and ‘more regulation’. I suspect that a general 
consensus amongst the staff is to contest head office 
communication and treat with some scepticism the directives that 
emanate from ‘management’. I noticed that the newer staff often 
approach older, long–serving staff to enquire if a particular memo is 
‘important and worth taking notice of’.  (Field Note: Location one) 
 
The final element in problems with organisational communication can be found 
in the HSO’s question ‘is this memo important and worth taking notice of’? The 
housing workers in this study told me that they were exposed to an 
overwhelming volume of information. Each and every–day they dealt with 
phone calls, postings on Knowledge Net (the online information system), policy 
manuals, updates to procedure, information on white boards, tenant files, 
notification of legislative changes, Centrelink payment variations, VTAC 
hearing updates, emails and many other communications. Not surprisingly, as 
a coping mechanism, staff selectively processed the information communicated 
to them, using a process communication theorists call ‘levelling’, a practice by 
which we ignore or drop out information in an effort to manage information 
overload (Marsen, 2006).  Over the years Phil had become quite skilled at 
‘levelling’: 
 
I smile when I see the new staff trying to get their heads around all 
the material they have to cover. I usually advise them that the best 
place to start is the tenant files, the thickest first. [‘The thicker the 
file, the more problematic the tenant’ is a loose rule of thumb.] 
Ignore the piles of crap that comes from head office and get to know 
your patch.  I then tell them to look at the policy manuals, see the 
pages with tear drops and coffee stains?  Read them first’. 
(Interview: Location one) 
 
When I quizzed the staff at head office about the volume of information 
produced, distributed and processed, most shared the HSO’s views on the 
matter. Sara was very blunt: 
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The OoH expects far too much of people, especially HSO’s. They 
have to understand Centrelink payments, the child protection Act, 
VTAC rules, OoH rules and so many others I can’t even remember 
them myself.  It’s too much, they should, most importantly, know 
their tenants. Especially those most at risk.  They just can’t and the 
patch model doesn’t help them here at all.  “All things to all people” 
and what actually happens is HSO’s crumble under the weight of 
the paperwork, admin and constant updates.  Don’t get me started 
on how much paperwork the minister and the director can produce 
and the busy, meaningless work that is fashioned from this! 
(Interview: Location three) 
 
Irrespective of their status, position or office location, the majority of staff 
agreed that they were expected to ‘meaningfully respond’ to an ‘unrealistic and 
unreasonable’ volume of communication. This consensus of opinion 
evaporated when I asked them to discuss the remedies proposed to fix these 
communication problems. The majority of staff at head office told me that 
regular and detailed communication was an important part of their job. 
However, most HSO’s told me that they found these communications intrusive, 
excessively frequent and sometimes verbose. 
 
A separate, but related communication problem has been the delayed 
implementation of the new housing management software (HIIP) and the 
parallel decline of the existing (ISIP) package. In their stories, HSO’s told me 
about their frustrations in working with a computer package that was out–dated, 
slow and effectively abandoned with the ‘promise of something new’. Most 
long–serving staff told me that they knew of the HIIP project as far back as 
2001/2 (one showed me a glossy brochure announcing HIIPs arriving soon at 
‘your housing office’) and most agreed that ISIPs functional and technical 
capacities were no longer adequate (and had not been for some time).  
 
The final report of the HOR states that HIIP was needed because: 
 
The new system will introduce improved technology to automate 
functions and draw together tenancy and property transactions in a 
more cohesive way, to improve decision–making, streamline 
administration and allow staff to help tenants more quickly. (Office of 
Housing, 2004) 
 
By the time I had finished my research, the HIIP software roll–out had yet to be 
fully implemented and HSO’s continued to work with the out–dated and 
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unreliable ISIP, some new and quickly commissioned software ‘fixes’ and an 
‘awful lot of phone calls to the help line and the Good Practice Unit’. (As an 
aside, this unit was initially called the ‘Best Practice Unit’, but their title was 
changed shortly before my head office placement). This ‘downgrading’ was a 
source of some amusement to HSOs. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described in detail the complex construction of issues that add 
up to ‘problems with organisation’. This construction is a product of the 
organisation’s (that is, its members’) reaction to its problems with tenants, 
funding and assets.   
 
The problems of ‘management’ were also problems with ‘leadership’. I found 
that housing staff perceived the management and leadership of the Office of 
Housing in a number of ways. Most talked about their concerns with the 
organisational and geographic isolation of the ‘housing leader’ and the ‘housing 
practitioner’.  A significant number of head office staff told me about their 
concerns about the unsuitable and inevitable appointment of policy makers to 
leadership positions and how the profound ‘busy–ness’ of operational work 
prevented people from developing and embracing the ‘leadership style’ needed 
to enable the successful implementation of the Review.  
 
The problem of ‘teams’ was essentially an issue with the distribution and 
recognition of housing work. Under the ‘patch model’ staff worked in teams, but 
not in any meaningful way. The daily work of HSO’s was highly individualised 
and they, by and large, were being left alone to manage an increasingly large 
and complex patch.  In their stories, most staff understood that the ‘ever–
enlarging patch’ model was not sustainable, but front–line staff were nervous 
about how the introduction of highly specialised, function–based teams might 
diminish the personal reward that comes from success in a challenging and 
energising job. 
 
The problem of ‘staffing’ was by far the most significant and entangled problem. 
I found that the OoH has long struggled to balance the conflicting aims of 
improving the skills and qualifications of staff in order to ‘professionalise’ 
housing work, whilst recruiting, training and retaining an adequate number of 
staff to cover the workloads.   The Office of Housing faced a number of 
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problems with staffing. ‘Good’ staff were hard to attract, the training of staff was 
expensive and time–consuming, and retaining skilled and competent staff was 
an ongoing challenge for local office managers. Most problematic of all was the 
discovery that most people who work for the Office of Housing do so because 
they have to, not because they want to. 
 
One of the other key findings of this research was the not so surprising 
discovery that housing workers struggle to reconcile the frequently conflicting 
role of ‘landlord’ and ‘welfare worker’. Staff told me about how they struggled to 
‘sustain tenancies whilst not going soft on arrears’ (Office of Housing, 2004), 
how they were expected to respond to complaints about anti–social behaviour 
in meaningful, but non–punitive ways and how they ‘slap one hand while 
holding the other’. 
 
Communication was also a significant problem. Like many large bureaucracies, 
the daily work of staff at the Office of Housing required them to communicate 
with tenants, staff, other agencies, non–government organisations and 
numerous other groups and individuals. The Office of Housing had mixed 
success with the effectiveness of its communication.  In their stories, staff 
described the consequences of ambiguous, centrally produced letters, they told 
me about the frustration of managing, decoding and dismissing a significant 
volume of information and I discovered that the way housing managers 
understand and value communication was quite different to the understandings 
and values of the housing worker. 
 
The following chapter is the conclusion and it’s here that the reader comes to 
fully understand how the work of staff in the Victorian Office of Housing has 
changed as a consequence of the shift from the provision of ‘public housing’ in 
the post–WWII period to the provision of ‘welfare housing’ from the early 
1980s. 
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Chapter Eight  
Conclusion  
 
This thesis has sought to understand the changing nature of work done by staff 
providing public housing to low–income tenants in the Victorian Office of 
Housing.  It responded to the question ‘How has the work of staff in the 
Victorian Office of Housing changed as a consequence of the shift from the 
provision of “public housing” in the post–WWII period to the provision of 
“welfare housing” from the early 1980s?’  
 
In this final chapter, I will summarise my answer to this question by explaining 
how housing services officers and housing managers worked to construct and 
understand ‘wicked housing problems’, how they experienced the reality of 
daily work with tenants who are living with complex and multiple needs and 
how workers and managers perceive the remedies proposed to solve these 
‘wicked problems’. In this final chapter, I will consider how the problems (and 
their remedies) described by the Housing Office Review shaped and influenced 
what it means to work in an organisation that has moved from providing 
housing for the working poor (‘public housing’) to the provision of housing for 
the most marginalised and precarious members of society (‘welfare housing’). 
 
In this conclusion, I will describe how housing workers use discretion in 
decision–making, how they manage work–related stress and allocate scarce 
resources through the selective interpretation of policy. I will describe how, for 
close to a century, workers have used narrative to understand their work and, 
in turn, structure the organisation. These final pages are a description of how 
the problems identified by the Housing Office Review (and experienced by the 
modern–day housing worker) are a contemporary manifestation of ‘age old 
public housing issues’. This conclusion describes and explains how housing 
staff have long used narrative to make sense of their often difficult work and 
ultimately, how they used these experiences and understandings to inform and 
influence the major process of operational policy change associated with the 
shift from ‘public’ housing to ‘welfare’ housing. 
 
This research provides the reader with a ‘thick description’ (Van Maanen, 1988) 
of the demands, stresses, and challenges facing a cohort of staff in a complex, 
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socially constructed bureaucracy that is undergoing significant (and 
continuous) organisational change. Using a social construction framework, I 
have worked to make ‘visible’ the ‘invisible’, thus enabling the reader to 
comprehend the potency of discourse of staff who work with difficult tenants 
drawing on limited and declining resources and in a context of constant 
organisational change.   
 
My use of the word ‘sedimentation’, a geological metaphor, assists in 
understanding how the ‘new’ problems identified by the Housing Office Review 
can be understood as another layer in the sediment of entrenched and 
persistent housing problems. The exploration of this discursive sediment 
uncovered four key persistent themes in staff narratives and in the many formal 
reviews of the HCV and more recently the Office of Housing.  These were: the 
‘problems with tenants’ found in the changing profile of tenants and staff 
responses; the ‘problem of rent’ centring on setting and collecting rents from 
low–income tenants; the ‘problem of housing standards and assets’ focusing 
on housing quality, maintenance and the tenant use of properties; the 
‘problems with the organisation’ found in the constant searching for the best 
ways of defining roles, leading and communicating within a large and 
geographically distributed organisation.  
  
A key finding was that staff, as they sought to ‘solve’ these problems, had to 
decide if they were ‘managers of public housing’ or ‘managers in public 
housing’. Staff who identified as managers ‘of’ public housing often had a 
‘pedigree’; they had worked as an HSO, and as result, remembered and 
understood the complexity of work at the frontline and ‘managed’ with this in 
mind. People who saw themselves as managers ‘in’ public housing often came 
from outside the organisation and were more concerned with the overall 
‘system’ of housing.  I discovered that front–line staff see themselves more as 
‘managers of public housing’, accountable for the day–to–day allocation of 
scarce resources, the supervision of their patch and intervention in and 
management of anti–social activities. On the other hand, managers at head 
office saw their role differently.  They were ‘managers in public housing’ 
responsible for high level decision making, objectively prioritising resource 
allocation at the ‘organisation–wide’ level and coordinating regions rather than 
neighbourhoods. As managers ‘in’ public housing, they only become involved 
in operational matters when there is a risk of an untoward precedent being set 
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and unwanted media attention. For some senior managers, it was not the 
‘content’ of what was to be managed, but the skill of managing itself that was 
most important.  
 
In between the head office and the local office, the staff at regional office 
‘translated’ and ‘mediated’ between head and local offices. These staff had 
developed the skill of being able to adroitly ‘toggle’ between ‘management of 
public housing’ and ‘management in public housing’. Local office staff told me 
that ‘they respected and trusted the regional office’ and staff at head office told 
me that ‘they had a lot of time for the staff working in regional offices, but were 
a little unsure of their role’. The answer, coming from the regional office staff, 
was greater recognition of their skills in moving between head and local offices.   
Their proposition was that they could do more to help managers and housing 
workers to resolve aspects of the ‘wicked problems’.   
 
Recognising the local–regional–head office distinctions became important 
when I sought to understand what happened to the early implementation of the 
HoR. A small number of participants were openly hostile and claimed that they 
intend to actively work to undermine its implementation. But, on the whole, 
most front–line workers were ambivalent about the Review, they had received 
a ‘flurry’ of initial information and what they called ‘PR spin’ about the Review, 
but little detail or concrete information.  Longer serving staff were ‘not phased’ 
because they had ‘seen it all before’ and the younger/newer staff were keen 
and interested, but, by the end of my research, told me that they had grown 
bored and disillusioned with the slowness of implementation, especially the 
absence of the revolutionary software they had been ‘promised’. Early in my 
fieldwork it became apparent that the implementation of the recommendations 
of the Housing Office Review Final Report would be not be easy.   
 
Nevertheless, team leaders, supervisors and local managers told me that 
something had to change. Most front–line staff told me that their work had 
become too hard, the workload to big and the ‘needs of tenants seemed to 
increase with every month that goes by’. Head office managers had different 
expectations for the Housing Office Review.  Most believed that it should not 
only produce a new approach ‘for managing difficult tenants’, but a ‘system–
wide response’, reforming and overhauling the housing system more generally. 
Managers believed that the nature of work for HSO’s had changed, tenants had 
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changed and the management of public housing needed to change as well. 
They saw the Review as an opportunity to ‘reinvigorate the housing system’, 
‘re–align resource allocation’ and to move staff towards a ‘culture of customer 
service’.  
 
These differing perspectives about ‘the role of the Review’ can be seen as a 
‘fissure of understanding’ in the organisation. HSO’s expressed a desire for 
reform that helps them cope with the ‘ragged reality’ of working with tenants 
‘experiencing complex and multiple needs’ whilst senior managers wanted 
reform that reduced the impact of these tenants on the housing system. 
 
This ‘fissure of understanding’ in the organisation was further explored 
examining four persistent themes in staff narratives about the ‘problems with 
tenants’, ‘problems with rent’, ‘problems with housing standards and assets’ 
and ‘problems with the organisation’.  
 
Staff in the Office of Housing had a number of problems with tenants that had 
an impact on both individual staff and the housing system. I found that HSO’s 
worked to reduce the impact of these problem tenants on them and their 
‘patch’.  They did this because the problems with tenants have a direct affect 
on their morale, job satisfaction, work loads and meeting their key performance 
indicators. In their stories, housing workers described how they felt powerless 
in dealing with problem tenants.  They understood that the problems with 
tenants were connected to problems with other systems such as social 
security, child protection, community safety and criminal justice.  Front–line 
staff recognised that they faced a problem. They understood the importance of 
connections between systems but had little capacity to establish the 
connections with agencies resourced to assist. The ‘joined–up government’ 
promoted by the Review was beyond them. 
 
Managers were more interested in managing and reducing the impact of these 
‘problem tenants’ on the housing system in general. They did this because their 
KPIs measured how effectively they administer the broader organisation of 
state housing. They promoted ‘joined up’ government and ‘interagency 
cooperation’ as an essential part of the remedy to the problems with tenants. 
Most believed that an organisational reform this significant will require ‘firm 
direction’ and a ‘complete overhaul’ of the way by which front–line teams are 
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structured and, eventually, how they go about working with tenants with 
‘complex and multiple’ needs. 
 
In addition to the problems with tenants, the organisation has a number of 
problems with ‘rent’. Staff from across the organisation told me that Office of 
Housing is ‘cash strapped’ because of declining income due to the reduction in 
commonwealth funding and the organisation’s reliance on rental income from 
tenants who themselves rely on very low incomes, primarily in the form of 
social security benefits. As a result of the enduring and persistent nature of 
these ‘wicked’ problems, members of the organisation told me about a number 
of strategies and patterns of action they had developed to address and resolve 
the problems with rent. I found that rental policy and procedure, no matter how 
well constructed, has always been reinterpreted and selectively applied by the 
front–line worker responsible for policy implementation and enforcement. 
Managers understood that sometimes staff might use policy and procedure to 
produce an immediate but short–term solution to problems with rent; they were 
also aware that the rental rebate scheme was complex and difficult to 
administer and managers were cognisant of the fact that ‘actioning’ the rental 
arrears of people on very low incomes was a ‘horrible’ component of the job. 
These managers believe that the reforms proposed in the Review will go some 
way to resolving these problems. They told me that the new, simplified and 
flexible rebate system will assist staff to generate accurate and enduring rates, 
the introduction of a new direct debit system will reduce arrears, and the new 
function–based team structure will free staff up to home visit and be ‘more 
proactive in the pursuit of arrears’.  
 
A related finding of this research was the not so surprising discovery that 
housing workers struggle to reconcile the frequently conflicting role of ‘landlord’ 
and ‘welfare worker’. Staff told me about how they struggled to ‘sustain 
tenancies whilst not going soft on arrears’ (Office of Housing, 2004), how they 
were expected to respond to complaints about anti–social behaviour in 
meaningful, but non–punitive ways and how they ‘slap one hand while holding 
the other’. The role of the HSO’s is often conflicted, and so, in turn, are they. 
 
Related to these problems with rent are the ‘wicked problems’ with assets, 
standards and waiting lists. The shortfall in funding has resulted in dwellings 
that are old, ‘tired’ and poorly maintained; ever–expanding patch size means 
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that the condition of properties was poorly understood by staff and it was widely 
acknowledged that the supply of public housing is never going to be adequate 
to meet present, let alone future demand. As a result, the ‘waiting list’ featured 
large in most interviews. But, aging, unsuitable and insufficient properties are 
not the only ‘asset and finding’ problem for the Office of Housing. I found that 
the HSO’s in this study agreed with and understood the need for improved 
housing standards, but, almost without exception, they also believed that on 
some occasions these standards should not apply. Managers told me that 
‘common sense’ should play a role in the resolution of problems with assets. 
Most senior managers told me that the ‘arranged marriage’ of compliance, 
policy, procedure and common sense (promoted by the Review) is sure to be a 
rocky one. 
 
I discovered that housing workers can ‘do their job’ without really 
understanding the condition of the properties or the people in their patch. As a 
result, I found that they need to develop only a rudimentary understanding of 
their patch. They do this because most ‘patches’ have become geographically 
too large to ‘get to know and understand’; a problem compounded by the fact 
that patch allocation was subject to constant change. I discovered too that the 
long absence of a competent and accurate housing management software 
system has resulted in staff in the local office developing sophisticated, 
localised and often informal social networks to store and disseminate data 
about the condition of each patch. After some twelve months of fieldwork I 
found the problems with assets, standards and waiting lists to be deeply 
ingrained into the organisational fabric of the local office.  Managers told me 
that the number of informal and unsanctioned procedures developed by staff to 
solve these problems is a significant impediment to the success of the Review. 
They envisage that these impediments will be resolved by reforms to 
operational policy and procedure, the introduction of new property 
management software, a centralised call centre for maintenance and a new 
database of the age, status and condition of all properties.  
 
I found that the problems of ‘management’ were also understood to be 
problems with ‘leadership’. Most HSO’s told me about their unease with the 
organisational and geographic distance between the ‘housing leader’ and the 
‘housing practitioner’.  A significant number of head office staff told me about 
their concerns with the appointment of ‘outsider’ policy makers to leadership 
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positions and how the profound ‘busy–ness’ of operational work prevented 
people from developing and embracing the ‘leadership style’ needed to enable 
the successful implementation of the Review. A number of middle level 
managers told me that they were too busy to develop the ‘leadership skills’ they 
want and need to lead their teams. 
 
The Office of Housing’s problems with its teams were mostly problems with the 
distribution and recognition of housing work. Under the old ‘patch model’ staff 
worked in teams, but not in any meaningful way. The daily work of HSO’s was 
highly individualised and they, by and large, were being left alone to manage 
an increasingly large and complex patch.  In their stories, most staff understood 
that the ‘ever–enlarging patch’ model was not sustainable, but front–line staff 
were nervous about how the introduction of highly specialised, function–based 
teams might diminish the personal reward that comes from success in a 
challenging and energising job. In all but one interview with HSO’s, the word 
‘diverse’ (or similar) was used to describe the best part of their job. Most front–
line staff believed that the new team structure proposed by the Housing Office 
Review was a serious threat to this diversity. Managers agreed. They told me 
that work for the contemporary housing worker seemed impossibly vast, large 
patches, with poorly functioning teams, reactive leadership, very basic training 
and job descriptions that no longer capture the complexity of their work. 
Managers understood that these problems would be addressed by the 
introduction of centralised recruitment, better and more training and the 
realignment of work following the introduction of function–based teams. 
 
These problems with ‘staffing’ were the most significant and entangled 
problems I encountered. I found that the Office of Housing had long struggled 
to balance the conflicting aims of improving the skills and qualifications of staff 
in order to ‘professionalise’ housing work, and yet recruit, train and retain an 
adequate number of staff skilled enough to do the work.  I discovered that the 
Office of Housing has always had problems with staffing. ‘Good’ workers have 
always been hard to attract, training of staff has always been expensive and 
time–consuming and retaining skilled and competent staff was an ongoing 
challenge for local office managers. Most problematic of all was the discovery 
that most people who work for the Office of Housing do so because they have 
to, not because they want to. Most of the front–line staff in this study were 
‘accidental HSO’s’. The majority of managers were the same. 
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Communication was also a significant problem. Like many large bureaucracies, 
the daily work of staff at the Office of Housing required them to communicate 
with tenants, staff, other agencies, non–government organisations and 
numerous other groups and individuals. The Office of Housing had mixed 
success with the effectiveness of its communication.  In their stories, HSO’s 
described the consequences of ambiguous, centrally produced letters; they told 
me of the frustration of managing, decoding and dismissing a significant 
volume of information and I discovered that the way housing managers 
understand and value communication was quite different to the understandings 
and values of the housing worker. I discovered that, depending on your role in 
the organisation, there is either ‘too much’ communication, or ‘not enough’. 
Never in–between. Organisational communication was also a significant 
contributor to the ‘problems with tenants’. I discovered that the absence of a 
shared context in which local and head office staff might discuss their housing 
problems meant that finding an agreed discursive position around what to do 
about these problems is not easy. I found that the communication skills of the 
regional office are misunderstood and under–used by both local and head 
office and, as a result, front–line workers ‘feel like’ head office simply mandate 
compliance and head office staff perceive the role of the HSO’s to be more 
about resistance than compliance. 
 
Over a period of some twelve months, housing staff told me stories about how 
they felt increasingly pressured (and yet powerless) to respond to issues of 
social isolation, poverty, mental illness, ‘anti–social’ behaviour, drug/alcohol 
abuse and family violence. Managers told me of how they feel pressured to 
reform and modernise an enormous, under–funded, ‘ancient’ government 
department that serves some of the most marginalised and needy members of 
society. As an informed outsider I was privy to a number of secret stories. I was 
told of staff delivering ‘care parcels’ purchased with their own money, I heard 
stories of ‘repair by stealth’ and ‘carpet by VCAT’ and staff told me many ‘war 
stories’ to illustrate ‘how little money is available and bad some tenants are’. 
The use of social construction as a theoretical framework proved to be a sound 
decision, this approach provided me with a frame around which to organise and 
understand these stories and observations. 
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My research provides an insight into the work world of the Office of Housing. I 
have exposed how staff applied discretion to policy and procedure, how 
managers ensured compliance and performance and, generally, how housing 
staff went about their daily work. This research described workers managing 
conflicting objectives, working productively with fluctuating staffing levels and 
navigating complex workplace relationships. I have explained in some detail 
how individual staff experienced and understood the many phases of 
organisational change, and how they coped with numerous restructures, what 
they think about shifting key performance indicators, how they respond to new 
protocols like tenant complaints.  This research has produced a ‘thick 
description’ of what it’s like to do a stressful job in an organisation undergoing 
reform and restructure. Workers told me their personal stories. They told me of 
their concerns with goal setting, their worries about team reorganisation, how 
they were anxious about the quality of their leadership; they complained about 
delegation and, most of important of all, they encouraged me to gather all this 
together into a grand narrative about ‘what it’s like to be a welfare housing 
worker’. 
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